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Abstract 
 
In this research, I set out to understand more about how society influences the 
course of science and technological development. Specifically, I wanted to know 
whether the UK’s 10 year-long experience with public dialogue has brought science 
policy closer to the values of the public. Using a computer assisted text analysis 
technique, I have looked at the substance of the discussions that take place within 
these dialogue events and compared them to analogous expert and policy 
discussions, not only to understand how these discussions have impacted on policy, 
but also to shed light on how we as a society learn to live with technoscientific 
developments and on how expertise and evidence is understood, valued and used 
in policy. 
 
I have found that public dialogue has had little effect on policy for three reasons: 
Firstly, the public in these debates describe a sociotechnical imaginary of science 
that is more complicated, less manageable and therefore more difficult to fit into 
policymaking structures and objectives than the imaginary described by scientific 
experts; Secondly, since they do not come from ‘experts’, the outputs of public 
dialogue are not considered to be appropriate sources of evidence by policymakers; 
Thirdly, public dialogue activities take place outside the networks from which UK 
policymakers draw advice.  
 
The outputs of public dialogues do however show that the activities generate some 
interesting discussions and that the public do have contributions to make to public 
policy around science and technologies. I conclude that to increase impact, thought 
needs to be given to the type of decisions that dialogues seek to influence, to 
engage policymakers in discussions about the sociotechnical imaginaries that are 
shaping their perceptions of policy and the public, and to ways in which public 
dialogue can be brought into policymaking networks and coalitions. 
 
 5 
 
Table	  of	  Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction 8 
Chapter 2: Literature Review – Background and what we know so far. 13 
Background: Where did the mood for dialogue come from? 13 
What do we know about the impact of dialogue already? 22 
Impact appears to be limited – and focused on benefits of participation 23 
Why this lack of impact? 24 
Why might policymaking institutions lack reflexivity and why would this exclude 
alternative viewpoints? 26 
Problems resulting from dialogue 30 
Chapter 3: Methodology 31 
Conceptual Framework 32 
Approach 35 
Analysis of discourses in public, expert and policy documents 36 
From discourses to sociotechnical imaginaries 53 
Semi-structured interviews 54 
Chapter 4: Results – Analysis of Public and Expert documents 57 
A. Public dialogue reports (Corpus A) 58 
Corpus A Initial interpretation: Class descriptions 62 
Summary of key features of public discourses 73 
B. Analysis of expert documents (Corpus B) 80 
Corpus B Initial interpretation: Class descriptions 84 
Summary of key features of expert discourses 95 
C. From Discourses to Sociotechnical Imaginaries 99 
Public sociotechnical imaginary 102 
Expert Sociotechnical Imaginary 108 
Chapter 5 – Analysis of policy documents 117 
Results of Iramuteq analysis: Corpus C 117 
Initial Interpretation: Class descriptions 122 
Summary of key themes emerging from policy discourses (Corpus C) 136 
From Discourses to Sociotechnical Imaginaries 138 
 6 
Chapter 6: Comparison of public, expert and policy sociotechnical 
imaginaries 142 
Comparing Sociotechnical Imaginaries 143 
What does this tell us about the impact of public dialogue? 146 
Interviews with policymakers 150 
Hypothesis 1 – Public dialogue has had some, but limited impact on policy. 150 
Possible explanations for this limited impact 164 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of public dialogue is limited because of differences 
between elite and public sociotechnical imaginaries 164 
Hypothesis 3: ‘Expert’ sources valued in policymaking – and public dialogue is 
not seen as a source of expertise. 173 
Models of policymaking 186 
Chapter 7- Discussion and Conclusions 193 
1. Dialogue offers insight into public perceptions 194 
a. Contingent optimism 195 
b. Clusters around technologies 196 
c. Risks and ethical concerns inherent to technologies 199 
d. Focus on people 202 
e. Role of Nature 203 
f. Active role for government vs. industry 204 
2. Rhetorical problems within dialogue 205 
3. Little evidence that public discourse has influenced policy 207 
4. Reasons why public dialogue has had limited impact. 210 
a. Different visions for the future of science – competing sociotechnical 
imaginaries 211 
b. The problem of expertise 217 
c. Networks 223 
Conclusions for Public dialogue 226 
1. How can we involve the public in discussions about upstream issues? 227 
2. How can the policymaking process and machinery deal with social and 
ethical issues as anything but epiphenomena? 228 
3. How can public dialogue be better heard in policymaking? 228 
References 231 
Appendix 1: Documents included in the computer assisted text analysis 261 
 7 
Appendix 2: List of significant words for each class produced by IRAMUTEQ 
analysis of public dialogue documents 266 
Appendix 3: List of significant words for each class produced by IRAMUTEQ 
analysis of expert documents. 270 
Appendix 4: List of significant words for each class produced by IRAMUTEQ 
analysis of policy documents. 276 
Appendix 5: Question Framework for Semi-structured Interviews 280 
Appendix 6: Ethical Approval 282 
 8 
Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  
 
The past 20 years of science in public has been characterised by a move from 
deficit to dialogue. In the 1980s and 1990s, the ‘problem’ with the relationship 
between science and society was seen to be the public’s lack of understanding of 
science – people were mistrustful of science because they didn’t understand it; 
education and information was the answer – the so called deficit model (see for 
example The Royal Society, 1985). During the mid to late 1990s however, evidence 
emerged that the relationship between knowledge and attitudes was more 
complicated – that people’s attitudes to science and technology were case specific, 
shaped by their own values and world views and usually had more to do with the 
social and ethical issues surrounding the science, rather than the nuts and bolts of 
how the science worked (Evans & Durant, 1995b; Frewer, Howard, & Shepherd, 
1998; Slovic & Peters, 1998). At the same time, scientific controversies such as the 
BSE crisis, and public concerns around GM foods and the MMR vaccine, created a 
view that across the industrialised world, trust in science and in scientific institutions 
was declining (Durant 1999). The argument developed, documented most 
significantly in the 2000 House of Lords report ‘Science and Society’ (House of 
Lords Science and Technology Select 2000) but also presented in the literature by 
authors such as Wynne, Durant, Irwin and Grove-White (Durant, 1999; Grove-
White, 1997; Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Irwin, 2001; Wynne, 1998), that instead of 
expecting people to develop more positive attitudes to science by giving them more 
information about science (the deficit approach), dialogue between experts and lay 
people should be seen as a precondition to establishing socially acceptable policies 
that command the confidence of the general public. 
 
In 1999, John Durant described these two views of ‘PUSET’ (public understanding 
of science, engineering and technology) as almost parallel approaches. He argued 
that from the launch of the Public Understanding of Science journal in the early 
1990s, it was clear that no single paradigm governed research and practice in this 
field, not least because the PUSET community was “an uneasy coalition of many 
different professional and social interests” and that “these very different groups 
bring different aims and assumptions to the field.” (Durant 1999). Yet in the decades 
that have followed, what Durant termed the ‘democratisation’ approach to public 
understanding, which focuses on ways to enable public dialogue, has come to form 
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the basis of the UK's science in public activities and policies. In particular, since 
2004 the UK Government’s support for science and society activities has entirely 
focused on the ScienceWise programme, that aims to embed participatory 
techniques in government policymaking.  
 
But given the complexity of public relationships with different aspects of science, it 
might seem surprising that dialogue has come to be seen as the only, or at least the 
most powerful, approach for mediating science’s role with society. Furthermore, 
over the past 10 years numerous papers have described how there is very little 
credible evidence to show that public dialogue has had any impact (see for instance 
Abels, 2007; Emery, Mulder, & Frewer, 2014; Kurath & Gisler, 2009; Rowe & 
Frewer, 2000; Rowe, 2005; Wilsdon, 2005). 
 
Evaluations have tended to focus on the process of dialogue – whether particular 
groups have had a say, whether the discussions were framed by the participants 
and organisers, for instance. And the explanation often given for public dialogue 
activities’ lack of impact on policymaking is the lack of reflexivity of policymaking 
institutions and their dominance by technocratic viewpoints (see for instance 
Macnaghten & Chilvers 2014; Emery et al. 2014; Welsh & Wynne 2013). As a 
result, both the nature of public discussions and institutional responses to them 
appear to be under-theorised in the STS literature. Why are institutions unable to 
accommodate public responses? Is it to do with how the public see and discuss 
science, and if so, why is this view problematic? Does it have nothing to say to 
policy? Is it impractical? Or does it undermine wider policy objectives? Why would a 
technocratic viewpoint automatically exclude public perspectives? What does this 
say about reliable sources of expertise within our democratic structure and how the 
public do and could fit into that? 
 
There is however work in STS and in political science that can help further our 
understanding of the institutional response to the outputs of public dialogue and I 
seek to draw on this work in my research. For instance, Sheila Jasanoff’s work 
comparing processes of decision-making, forms of public reasoning and the 
imaginaries at the heart of these processes in different countries, sheds some 
valuable light on these questions. She describes how decision-making in different 
countries reflects different understandings of what counts as evidence and expertise 
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in a policy context (Brickman et al. 1985), and how different societies have different 
‘civic epistemologies’ or use different modes of public reasoning when making 
decisions involving science and technology, modes of reasoning that shape how 
policy issues are framed and processed by the state (Jasanoff 2005). More recently 
she has described how scientific and technological projects and policies are shaped 
by “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order” which she calls 
“sociotechnical imaginaries”. The machinery of science is produced by people, 
institutions and societies that have a particular view of how things should be and 
that these views – the sociotechnical imaginaries – serve both a normative and 
descriptive function, producing collective visions of good and attainable futures 
while at the same time shaping how we understand and regulate science and 
providing legitimacy for the role and power of science (Jasanoff & Kim 2009).  
 
Alongside this, understanding how public views are seen in terms of expertise and 
in comparison to ‘scientific’ expertise by policymakers will also help us understand 
further how institutions respond to the outputs of public dialogue. I will therefore also 
draw upon work in the STS literature around the nature of expertise, to try to shed 
light on why public perspectives might be difficult to accommodate in policymaking. 
In particular, I will look at my findings in light of discussions about the substantive or 
relational nature of expertise (for instance Irwin, 1995; Wynne, 1998 ) and of the 
different ‘types’ of expertise proposed by Collins and Evans (Collins & Evans 2009). 
Collins and Evans make the distinction between ‘ubiquitous’ expertise’ – abilities 
that people acquire as they navigate through life, such as fluency in natural 
language, moral sensibility and political discrimination – and ‘specialist expertise’, 
which is gained from the mastering of the tacit knowledge of a particular specialist 
field via a process of ‘enculturation’ – driving a car, or having expertise in a 
particular field of science, for example. They further divide the ‘specialist’ category 
into ‘contributory expertise’ which enables those who have acquired it to ‘contribute’ 
to the field of expertise; and interactional expertise, which is expertise in the 
language of a specialism (Collins & Evans 2004). 
 
For Collins and Evans, this distinction between ubiquitous and specialist expertise is 
important in the public dialogue context because of what they term ‘the problem of 
extension’ – “how far should technical expertise be taken to extend among the 
public?” (Collins & Evans, 2004 p4). They argue that since it is impossible for the 
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public to have expertise in every specialist technical domain, space needs to be 
preserved for expertises that are not the property of the general public (Collins & 
Evans, 2004 p4). Do policymakers make the same distinctions? 
 
Further to this, I will also draw on work in political science, especially that around 
the importance of groups in policymaking, to understand more about how the 
outputs of public dialogue activities are received within policymaking institutions and 
how they interact with other sources of evidence. Such research acknowledges that 
policy is not just shaped by institutions and individual policymakers, but that groups 
and associations (such as pressure groups or industry groups) help generate and 
shape the policy agenda, through lobbying or behind the scenes negotiations. In 
particular, I will consider how the outputs of public dialogue might fit into Rhodes’s 
conception of ‘policy networks’ (Rhodes 1997; Marsh & Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 
1990) which are based around shared resources and power dependency, and into 
Sabatier’s idea of an ‘Advocacy Coalition Framework’ (AFC) in which groups are 
organized around common agency and beliefs (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; 
Weible et al. 2011; Sabatier 2006; Sabatier 1998). Together, these understandings 
appear to build a complex picture of the institutions and process that the outputs of 
public dialogue seek to influence. I will therefore draw on this work to try to develop 
our understanding of why institutions appear to be unable to accommodate public 
responses. 
 
Beyond the focus on the process of dialogue and under-theorising institutional 
responses, I have argued previously (Smallman 2014) that research in this area has 
tended to focus on particular examples or case studies. As a result, larger over-
arching lessons have not been learned. Others (Irwin et al. 2012a; Stilgoe et al. 
2014) have criticised this case-study approach for putting limitations on the wider 
understanding of the ‘higher order game’ of which public dialogue is a part. By 
focusing research and discussions on the strengths and weaknesses of particular 
instances or technologies, the wider discussion of the shape of the world that 
science is creating and is created by, and the place of dialogue and the public within 
that, is restricted. 
 
In this thesis, I set out to move beyond evaluations of process and case studies, to 
understand more about what is said within these dialogue events and what that 
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means for policymakers and institutions being asked to act on the outputs of such 
events. Specifically, I will use a computer assisted text analysis technique to identify 
the underlying themes, discourses and sociotechnical imaginaries that can be 
detected in almost 10 years worth of public dialogues. By comparing these 
discourses and imaginaries to those identified in analogous expert documents, I 
characterise the public and expert discourses – and the key differences between the 
two and ask what these differences mean in terms of impact on policy – are public 
discourses and imaginaries reflected in policy?  
 
I set out to go beyond simply answering the question of impact. As I have described 
above, a common conclusion of the evaluations to date is that the impact of 
dialogue has been limited because policymaking institutions are insufficiently 
reflexive and therefore tend to close down issues that need to be opened up (Stirling 
2007; Chilvers 2012; Macnaghten & Chilvers 2014; Stilgoe et al. 2014; Wynne 
1993). In explanatory terms, this conclusion appears to be extremely limited. It 
leaves open the very big question of why this might be so – what is it about public 
institutions that make it so difficult for the outputs of public dialogue to be taken into 
account? I will explore this question further in interviews with policymakers and by 
drawing on the literature from political science, to understand more fully whether 
public dialogue has had an impact on policymaking in the last 10 years and if not, 
why not. 
 
In considering these questions, as well as shedding light on the practice of public 
dialogue, I hope to illuminate further some of the key questions for STS scholars – 
how does the public come to know and think about new and emerging science and 
technologies? How is expertise understood and valued by policymakers? How does 
the public influence the course of scientific and technological development and what 
is the role of public dialogue in bringing such co-production into the open?  
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Chapter	   2:	   Literature	   Review	   –	   Background	   and	   what	   we	  
know	  so	  far.	  
Background: Where did the mood for dialogue come from? 
 
The ‘new mood for dialogue’ for science in public activities in the UK, was heralded 
in by the 2000 House of Lords report (House of Lords Science and Technology 
Select 2000). Responding to a perceived public crisis in confidence in the 
government’s use of science following BSE and Foot and Mouth Disease, the report 
effectively marked a line in the sand for UK government policy on science and 
society. The old one-way communication methods had failed to halt the collision 
course over BSE, so it was time for a new way of talking, if we were to avoid 
another clash over issues like nanotechnology. But the idea of public participation in 
decision-making around science and technology, and the techniques to enable that, 
was by no means new at this point. It drew upon long-developing thinking in fields 
as diverse as Science and Technology Studies (STS), environmental management, 
technology assessment and political science. 
 
In STS, for the past 30 or more years, scholars have been coming to understand the 
social nature of scientific and technological developments. For instance, in 
‘Leviathan and the air pump’, Shapin and Schaffer (1985) describe the disputes 
between Hobbes and Boyle about experimental method and the generation of 
knowledge in restoration England. They argue that the way in which the dispute was 
resolved had as much to say about the political and social context as the science.  
The solutions to the problems of knowledge were solutions to the problems of social 
order; Collins, in his early research into gravitational wave physicists described how 
the problem of ‘experimenters’ regress’ (whereby verification of experimental 
evidence relies upon theory, while proof of theory relies on experimental evidence) 
is broken by social negotiation (Collins 1981); Latour and Callon’s Actor Network 
Theory, in emphasising an equality between technology and human, natural and 
artificial in terms of the role they can play in creating technoscientific knowledge, 
again shows how important machines and the material are in elucidating scientific 
‘facts’ – such ‘facts’ do not simply emerge from nature, but need the social and 
material to be made tractable (Latour 1987). Feminist scholar Donna Haraway, in 
 14 
describing the tendency to masculinize stories about reproductive competition and 
sex between aggressive males and receptive females, thereby facilitating some and 
precluding other theories, showed how theories (of primate evolution) reflect the 
social norms and expectations of the researchers more than reality (Haraway 1990); 
Wynne, in his case study on the effects of Chernobyl, described how local farmers 
and radioactivity experts had very different understandings of the local soils, grazing 
conditions and uptake of radioactivity by the pastures – and how these different 
understandings stemmed from their different life worlds (Wynne 1998). Jasanoff’s 
concept of ‘co-production’ – the idea that natural knowledge and social order are 
coproduced through the same process and that the ways in which we know and 
represent the world are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it 
(Jasanoff 2004) – brings many of these ideas together. Gibbons and Nowotny  
describe a process of how science and society co-evolve, in their work looking at 
the complex and networked structure of scientific knowledge production (Gibbons et 
al. 1994). Again, rather than society being the passive recipient of knowledge which 
has been produced autonomously, they argue that the way scientific knowledge is 
produced and used has changed in a way that connects science and society more 
closely – what they term Mode-2 knowledge. As a result of the more direct effect 
that scientific knowledge now has on society, society reacts by trying to influence 
science more forcefully than before, such that science and society co-evolve. 
 
One understanding of the move to dialogue then, is that public dialogue was seen in 
STS as a way to bring the ‘social’ part of the scientific endeavour into the open. 
Indeed, a key feature of Mode 2 knowledge production, for instance, is ‘social 
robustness’ – the idea that the social quality of the process of knowledge production 
ensures innovations are likely to be met with acceptance among those affected by 
it. Public participation is seen as a key way of achieving this social robustness 
(Gibbons et al. 1994; Nowotny et al. 2001; Nowotny 2003). 
 
Importantly, alongside the understanding that the social and the natural are more 
difficult to separate out than previously thought, STS scholars and sociologists have 
also been developing an understanding that science and technology is increasingly 
uncertain and unpredictable. Beck and Giddens in particular, in their work around 
‘Risk Society’ (Beck 1992; Giddens 1999) describe how western society has been 
transformed in the late 20th Century, at least in part by the increasing influence of 
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science and technology, such that we now live “on a high technological frontier 
which absolutely no one completely understands and which generates a diversity of 
possible futures” (Giddens 1999). Importantly, this preoccupation with the future 
(and controlling the future) puts a focus the notion of risk (rather than hazard). But 
where we were previously concerned with externally caused dangers “from the gods 
or nature” (Beck, 1992 Chapter 7) today’s risks are created by the very processes of 
modernity or human progress – particularly scientific progress. Giddens calls these 
internal risks “manufactured risks” (Giddens 1999), which he argues we can’t 
“quantify accurately in terms of probability tables”, or even know. As a 
consequence, whereas once “science faces a practice and a public sphere whose 
resistance it can sweep aside, supported by its success, with promises of liberation 
from constraints not yet understood” (Beck 1992, Chapter 7) science is now not just 
targeted as a source of solutions to problems but also the cause of the problems – it 
is simultaneously “one of the causes, the medium of definition and the source of 
solutions to risk…Science becomes more and more necessary, but less and less 
sufficient for the socially binding definition of truth” (Beck, 1992 Chapter 7).  
 
Functovicz and Ravetz (1993) describe a similar shift in our understanding of 
science in modern times: “Whereas science was previously understood as steadily 
advancing the certainty of our knowledge and control of the natural world, now 
science is seen as coping with many uncertainties.” Using the term ‘Post-normal 
science’ to characterise science in these modern circumstances, they argue that the 
best way to cope with this change in policy situation is to create an extended peer 
community of all those affected by an issue who are prepared to enter into dialogue 
on it. Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe (2001) echo the point that contrary to past 
expectations, scientific and technological developments have brought us more not 
less uncertainty and a “feeling that our ignorance is more important than what we 
know” (Chapter 1). The resulting public controversies – around issues like BSE or 
nuclear waste – increase the visibility and underline the extent of these 
uncertainties. They go on to argue that the situation now exists whereby science 
and technology cannot be managed effectively by the political institutions we 
currently have. They conclude that “when the uncertainties about possible states of 
the world and the constitution of the collective are dominant, the procedures of 
delegative democracy are shown to be unable to take the measure of the overflows 
[the unforeseen consequences of science] provoked by science and technology. 
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Other procedures of mobilisation and consultation must be devised” (Chapter 7). 
Specifically, they describe the importance of ‘hybrid forums’, which are open places 
where groups from all backgrounds can come together to discuss technical options 
facing society at a variety of levels and in different domains.  
 
Alongside this thinking in STS and sociology, a parallel conversation has taken 
place in political science. While some date deliberative or participatory democracy 
back to ‘the city states of ancient Greece’, whereby the process in which citizens 
publicly discuss and debate laws was seen as a way of reaching better decisions 
than by experts acting alone (Carpini et al. 2004), many of the modern ideas around 
public participation and experiments in democracy refer back to the ideas of John 
Dewey in the early 20th Century. Dewey is widely regarded in political theory as 
most strongly recognising the value of dialogue for democracy in post-industrial 
society (Marres 2007; Westbrook 2005). In response to two books by the journalist 
and public intellectual Walter Lippmann (1927;1922) in which he argued that as 
politics in the industrial world was becoming increasingly complex, ordinary citizens 
were unable to perform the governing role that democratic theory gave them, Dewey 
made the case for participatory democracy (Dewey 1927).  Whereas Lippmann’s 
solution to increasing complexity was a stronger role for expert advice in 
government decision making, with limited input from citizens, Dewey argued that 
technological societies needed more public input not less. Indeed he did not see 
public involvement to be simply necessitated and mediated by controversies that 
other institutions were unable to resolve, but he saw it as also providing a way of 
resolving these controversies – not least because ‘the public’ in his terms is made 
up of citizens whose common interest is focused on alleviating these negative 
externalities.  
 
In more recent times Abels (2007) describes “a participatory revolution [during the 
1960s]... where demands for ‘more’, ‘better’ and ‘enhanced’ citizen participation are 
frequently raised.” This gave rise to new forms of political participation – from 
boycotts and demonstrations, to formal processes to involve citizens in local 
planning decisions. Participation became of particular interest in the 1990s however, 
when concern grew around an emerging ‘democratic deficit’, whereby citizens were 
becomingly increasingly distant and disillusioned from traditional decision making 
structures, seeing participation rates in elections dropping and cynicism about 
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government and politics rising (Barnes et al. 2007). Explanations for this included 
concentration of power into central government which left citizens as passive 
observers (Ostrom 2000), social and economic change that resulted in reduced 
social connections and capacity to participate in civic life (Putnam 2001) and 
increasing global capitalism that was leaving nation states powerless to act (Klein 
2000). In the UK in particular, Barnes et al (2007) argue that while the Conservative 
government of the 1980s and early 1990s reconceived citizens as consumers, the 
New Labour Government of 1997 responded to the inadequacy of this limited 
conception of citizens as consumers, by putting forward a broader idea of 
citizenship (Barnes et al. 2007). This new idea of citizenship emphasised the role of 
public participation in local governance as a way to develop a more involved and 
responsible citizenship – participation in specific local initiatives was seen to lead to 
increased levels of public interest, involvement and influence in local issues. It was 
also seen very much as a way to raise standards and find the best possible fit 
between local needs and local capacity (Barnes et al. 2007). As a consequence, 
numerous public and citizen participation opportunities and exercises arose – the 
‘best value’ regime, which was New Labour’s alternative to the Conservative’s 
compulsory competitive tendering process, introduced a duty on local authorities to 
involve citizens in reviewing local services and considering alternative means of 
service delivery (Barnes et al. 2007); communities were involved in decisions 
around regeneration through the New Deals for Communities initiatives; and a 
variety of methods such as deliberative polling, citizens juries and citizens panels 
were used to inform local health care priority setting decisions (Abelson et al. 2013). 
 
More widely, significant social changes were taking place during the second half of 
the 20th Century. Ulrich Beck described how citizens’ initiative groups across Europe 
took power unilaterally without waiting for policymakers and politicians (Beck 1992). 
He argued that citizens not politicians brought about the unification of Europe and 
put issues like ecology, gender equality and animal rights on the agenda, creating a 
sense of the importance of the citizen versus those traditionally holding power. In 
his book ‘The Third Way’ Anthony Giddens (1998) makes a similar point in saying 
that as a result of the power of citizen groups and NGOs, “Governments will have to 
be ready to learn from them, react to the issues they raise and negotiate with them”. 
He also argues that partly as a result of globalisation, the pace of science and 
innovation has sped up, such that the boundary between nature and technologies is 
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becoming increasingly complex. Consequently, all of us “live in a more interrogatory 
relationship with science and industrial innovation than ever before…Decision 
making in these contexts cannot be left to the ‘experts’, but has to involve politicians 
and citizens. In short, science and technology cannot be left outside the democratic 
process” (Giddens 1998). The democratisation of science and technology in this 
context, was therefore, very much part of the modernisation of social democratic 
politics in the UK. 
 
Liesbet van Zoonen (2012) has recently documented a further sociological change 
that builds on this notion of powerful citizens and is significant both for the rise of 
public engagement but also the role of traditional expertise.  She reflects on the 
current tendency towards epistemological suspicion, whereby all knowledge 
appears to be tied to social and material interests and therefore not to be trusted. 
While this was once particular to feminist, critical and postmodern theory, in 
Western cultures such suspicion now seems to have become a dominant mindset. 
She argues that this suspicion has been coupled with the emergence of ‘self’ as the 
source and arbiter of all truth – people have come to believe that “the truth is in 
there; in the self, in personal experiences and feelings, in subjective judgement and 
individual memory” rather than in traditional sources of knowledge and expertise. 
She terms this “turn into the self as the origin of all truth” as ‘I-pistemology’ and 
argues that it has arisen, at least in part, as a result of the uncertainty in the world 
around us – in a situation of high-epistemological insecurity, people have turned to 
themselves as an alternative source of knowing or understanding. Our personal 
experience and perspectives are something we can be certain of if nothing else.  
 
The concept of I-pistemology is interesting in the context of science in public for two 
reasons. Firstly, it provides at least a partial explanation for the occurrence of 
science and society conflict points where government information is contested and 
alternative facts and truths produced, or at least the tendency of some to believe the 
alternatively produced facts – for instance the various arguments around the causes 
of climate change. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly for this thesis, it sheds 
further light on the ideological viewpoint from which the move towards dialogue 
appears to have come from. Van Zoonen argues that while first person narratives 
have become the privileged position from which to speak in political and popular 
culture, it is not exclusive to these contexts. It has also been a key part of 
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progressive politics in the late 20th century – especially the politics of feminist, civil 
rights and gay movements where the personal was not only political but also true. In 
feminism in particular, “the individual experiences of women were thought to add up 
to a collective truth about women’s subordinate positions” (van Zoonen 2012). If 
official knowledge was produced from a white, male, heterosexual perspective then, 
part of the progressive political project was to produce the alternative knowledge 
coming from the experiences of women, black people and gay people. Not all of 
these voices were given equal interest however and a preference for progressive, 
‘against the grain’ views has remained in many areas of study (van Zoonen 2012). 
 
Understanding that many STS perspectives on science in public developed within 
this academic context during the late 20th Century, it is possible to see how 
democratising science and technology is also the logical extension of this political 
academic project. Looking at the issues of science and society through the lens of 
progressive social movements, the focus falls upon the power imbalance between 
scientific experts and citizens. The right solution (as it was with feminism and civil 
rights before) would be to tell the personal stories that were up until now hidden. It is 
possible to see such a perspective in some of the early work of proponents of 
dialogue – for instance, Brian Wynne’s work looking at the lay-expertise of the 
Cumbrian sheep farmers following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (Lash et al. 1996; 
Wynne 1998) tells a story of how the (working-class) farmers’ expertise and 
understandings were side-lined in favour of the (typically white, middle-class male) 
scientific experts understandings; or Tom Wakeford’s work on citizen’s juries, in 
which he argues that the role of participatory techniques is specifically to involve 
excluded voices: “key to their [Citizens’ Juries] future is the development of citizens’ 
juries that are not only fair, representative and transparent, but are able to form part 
of longer-term initiatives particularly aimed at those currently excluded from political 
processes” (Wakeford 2002). 
 
Bringing together many of these ideas around democracy, uncertainty and the 
social nature of science and technology, a practice called Participatory Technology 
Assessment (PTA) arose in Europe during the 1980s and 1990s (Griessler et al. 
2011). PTA is a process (or series of processes), which aimed to broaden the 
knowledge base of decision making by taking an interdisciplinary approach to 
identifying the possible positive and negative implications of a technology in order to 
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make political decision-making more informed and rational. Durant (1999) describes 
it as a “response to the structural changes in democratic society at the end of the 
20th Century”, while Abels (2007) argues that the motivation for developing such and 
approach was two-fold: Firstly as a response to demand for policy-making 
procedures that allow integrating the factual and social dimension of conflicts over 
the role of science and technology for society; secondly, for normative reasons – 
because involving people in decisions around science is the right thing to do. Joss 
and Durant track the idea of public participation in decisions around science and 
technology back to the 1970s where the USA’s National Institute of Health (NIH) 
first instigated organized dialogues between panels of medical and other 
professional experts. These medical consensus conferences aimed to facilitate 
professional assessment of new medical technologies (Joss & Durant 1995b). Joss 
and Durant argue that such participatory processes were rooted in a 'dialogue 
model' of the public understanding of science, in which the key activity is two-way or 
multi-way communication between scientists and non-scientists, with the aim of 
creating greater mutual understanding, which may or may not lead to greater accord 
between scientists and non-scientists (Joss and Durant 1995). 
 
A number of European countries took up this approach during the 1980s and 1990s, 
most notably the Danish Board of Technology, which developed and ran a series of 
‘Consensus Conferences’. The Netherlands also took up the idea, organising a 
consensus conference on genetic modification of animals in 1993. In 1994 London’s 
Science Museum organised the UK’s first consensus conference on plant 
biotechnology (see Dale, 1995; Joss & Durant, 1995a, 1995b for descriptions of the 
event). Funded by the BBSRC, which felt that it had a responsibility to communicate 
with the public about the new biotechnologies and wished to obtain a clearer view of 
public attitudes towards these technologies, the consensus conference made 
recommendations to government about how GM foods should be labelled and 
handled in the future. But without any formal links to government, it was largely 
seen as an “experiment” in participatory democracy (Joss & Durant 1995b). Durant 
later (Durant 1999) stated that it achieved only part of the organisers aims as it was 
“delivered and received in a cultural context largely dominated by the deficit model”. 
The conference organisers were keen to point out that success was not only 
measured in terms of impact on “the formal institutions of political decision making” 
however, concluding that “arguably, the very existence of constructive and open 
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dialogue between experts and laypeople may help to build useful bridges between 
the scientific community and the wider public” (Joss & Durant 1995b). 
 
Subsequent socio-technical controversies around BSE, disposal of the Brent Spar 
oil rig and GM crops themselves led to increasing calls for public perspectives to be 
built into the decision making process in the UK (see for example Grove-White, 
1997; Irwin & Wynne, 1996). This culminated in the 2000 House of Lords ‘Science 
and Society’ report, which recommended a “new mood for dialogue” that would 
“help the decision-maker to listen to public values and concerns; and give the public 
some assurance that their views are taken into account, increasing the chance that 
decisions will find acceptance.”  
 
Following the recommendations of the House of Lords, and the Agriculture and 
Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) report ‘Crops on Trial’ (Agriculture 
and Environment Biotechnology Advisory Board 2001), the UK government set up 
the first national-scale public dialogue on a science topic in 2002 – with the heated 
issue of GM foods as the focus (Horlick-Jones et al. 2006). The AEBC, in looking at 
the value of the Farm Scale Field trails of GM crops and the reasons why the trials 
had created such public controversy, concluded that the development of GM crops 
had “suffered as a result of the lack of opportunity for serious debate about the full 
range of potential implications of GM agriculture, on the basis of clear 
understandings of what is involved, away from concern that had been created by 
campaigning elements of the media.” Consequently, they argued that the 
government needed to “encourage comprehensive public discussion of the 
ecological and ethical – including socioeconomic – issues which now have arisen” 
(Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Advisory Board 2001). 
 
Comprising a series of open public meetings, a dedicated debate website and a 
series of closed discussions (which acted as control groups) the GM Nation debate 
ran over the summer of 2003 and is believed to have reached more than 20,000 
people (Rowe 2005). Its stated aims were twofold: “to promote an innovative, 
effective and deliberative programme of debate on GM issues, framed by the public, 
against the background of the possible commercial production of GM crops in the 
UK and the options for possibly proceeding with this; and through the debate 
provide meaningful information to Government about the nature and spectrum of the 
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public views, particularly at grass roots level, on the issue to inform decision-
making.” (GM Nation website http://www.gmnation.org.uk) 
 
Overall, from a number of perspectives, the debate was not considered to be a 
success. From the government and scientists’ perspective, it was seen to do little to 
take the heat out of the debate (Gaskell 2004; Horlick-Jones et al. 2006). Others 
criticised the approach taken by the government, arguing that it was impeded by 
lack of time and money (House of Commons Environment Food Select Committee 
2003), that it failed to engage with a sufficiently wide array of people, that is was 
primarily a legitimatory exercise and that it lacked focus (Irwin 2012, Council for 
Science and Technology, 2005; House of Commons Environment Food Select 
Committee, 2003). The GM debate was however seen to be foreshadowing a 
controversial new and emerging science – nanoscience. While the UK was leading 
the way with this promising new field, public opposition could dramatically curtail 
this. In ‘See through Science’ (Wilsdon & Willis 2004), Demos used the launch of a 
Royal Society report on nanoscience as the backdrop against which to make the 
case for improved dialogue (upstream engagement), contrasting the potential to get 
things right now, with how things went wrong with GM.  At least in part to learn the 
lessons from the GM debate, and to forestall any potential public opposition to this 
new area of science, the UK government launched the ScienceWise programme, to 
encourage, fund and support policymakers to involve the public in decisions around 
science and technology. This is the point where I take up the story in my research. 
While the normative case for doing dialogue has been made strongly, what has 
been the impact of this shift from deficit to dialogue? Has it been effective in 
ensuring the views of the public have been heard and reflected in policy? And if not, 
why not? 
 
What do we know about the impact of dialogue already?  
 
Given such an established history of public dialogue over more than 20 years, what 
outcomes and impacts does research to date suggest has been produced? Despite 
the dominance of the technique within science and society relations in the UK, many 
argue that much of the literature around the benefits of dialogue and public 
participation are advocacy rather than empirically based (Culyer & Lomas 2006; 
Abels 2007). Evidence of impact on policy is still very limited and this appears to be 
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both because there has been little research into policy impact (Rowe and Frewer 
2005; Emery et al 2014) and because that research which has been done has found 
little evidence of impact (Loeber et al. 2011; Hansen & Allansdottir 2011; Kurath & 
Gisler 2009). For example, Goodin and Dryzek’s work (Goodin 2006) which 
specifically set out to chart the ways in which ‘mini-public’ events, which bring 
together small groups of selected ‘publics’ to discuss particular issues, have an 
impact on policy found few examples of mini-publics influencing policy. They state 
that cases of mini-publics making policy “are still rare” and cite the example of the 
Danish Consensus Conferences of the 1980s as instances where the ideas of mini 
publics were taken up by policy. Even in this instance though they acknowledge that 
it was impossible to say for sure that these wouldn’t have been the policy outcomes 
anyway. Other examples they give include the UK GM Nation debate, which they 
argue might not have resulted in an anti-GM policy, but did prevent a pro-GM one 
(Goodin 2006) (although it is questionable whether this position was imposed by the 
EU). 
 
Impact appears to be limited – and focused on benefits of participation 
Furthermore, those instances where impact has been evidenced are usually 
focused on the benefits of participation (rather than any fundamental change in 
policy). For instance, participants in GM Nation reported that they had found the 
experience enjoyable and constructive (Rowe 2005); Durant and Joss (1995b), 
reporting on the first UK consensus conference on plant biotechnology, concluded 
that a key learning point was that “it is possible to facilitate constructive dialogue 
between laypeople and experts in socially sensitive areas of science and 
technology“ (Joss & Durant 1995b). Molster et al 2013, interviewing participants 
following a deliberative forum on biobanking, found that participants said they felt 
more informed about the issues they had discussed and had greater trust in 
government policymakers, who they believed would take reasonable account of 
their recommendations (Molster et al. 2013). Niemeyer 2011 looked at two case 
studies and compared views before and after participatory events. He found that 
participatory deliberative processes had an ‘emancipatory mechanism’ in freeing the 
public views from distortion by powerful symbolic influences in the media (Niemeyer 
2011). He argued that participants’ stated preferences in the deliberative events 
more closely reflected their underlying will. Looking at the impact on the 
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policymaking process itself in the UK, US and Canada, Einsiedel and Jones (2011) 
found that despite the lack of substantive policy change coming from citizens’ juries, 
the exposure to the method of public deliberation facilitated a shift in institutional 
culture, which was reflected in a greater openness to including a broader set of 
actors in the policy process (Einsiedel et al. 2011); Abels (2007) reported that while 
there is empirically insufficient proof that pTA has an impact on policy-making, there 
is still the enlightening function for the general public; Carpini et al (2004) describe 
how, in certain contexts dialogue can encourage the majority to consider new 
alternatives and perspectives and to more generally empathise with minority 
positions (Carpini et al. 2004) ⁠; and Loeber et al (2011) argued that even if 
participatory technology appraisal exercises have little ‘formal’ influence on the 
decision making process, they can provide an opportunity for citizens to become 
active and for new coalitions to emerge (Loeber et al. 2011) ⁠. While these outcomes 
are important and undoubtedly valuable, they do not match the high aspirations 
relating to the democratisation of science decision-making, attributed to dialogue by 
many. Reports of impact also often appear to be based upon a small selection of 
illustrative examples (Evans 2014), or are instances where public dialogues are 
supportive of the policy approach (Risk and Policy Analysts, 2015). It has also been 
reported that there is a tendency to over-report the positive outcomes and neglect 
the negative outcomes in evaluations of participatory exercises, particularly where 
evaluations are not independent (Daykin et al. 2007). 
 
Why this lack of impact? 
a. Impact difficult to measure 
To a large extent this lack of evidence of impact is a methodological issue relating to 
the difficult of measuring impact. For instance Rowe et al (2005) argue that 
evaluating outcomes is difficult because it is never clear when the end of a dialogue 
process is, and because outcomes are affected by external factors such as 
simultaneous events or external pressures of policy. As a consequence, they point-
out that “although the evaluation of outcomes is perhaps preferable to processes, 
because these will correspond more directly to the desired aims of the exercise, 
evaluation of exercise processes must often serve as a surrogate to outcomes. That 
is, if the exercise process is ‘good’ (conducted well according to one’s definition) 
then it would seem more likely that the outcomes will be good than if the process is 
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‘bad’ (Rowe et al 2005). Culyer and Lomas similarly argue that measuring the 
ultimate outcome of a deliberative or participatory process is problematic because of 
the difficulty in attributing cause and effect with confidence. They point out that “a 
deliberative process might be as excellent as it possibly could be, but the ultimate 
outcome might fail to emerge because of failures elsewhere in the system” (Culyer 
and Lomas 2006). Boaz et al (2014) pointed out that the focus on methodological 
aspects of dialogue is sometimes at the expense of a more deep-rooted exploration 
of the practices – looking at the values, norms and codes that shape scientific 
practice. Others have argued that we need to look at the wider political context 
within which dialogue takes place (Stilgoe et al. 2014; Irwin et al. 2012a; Stirling 
2007). And, as I have argued in the introduction and will describe later, it is possible 
that there is something in the substance of the discussion that is taking place – and 
the way the messages from the discussion are received – that affects the impact of 
dialogue as much the process undertaken.  
 
b. Lack of reflexivity of policymaking institutions 
The challenge of measuring impact however only appears to be part of the reason 
why there is little evidence of the impact of dialogue on policy. Where there has 
been work to evaluate the impact of dialogue, there is wide agreement that little 
evidence of impact has been found (Loeber et al. 2011; Hansen & Allansdottir 2011; 
Kurian & Wright 2010). Typically, the reasons given for the lack of impact of public 
dialogue in the STS literature focus on the lack of reflexivity of the policymaking 
institutions. As a result the role of the public is limited to discussion questions of 
values and ethical issues, rather than exposing ‘expertise’ to scrutiny (Kurath & 
Gisler, 2009; Wynne, 2006). Institutions see public dialogue as an opportunity to 
gain trust for a predetermined approach, rather than to rethink their policies and 
practices (Wynne 2006; Thorpe & Gregory 2010; Chilvers 2012; Macnaghten & 
Chilvers 2014; Stirling 2007). 
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Why might policymaking institutions lack reflexivity and why would 
this exclude alternative viewpoints? 
a. Credibility of participatory procedures 
So why and how might policymaking institutions develop this lack of reflexivity and 
resist alternative perspectives and voices? Some have suggested that policymakers 
do not consider social knowledge as equal to ‘expert’ knowledge (Kurath 2009). For 
instance, research looking at the policy impact of public debates around GM in New 
Zealand found that the value focus of public discussions led to public views being 
deemed ‘alternative science’ and therefore not credible, in preference for technical 
expertise. This, the authors argue, demonstrates the sponsoring organisation’s 
entrenched ideological belief in the benefits of science – and the view that science 
was the only possible arbiter of GM risks (Kurian and Wright 2010). Others have 
highlighted a paradox for the credibility of participatory procedures. On one hand, 
for dialogue to offer genuine alternatives to politics as usual, they need to 
distinguish themselves from other modes of alternative policy advice. On the other 
hand, if they are too 'alternative' they risk being ignored (Biegelbauer & Hansen 
2011).  
 
Taking these arguments further, Lovebrand et al (2015) used the text of the 2007 
European Commission report “Taking the European Knowledge Society Seriously” 
(Felt & Wynne 2007) as the basis for arguing that public dialogues lack legitimacy – 
or at least have questionable legitimacy. They make the case that while proponents 
of dialogue draw heavily from deliberative democrats’ normative accounts of 
legitimacy in order to legitimise science decision making, in practice they are drawn 
on different logics in evaluating the legitimacy of real life public deliberations – 
focusing on diversity and dissent, rather than questions of reciprocity, accountability 
and reason. As a consequence, proponents of dialogue fail to justify why deliberate 
governance deserves primacy over other ways of decision-making (Lovbrand et al. 
2010). Others question legitimacy on the basis of representativeness – who is 
present at the dialogues and who do they speak for (Sturgis 2014)? 
 
b. Links to policy 
The relationship to policy – in particular weak links to policymaking – are seen as 
further significant inhibitors of impact (Abels 2007; Kurath 2009; Emery et al. 2014). 
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Durant (1999) argued (in advance of the event), that the UK’s second consensus 
conference (on the long term management of nuclear waste) would have more 
impact than the first consensus conference because the UK government had lent its 
support to the second conference. This is in keeping with political science work, 
already mentioned, looking at the role and influence of groups in policymaking – in 
particular work describing the way in which different groups have different levels of 
power and influence, with some on the inside with good access to policymakers, 
while others have less access (for instance Richardson & Jordan 1979; Marsh & 
Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 1997; John 2013; Beyers & Braun 2013). ScienceWise 
deliberately set out to ensure the links to policy for their dialogue activities, 
formalising the links by asking that each dialogue project has a policy sponsor. 
Understanding whether this link has been enacted and if so whether it has brought 
the expected improvement in impact on policy are questions I set out to address in 
this research. 
 
c. Shared interests between scientists and policymakers 
The idea that policymaking institutions are dominated by an elite technocratic 
viewpoint which excludes any other has been described a number of times, 
particularly in relation to GM crops. For instance Dryzek (Dryzek et al. 2008) has 
described how participation exercises on GM tend to evoke a ‘precautionary public’ 
which is set against a ‘promethean elite’ worldview. More recently, Chilvers and 
Macnaughten (2014) have also described the same problem in explaining why the 
ScienceWise public dialogue programme has had little impact on policy. But why do 
different viewpoints necessarily exclude the perspectives of others? Bora (Bora 
2009) sheds some light on how elite relationships works to exclude the views of 
public participants. In looking at the impact of participation on the licencing of GM 
crops, he argues that in cases of legal administrative decision making, law and 
science create “regimes of technoscientific normativity”, excluding political (i.e. 
values based) perspectives. Bora argues that since both science and law speak to 
‘facts’ and ‘truth’, they are able to come together to define concepts of risk, nature, 
citizen and the public. Participatory decision making challenges this authority by 
bringing other perspectives to bear and so in such circumstances a collusive 
coupling between law and science takes place, thus excluding political discourse 
(Bora 2009).  
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Echoing the idea that shared interests in groups makes it difficult for them to 
accommodate the views of others, Slaughter (Slaughter, 2013), looking at the role of 
participation in the governance of the G20, argues that it seems unlikely that radical 
voices from various publics could be considered by the leaders of the G20, given 
their history of prioritising capitalist and neo-liberal ideas. Similarly, as I have 
already mentioned, Dryzek et al (2008) similarly points to an ‘elite’ attachment to 
‘promethean’ views of science, which leaves no space for more precautionary public 
perspectives that might be viewed as slowing down progress, arguing that “... One 
of the first priorities of contemporary national governments is to ensure economic 
competitiveness in a globalising world. Large costs can be expected when the state 
departs from a Promethean facilitation of technological innovation, diffusion and 
adoption” (Dryzek et al., 2008). Beynon-Jones and Brown (2011) also explain this 
dominance of technocratic viewpoints in terms of shared interested between the 
scientific and policy community, but argue that this also has the effect of closing 
down the timescale at which decisions are made – which could potentially exclude 
other viewpoints with longer time-frames. Based upon their study of UK decision-
making relating to xenotransplantation, they argue that decision-making tends to be 
guided by narratives generated by scientific entrepreneurs, which encourage short-
term decision making and perpetuate institutional amnesia about the long-term 
dynamics of research, precluding deliberation (Beynon-Jones & Brown 2011). 
 
d. Democratic Context 
Taking a wider view, there are arguments that the lack of impact of public dialogue 
in the UK relates to the type of democracy that we have. More specifically, 
participation is generally considered to be suited to participatory democracies, 
whereas the UK works within a representative democracy, which means that it is 
more difficult to integrate participatory practices into policy making ⁠ (Beigelbauer and 
Hansen 2011). For example, in their comparison of participatory technology 
assessments in different European countries, Loeber et al., (2011) concluded that in 
countries such as Austria, the “neo-corporatist and expert driven” form of 
policymaking, which tends to exclude the public, is not conductive to PTA. In 
contrast, the Swiss political culture has a system of checks and balances that 
emphasises consensus and gives the public a power of veto through its provisions 
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for direct democracy. As such, the institutional structure is better prepared to 
incorporate results from a PTA (Loeber et al., 2011). Looking at decision-making 
relating the regulation of xenotransplantation, Biegelbauer and Hansen (2011) 
similarly argue that the constitutional context and general openness of the political 
system in question matters as much in terms of impact, as the design of the 
dialogue process. In comparing the impact of public participation on policy in 
countries which have different democratic structures, they point out that it seems 
difficult to make the processes and results of participatory processes compatible 
with representative democratic processes, which in theory have no problem with 
reliance upon experts. Nevertheless, some countries have been more ‘susceptible’ 
to public engagement institutions – most notably those with a general openness of 
policymaking and where there is an absence of closely-knit policy communities. In 
the case of science and technology governance, since many issues do not involve 
politicians but stay at the civil service level, they argue that it is important that the 
“bureaucracy is not paternalistic but heeds accountability, transparency and 
openness as important factors of democratic decision making” (Biegelbauer & 
Hansen 2011). 
 
e. Substance of what is said in dialogue cannot be incorporated into policy 
Besides problematizing the policymaking institutions however, research looking at 
the content of the outputs of participatory exercises has found explanations for lack 
of impact within these outputs and the views they express. Participatory procedures, 
especially those dominated by lay people, tend to produce very unspecific and 
broad results that are hard to integrate into policy-making (Abels 2007; Kurath 
2009). Braun and Schultz (Braun & Schultz 2009) have argued that the way in which 
public dialogue activities tend to focus on 'pure public' and 'affected public' as the 
most important participants means that views given tend to be individualised ‘naïve’ 
perspectives which can be respected but hardly criticised and which tends to 
fragment, ethicise and depoliticise the issue at stake. As a result, public dialogues 
have little to say on issues of distributive justice, research priorities, economic 
interest or impact on society as a whole, as these matters require speaking 
positions of social or political groups (Braun & Schultz, 2009) ⁠⁠. Van Eeten (van Eeten 
2001) argues that it is the problematic nature of reaching conclusions in public 
dialogue activities that makes the substance of what is being said difficult for 
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policymakers to incorporate. Discussions generate varied views, which are difficult 
to focus into clear outcomes or conclusions that would be policy relevant and a 
basis for collective decision making. 
 
Problems resulting from dialogue 
Finally, as well as there being a lack of evidence of impact and evidence of a lack of 
impact, there is also evidence that in some instances dialogue can have negative 
impacts on people’s perceptions of democratic legitimacy and accountability of 
policymaking in science and technology (Abels, 2007; Kurath, 2009; Carpini et al 
2004). A number of reasons are put forward for this, including questions about who 
the public represents and is accountable to, the fairness of the process by which 
ideas are discussed and filtered within the dialogues (Abels 2007), evidence that 
views have had an impact and participants’ sense of procedural justice (Carpini et 
al. 2004; Ulbig 2008). Discussions tend to move collective opinion in the direction of 
the pre-existing views of the majority (Carpini et al., 2004). Rather than bringing 
people together, this tends to exacerbate already present tensions and differences.  
 
 
In the following chapters, I set out to build on this rich history of STS and Political 
Science literature. In moving beyond a case study approach, I aim to draw 
overarching lessons about how participants discus technologies in dialogue events 
and the impact on policy of the UK’s first ten years of public dialogue in science and 
technology. Drawing on the political science literature in particular, I also set out to 
examine the institutional context of the outputs of public dialogue – to explain why 
this apparent lack of reflexivity exists and what practical lessons can we learn to 
improve practice and impact on policy in the future. 
 
I begin (in Chapter 3) with a description of my methodology and the theoretical 
concepts that I will be drawing upon. 
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Chapter	  3:	  Methodology	  	  
 
As I have explained in the introduction, in this research, I wanted to move beyond 
the scale of the case-study, to consider all of the discussions that have taken place 
about new and emerging science and technology in the UK over the past decade. In 
so doing, I wanted to find out if taking this broader view can provide any new insight 
about the way people discuss and understand new technologies, beyond the insight 
gained from individual case studies. Are there patterns or themes emerging across 
topics or are discussions very particular to the issue in hand, for instance? 
 
Further to that, I also wanted to understand whether public dialogue has had any 
impact on policy and to explore the reasons why impact might be difficult to achieve. 
In particular, to understand more about previous claims that policymaking 
institutions are resistant to outside voices because they are dominated by 
technocratic viewpoints – is this claim evidenced across all public dialogues? Why 
does this viewpoint dominate and why is it difficult to accommodate different points 
of views in policymaking? 
 
Previous evaluations of the impact of dialogue (for instance previous evaluations of 
the ScienceWise programme) have attempted to track individual reports on a case-
by-case basis, looking for precise elements and ideas of the public report being 
reflected in the policy documents. Tracking the impact of individual dialogue 
comments into particular policy documents is a notoriously problematic approach 
however as there is often a long time-lag between a dialogue and policy being 
made, and because policy is subject to so many influences (Emery et al. 2014). 
Rather than trying to find direct lines between public dialogue and policy documents 
then, here I am seeking to look at how the high-level ideas and visions – and 
general approaches to the subjects in hand- are reflected and expressed in the 
different corpuses. I have taken a comparative approach that compares how 
participants in public dialogues, scientific experts and policymakers talk about the 
same range of technologies. Specifically, I have been looking at the sociotechnical 
imaginaries (described in more detail below) expressed by these three groups, to 
understand whether there is indeed a clash of viewpoints and what that means in 
policy. 
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Conceptual Framework 
1. Discourses  
For the purposes of this research, I use the term ‘discourse’ simply to refer to a unit 
of language organised around a particular subject matter and meaning. The first 
stage of my analysis identifies a series of subjects or discourses that are discussed 
within the public dialogues, based upon the words being used to discus them.  
 
I am however interested in discourses in order to understand the world that 
speakers describe with their choice of words – and the values and social norms 
revealed in these choices and descriptions. I therefore engage in these discourses 
more critically at the second stage of analysis when I consider the sociotechnical 
imaginaries at play within these discourses. 
 
2. Sociotechnical Imaginaries  
Sociotechnical imaginaries are defined as: 
 
“Collectively held, institutionally stabilised and publicly performed visions of 
desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and 
social order attainable through and supportive of, advances in science and 
technology”.  (Jasanoff & Kim 2015) 
 
Simultaneously normative and descriptive, they both express and prescribe the 
meanings, purposes and priorities of science and technology. 
 
The concept has been developed by Jasanoff and Kim (2009 & 2015) to help 
examine the complex relationship between knowledge, its applications and power.  
They argue that conceptual frameworks that help situate technologies within the 
material moral and social landscapes are in abundance in science fiction yet are 
scarce in STS. Nevertheless, STS acknowledges the normative dimensions of 
science and technology. For instance, the concept of coproduction (Jasanoff 2004) 
describes how science and technology do not uni-directionally shape our values and 
norms, but, in symmetry, our sense of how we ought to organise and govern 
ourselves shapes how we make sense nature, society and the world. Coproduction 
does however lack the specificity to understand why particular problems, viewpoints 
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and ideas persist – it helps us understand how things fit together, but not how they 
come to be as they are. They argue that “the idea of sociotechnical imaginaries 
confronts some of these challenges head on” (Jasanoff and Kim 2015).  
 
Originating in their work on the US and South Korean response to nuclear power 
(Jasanoff & Kim 2009), the concept also draws on literature around the construction 
of imaginaries from political and cultural theory.  For instance, Jasanoff and Kim 
(2015, p6) specifically attribute the work of Durkeheim and Weber as helping us 
take for granted the idea that societies share common narratives of who they are, 
where they have come from and where they are going. Benedict Anderson’s work 
‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1991) is also cited as being foundational to the 
concept. In this, Anderson brings together ethnography and political science, to 
understand the Nation state, and nationalism, as an imagined community – a 
construction of individuals that don’t meet but that are tied together thorough shared 
practices of narrating, recollecting and forgetting.   
 
Widening the gaze beyond nationhood and onto questions around the grand 
patterns of historial and political thought, Charles Taylor (2003) also develops the 
idea of imaginary further.  In considering how did the modern world – and its 
distinctive structures, institutions and practices – come to be, he concludes that 
imaginaries changed, defining social imaginary as “the ways people imagine their 
social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them 
and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative 
notions and images that underlie these expectations.”  (Taylor 2003, quoted in 
Jasanoff and Kim 2015 p7). Arjun Appadurai’s (1990) work on globalisation and 
diaspora is also cited as significant.  In particular, Jasanoff and Kim (2015) argue 
that in this writing Appadurai turns the notion of the imagination as a fantasy or 
“opium for the masses whose real work is elsewhere”, nor “simple escape from a 
world defined principally by more concrete purpose and structures”, but is 
contributing to the shaping of our material world by defining what could and ought to 
be (Appadurai 1990, cited in Jasanoff and Kim 2015). 
 
What is however missing from all of these accounts of social imaginaries however is 
any detailed investigation of science and technology, which Jasanoff and Kim 
argue, have been modernity’s most salient forces.  The notion of “technoscientific 
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imaginaries” developed by George Marcus (1995) might appear to address this 
omission, but Jasanoff and Kim (2015, p11) argue that the context of these 
technoscientific imaginaries is the scientific workplace and their aims and 
achievements tied to scientific production. They argue that instead, sociotechnical 
imaginaries are necessary in order to continue the STS tradition of symmetry, to 
investigate “how, through the imaginative work of varied social actors, scicence and 
technology become enmeshed in performing and producing diverse visions of 
collective good, at expanding scales of governance from communities to nation-
states to the planet” (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, page 11).  
 
As illustration, Jasanoff and Kim (2009) describe how “sociotechnical imaginaries” 
have proved particularly useful for policymakers in late modern societies:  
 
“Imagined futures help justify new investments in S&T; in turn, advances in 
S&T reaffirm the state’s capacity to act as responsible stewards of the public 
good. Sociotechnical imaginaries serve in this respect both as the ends of 
policy and as instruments of legitimation.” (Jasanoff & Kim 2009) 
 
Importantly for this research, Jasanoff and Kim (2015) argue that while National 
governments are important sites for the construction and implementation of 
sociotechnical imaginaries, others might hold different imaginaries, based on 
different values, cultures and perceptions of the good life. These imaginaries will in 
turn shape how power and the role of science and technology in our society are 
understood, legitimized, valued and assessed. Understanding the sociotechnical 
imaginaries at play would appear to be a useful step towards identifying similarities 
and differences in the views of the public, experts and policymakers, as well as to 
making sense of how different groups come to know and form positions on 
particular new and emerging technologies (Jasanoff & Kim 2009). 
 
Also helpfully for this research, Jasanoff and Kim (2009) have gone some way to 
explaining how to identify sociotechnical imaginaries. They suggest that documents 
and texts relating to science, technology and power – such as policy reports, 
speeches, judicial opinions – are some of the most accessible resources as, by their 
nature, official documents tend to favour the imaginaries of elites. Other documents, 
such as those produced by NGOS or social movements (arguably the reports of 
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public dialogues) are likely to reflect alternative imaginaries. They also suggest that 
open-ended interviews with key social actors are also useful to “understanding the 
performative, non-codified dimensions of collective self-identifications and 
ideologies” and to relate discourse to practice. In terms of analysis, they suggest 
going beyond formal techniques of discourse analysis, to look at linguistic and 
symbolic elements, such as rhetorical devices, articulations of the public good, risk 
or responsibility (Jasanoff n.d.). To further the use of the concept, Jasanoff has also 
produced a series of questions to ask of a text when trying to understand 
sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff & Hurlbut 2014). 
 
Despite these useful features, the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries is not 
without its drawbacks for my research. Most notably, it puts science and technology 
at its centre. While I am interested in how the public talk about science and 
technology, I am also aware that perceptions tend to be shaped by wider societal 
issues than science alone, and so I have some concerns about putting technology 
at the centre of my analytic frame.  
 
John Dryzek (Dryzek 2005), in his work looking at environmental discourses, uses 
the term ‘worldview’ to describe the values framework or vision of the good life that 
he argues shapes attitudes to environmental technology. While the term ‘worldview’ 
lacks the specificity of ‘sociotechnical imaginaries’ – Dryzek goes no way towards 
defining what it means, nor characterizing any mechanism by which it may function 
or exert influence – and appears to discuss a more personal rather than collective 
concept, it does appear to look more widely than sociotechnical imaginaries. Dryzek 
has also detailed a series of questions to ask of discourses in order to identify 
environmental worldviews. These questions have considerable overlap with 
Jasanoff’s questions and so I have drawn the two together to form a series of 
questions (described later in the chapter) to apply to my texts, that will allow me to 
both identify the sociotechnical imaginaries, but at the same time remain alert to 
wider influences. 
 
Approach 
To understand these sociotechnical imaginaries, I have taken a four-step approach: 
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1. Analysis of discourses and imaginaries expressed in reports of public 
dialogue exercises and in the analogous documents submitted to 
policymakers by ‘expert’ bodies. (Chapter 4) 
2. Analysis of discourses and imaginaries expressed in relevant policy 
documents (Chapter 5) 
3. Comparison of public, expert and policy discourse and imaginaries and 
development of initial hypotheses to explain the policy impact of public 
dialogue (Chapter 6, Part 1) 
4. Semi-structured interviews with policymakers, with questions focused on 
testing the initial hypotheses, in order to draw firm conclusions. (Chapter 6, 
Part 2). 
 
Analysis of discourses in public, expert and policy documents 
Sources 
Documents are considered to be important sources for understanding the 
relationship between evidence and policy (Evans et al. 2014). For instance Freeman 
and Maybin (2011) argue that ‘when evidence informs policy, the findings and 
conclusions of research and the problems and purposes of policy are distilled into 
documents’ (Freeman & Maybin, 2011 p155). The national public dialogues on 
science and technology that have taken place in the UK have all been well 
documented. The majority have been sponsored by the ScienceWise programme 
(www.sciencewise-erc.org.uk), which is the UK Government funded programme 
aiming to help policymakers commission and use public dialogue to inform policy 
decisions relating to science and technology issues (further details given in the 
appendix 1) and each one has produced a report for policymakers. Importantly, 
since I wanted to understand what is unique about public discourses on science and 
technology, the public dialogue reports either fed into or were accompanied by 
‘expert’ reports, also produced for policymakers. These were independent reports 
produced by groups of expert stakeholders, most typically involving senior 
researchers active in the subject, industry representatives, senior funders and in 
some instances ethicists and consumer representatives. Furthermore, a third set of 
documents was available which recorded the government responses to these two 
sets of input.  
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There are however significant limitations in documentary analysis – they will only 
report part of what has happened in the course of discussions and they represent 
limited perspectives (Shaw et al. 2004). The reports of public dialogue will have 
been mediated and the expert reports will reflect those elements that the scientists 
wish to display (Hilgartner 2000), for instance. The strengths of these sources 
outweighed the limitations in this case however, particularly as these are the 
sources presented to policymakers and I was keen to see dialogue and advice from 
this perspective. While taking these limitations into account, together, these three 
sets of reports nevertheless provided a good basis for analysing and contrasting 
public and expert discourses on new and emerging science and technologies, and 
for comparing these to policy discourses to understand where impacts had been 
made on policy.  
 
A full list of the documents included in the analysis is given in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Computer assisted text analysis 
The scale of the data did not lend itself easily to traditional content analysis in any 
systematic way however: Using ‘traditional’ discourse analysis techniques, I would 
have taken one of three approaches – either unsystematic sampling; systematic 
sampling; or making use of other data reduction techniques (Bara et al. 2007). But 
in recent years, particularly with recent and on-going developments in natural 
language processing, there has been an increasing use of computational methods 
for statistical text analysis (often called text mining methods or computer assisted 
text analysis) in fields including discourse analysis, sociological analysis, corpus 
linguistics, amongst others (Chartier & Meunier 2011). While this approach is yet to 
make any significant impact within STS, it has had recent use in identifying media 
frames (Parales-Quenza 2004) and in analysing answers to open ended questions 
which were given as part of the 2010 Wellcome Trust Monitor of public knowledge, 
interest and engagement in biomedical science (Stoneman et al. 2013). It is also 
widely used within political science, particularly in analysing parliamentary debates 
(see Bara et al., 2007; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2005; Laver, Benoit & Garry 2003 for 
examples). 
 
 38 
While we are still nowhere near having computers that are able to understand and 
extract meaning from a text, this approach can only be of use in assisting human 
analysis. At best, the software presents the researcher with a simplified pattern of 
the words making up the text, for interpretation by a process of abduction.  Such a 
technique does nevertheless appear to offer some benefits to the social researchers 
toolkit. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (Schonhardt-Bailey 2005) has argued that CATA 
techniques offer four particular benefits to researchers:  
 
• They guard against researchers and coders infusing their own biases into 
the coding and analysis 
• They can provide an impression of voluminous data in a short space of time 
• Issues with coder reliability are dealt with (as the text does not need to be 
coded for analysis) 
• Issues with sampling are dealt with (as sampling is not required).  
 
Given my own personal past involvement in the field being analysed in my research 
project, it is this first reason (guarding against bias) that makes the technique 
particularly appealing for this research. 
 
It is however important not to think about the software used in these analyses as a 
‘black box’ where you put data in and an analysis comes out. Instead, we need to 
think about the software as the implementation (or automation) of a series of 
methods designed to gain a statistical understanding of the words on the page – 
which must still be understood and interpreted by the researcher. In the following 
sections I will explain this process in more detail, along with the conceptual and 
methodological choices I have made in approaching the analysis. 
 
Conceptual background to CATA 
Computer assisted textual analysis draws very much on ideas of structural 
linguistics, particularly the work of Saussure (Saussure 1916). 
  
 Saussure described a linguistic unit or ‘sign’ as a “double entity” which is made up 
of two inseparable elements – the signifier, or sound image, and the signified, or 
concept. For Saussure, language is not a nomenclature or collection of names for 
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objects, so the ‘sound image’ is not a material concept, but belongs to the system. 
The sign therefore is ultimately determined by the other signs in the system which 
delimit its meaning and possible range of use. Saussure uses an analogy with the 
game of chess, noting that the value of each piece depends on its position on the 
chessboard (Saussure 1916). He describes the sign, as determined by the other 
signs in a system, as the ‘value’ (or the meaning and sound together).  
 
For Saussure then, meaning in language is structural and relational rather than 
referential. To illustrate this point Saussure describes how 'The French word mouton 
may have the same meaning as the English word sheep; but it does not have the 
same value. There are various reasons for this, but in particular the fact that the 
English word for the meat of this animal, as prepared and served for a meal, is not 
sheep but mutton. The difference in value between sheep and mouton hinges on 
the fact that in English there is also another word mutton for the meat, whereas 
mouton in French covers both' (Saussure 1916). 
 
The linguistic model behind CATA is the Word Space Model (Chartier & Meunier 
2011). This is a computational model of meaning that builds on Saussure’s work 
and describes how meaning for words is derived by looking at the way in which 
words are distributed and situated across a large textual data source (Sahlgren 
2006). It is based on two assumptions: 
 
1. The meaning of a word is built through its use 
Or put another way – it is easier to express meaning through a combination of 
words and as such you can measure the meaning of a word by looking at the set of 
words that co-occur with it in a given sentence or paragraph. 
 
For example, looking at the following phrases: 
Catch a ball 
Catch a disease 
Attend a ball 
In a) the meaning of catch, when combined with ball, is similar to grab but in b), 
when it is combined with disease, the meaning of catch changes to be similar to 
contract.  
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In a) the ball being referred to is a spherical object, while in c) it is a dancing event. 
(Erk 2010).  
 
2. Words that have similar co-occurrence patterns have similar meanings.  
Another way of thinking about this would be to imagine all of the words in a text 
presented in a multidimensional space that showed their relationship to every other 
word in the text, such that words that are often used in the same sentence would be 
plotted closer together than those which never occur in the same sentence. Those 
words with similar meanings would be used in similar contexts and would therefore 
be closer to each other in this multidimensional space. By looking at the distance 
between words, it is now possible to see how a computer might be able to help us 
analyse and extract meaning from a text. 
 
For the purposes of the analysis, I am trying to understand how the public and 
experts understand and consider different new and emerging science and 
technologies by analysing the way in which they speak about them. If different 
stakeholders have different meanings and purposes attached to particular words, 
then differences will be reflected in the way they use these words. On the basis of 
the Word Space Model, it will be possible to identify any common underlying 
narratives by looking at the way in which words group together.  
 
Further to that, (Lahlou 1995) has developed a methodology for using computer 
assisted text analysis to understand social representations, but which appears to be 
equally useful for discourse analysis. He argues that although each statement about 
a social representation is always a contextual lexical instantiation of that social 
representation, the semantic content of a social representation is never fully 
communicated within a single statement. By grouping various statements (which 
might have been produced in different context or spoken by different actors) 
together according to their lexical content, it will however be possible to build up a 
‘semantic map’ that becomes a ‘model’ or simplified version of the social 
representation (or discourse in this case) being studied.  
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Software selection – IRAMUTEQ 
There is a variety of CATA software packages available, most of which draw upon 
the word space model, but with each taking a slightly different approach – some 
look at word frequencies, others at co-occurrences, some are effectively 
visualisation techniques while others provide an automation of many of the steps, 
for instance (for a fuller description of the different types of software available, see 
Lowe (2003)). Selecting the right software depends upon how the researcher 
wishes to carry out the analysis – which aspects of the data do you want to focus 
upon.  
 
The software currently available can be split into two main categories – those with 
an inbuilt dictionary (automated) and those in which the researcher creates a 
dictionary of key terms (semi-automated). In the latter, the meaningful content of 
words in the text are specified by the researcher in advance. In the former, the 
meaningful content words in the text (i.e. those words which are included in the 
analysis, since not all words are important) are defined by the words within the 
programme’s own internal dictionary (Bara et al. 2007).  There are two ways of 
doing this – grammatical filtering focuses on words with lexical meaning (i.e. nouns, 
adjectives, verbs or adverbs) while discarding ‘empty’ or ‘functional’ words (articles, 
prepositions and pronouns). Statistical filtering excludes words common to all 
statements (or sentences) on the basis that they have low discriminative power 
(Chartier & Meunier 2011). 
 
Bara, Weale and Bicquelet (2007) have assessed how far these two approaches 
yield different analyses. Using Hamlet (semi-automated) and Alcesete (automated) 
software, they looked at a July 1966 House of Commons debate around a private 
member’s bill on abortion. They concluded that there were similarities of analysis 
despite the detailed differences in the two approaches. The strength of the 
automated software was in its ability to analyse dimensionality and identify the 
textual location of words, while the semi-automated software was better able to 
produce material that could test hypotheses relating to linguistic patterns and to deal 
with smaller corpuses of material. There was however a greater scope for ‘human 
contamination’ in the case of the semi-automated software (Bara et al 2007). 
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For the purposes of this research, a software package with an in built dictionary 
seemed to be the best option for two reasons. Firstly, I have been a practitioner in 
science communication and public dialogue for the last 20 years and have worked 
on some of the dialogue projects being examined. While this gives me valuable 
insight, it also brings with it a particular perspective and expectations on the material 
being considered. I wanted to use the computer-assisted analysis to challenge my 
own conclusions or provide a more robust evidence base for my argument. Using 
an in-built dictionary was the best way of ensuring my own bias didn’t affect my 
work. Secondly, I was keen to be confident that there weren’t any issues that I had 
missed in my preliminary reading. If I had built the dictionary of key words, any bias 
in my expectations and oversight at the reading stage would have been replicated in 
the final analysis. 
 
Beyond this decision, the further choices available depend upon how you would like 
to conduct the analysis.  For instance, the software can stem or lemmatize words, 
use spatial mapping or hierarchical clustering techniques. The differences in each 
case are subtle (see for example (Bara et al. 2007) and (Schonhardt-Bailey 2012) 
both of which compare two or more different approaches to the same analysis and 
conclude that each approach is effective in certain subjectively different 
circumstances). The choice of statistical approach is therefore a subjective 
judgement depending upon what gives you the best information – rather than 
producing answers, the software simply provides a lens or map, through which the 
researcher can view and interpret the data. The choice of which lens to use is down 
to the researcher and task in hand. None of the software will produce clear ‘results’, 
but instead the researcher uses all of this material produced by the software, along 
with the original text, to build an understanding of the discourses and to help identify 
the most plausible inferences from the data.  
 
Another big difference between the various softwares available is their accessibility 
– most are proprietary but one, IRAMUTEQ, is open source and therefore available 
free of charge. While it is relatively new and currently still in a ‘beta’ phase, it has 
been developed around the analytic technique within the Alceste software (Ratinaud 
& Marchand 2012) which has been well documented and tested (see for instance 
Reinert, 1983 and Reinert, 1990). Despite slight differences in the precise nature of 
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the algorithms,1 IRAMUTEQ has been shown to produce results comparable to 
those of ALCESTSE (Ratinaud & Dejean 2009; Ratinaud & Marchand 2012). 
IRAMUTEQ does however have some advantages over ALCESTE: Besides the low 
barriers to entry, it is open source and written in the computer language R, so can 
be customized to perform particular calculations; it uses less computing power so 
can process bigger corpora; it also offers additional functionality, particularly in 
producing graphical representations of the findings. For these reasons, I have 
chosen to use IRAMUTEQ (0.6 version 3) for my analysis.  
 
CATA Methodology 
Beyond describing the lexical basis of CATA approaches, Lahlou (1995, translated 
in Chartier & Meunier 2011) has developed a three-step methodology for using 
CATA in mapping social representations from texts. I have adopted this 
methodology because as well as setting out a clear process for applying the 
approach, it also makes transparent the parts of the analysis which are automated 
by the software and those which involve the researcher. I will discuss this in more 
detail below. 
 
                                                1	  For	  further	  details	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  IRAMUTEQ	  and	  ALCESTE,	  see	  (Mutombo	  2013).	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The three phases of a text mining method for social representation and analysis. 
Adapted from Chartier & Meunier (2011). 
 
The Process 
a. Corpus collection 
This analysis has drawn on three corpuses for analysis: 
 
• Corpus A: Reports of public dialogue activities, funded by the UK 
government and taking place in the UK from 2002-2011. 
The majority of the reports in the analysis were produced from events 
sponsored by the ScienceWise programme, which is the UK Government 
funded programme aiming to help policy-makers commission and use public 
dialogue to inform policy decisions involving science and technology issues. 
In order to ensure that the analysis was not simply the product of a possible 
‘ScienceWise’ voice however, any other publicly-funded UK based events 
that were identified as taking place during the relevant time period were also 
included in the analysis.  
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• Corpus B: Expert reports produced by learned societies and submitted to 
government alongside public dialogue reports 
The majority of the ScienceWise reports either fed into or were accompanied 
by an ‘expert’ report – independent reports produced by groups of expert 
stakeholders, most typically involving senior researchers active in the 
subject, industry representatives, senior funders and in some instances 
ethicists and consumer representatives. These analogous reports formed the 
Corpus B ‘expert documents’ for this research.  
 
• Corpus C: Policy documents relating to issues considered in public dialogue 
and expert reports 
The reports in Corpus C are typically ‘government responses’ to the expert 
submissions, but also include select committee investigations into which the 
public and expert reports were submitted for evidence, as the public and 
expert reports fed into various stages of the policymaking process. These 
documents do not span precisely the same timeframe as the public and 
expert reports, as there is a time-lag in policymakers producing their 
responses.  
 
The list of documents included in the corpuses is given in Appendix 1. 
 
Three of the public dialogue reports did not have analogous expert and/or policy 
reports (The Big Energy Shift , ScienceHorizons and DNA database), These public 
reports were still included in Corpus A however as they were significant projects in 
the ScienceWise programme and were therefore important in developing a 
comprehensive overview of the public discourses. In order to check that their 
inclusion in one corpus and not the other was not distorting differences in results, I 
ran the analysis of public documents using the Corpus A containing these three 
reports and a version which did not. Their presence/absence did not appear to 
significantly alter the classes found – there were of course small difference in the 
lists of significant words, but the overall sense of the discourses understood from 
these lists remained the same.  
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Using the reports, rather than the verbatim transcripts of the discussions that 
produced the reports, does however raise some important interpretive issues. We 
are looking at a mediated and filtered account of the discussions, and therefore the 
discourses identified are the discourses written in the reports. This is not the same 
as the discourses discussed by the participants themselves. While they should 
reflect the discussions taking place at the event, decisions about language, 
vocabulary and discourse will have been made by the report authors and will 
therefore affect what we see. This will be discussed further in the discussion 
section. 
 
Nevertheless, with this in mind, the reports of the discussions were selected as 
source material for a number of reasons: 
 
First, these are the documents presented to policymakers. Apart from those few 
policymakers who attend the dialogue event itself, this is how policymakers 
encounter public dialogue.2 If we want to understand the content of dialogue from 
the policymakers’ perspective, then this is the most valuable evidence to examine.  
 
Secondly, discussions at dialogue events often take place in multiple parallel small 
groups, which are not all recorded or transcribed. Furthermore, not all of the 
discussions are spoken. Participants are often asked to write on flip-charts and post 
it notes, for instance. Transcripts of what was spoken at the meetings would not 
have given a complete picture of the discussions – and indeed in many instances 
full transcripts do not exist for all projects. 
 
Thirdly, there would be ethical issues around using the transcripts. ScienceWise did 
not ask participants to allow the transcripts to be shared with people outside the 
dialogue project. Nor were participants invited to be research subjects when signing 
up to participate in the dialogue events. The reports are however public documents. 
 
                                                2	  This	  is	  based	  upon	  my	  experience	  of	  working	  within	  Government	  and	  within	  the	  ScienceWise	  
programme.	  There	  is	  however	  very	  little	  [nothing]	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  how	  policymakers	  
encounter	  public	  dialogue	  exercises.	  I	  will	  discuss	  this	  further	  in	  the	  context	  of	  my	  interviews	  with	  
policymakers.	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Given the identification of the source material, a number of sections of the reports 
were removed prior to analysis: 
 
• Chapter and section headings. 
• Footnotes 
• Figures and graphs 
• References, sources, and details of consultees. 
 
These elements were removed as they did not contribute to the substantive material 
and would have distorted the analysis because of their frequency of occurrence. We 
did not want words such as ‘chapter’ ‘section’ ‘figure’ and ‘appendix’ featuring 
prominently in the final clusters, for example. Descriptions of the process and 
briefing materials provided by the organisers were also removed from the public 
documents as they were not part of the public discussions. 
 
In addition to that, a number of formatting changes had to be made to the text in 
order to be processed by the Iramuteq software we were using. Specifically: 
• [£] were changed to [pounds] 
• [$] changed to [dollars] 
• [“] and [‘] removed 
• [*] removed 
• All capital letters changed to lower case 
 
 
b. Word selection 
For this analysis, we were only interested in the ‘meaningful’ words in the text. 
Iramuteq automatically identifies these words in two steps: 
 
Words are lemmatized (i.e. reduced to their root forms, so that run, running, ran 
would all appear as run). The point of this is to make sure that functionally similar 
words are not treated as separate entities in the analysis. 
 
Grammatical filtering divides the vocabulary into two classes – function words 
(articles, prepositions and pronouns) and content words (nouns, adjectives, verbs 
and adverbs). While the function words are not used in the analysis, they are not 
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discarded altogether as they might be valuable later in understanding the context of 
context words. For example, whether a word is preceded by his or her, or is or is not 
could be important in making sense of the analysis. 
Iramuteq then breaks down the corpus into text segments, which are based upon 
the sentences within the text. In order to double check that the length of these text 
segments does not affect the outcome of the analysis, Iramuteq produces two 
different sets of text segments. The user specifies the length of these text segments 
– the default setting is 10 and 12 words. Throughout this thesis, I have described 
the results produced on this default setting. I have however also carried out the 
analysis using text segments of 8 & 10 words and of 12 & 14 words. The purpose of 
this was to verify the stability of the classes – as an additional check that they were 
not affected by word length.  These different settings had no effect on the results 
and they all produced the same classes.  
 
c. Automatic clustering 
Following on from the theoretical argument that how people think about subjects is 
reflected in the words they use to talk about them, Lahlou (Lahlou 1995) argues that 
it is reasonable to assume that the words in our texts are structured in a particular 
way and not randomly distributed but that different sentences or text segments will 
express different aspects of the discourse or social representation. On this basis, a 
clustering algorithm which groups together text segments with similar lexical 
features and separates those which are different, can induce or construct a class 
structure that will approximate the lexical structure of the text. Iramuteq does this 
using descending hierarchical clustering (DHC), which aims to find the least 
difference within classes, using Chi-square as a measure of the relationship 
between words: 
 
• A contingency table is produced which maps the presence or absence of a 
particular word in each text segment of the text corpus. Each word in the 
corpus is assigned a column and each segment assigned a row. The 
presence of absence of a particular word in a particular segment is marked 
with a 1 (presence) or 0 (absence) in the appropriate box where that column 
and row meet. 
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• Using this table, words are grouped into classes, according to their 
distribution in the table (and therefore text). The aim is to create classes of 
words that are used in similar ways. Descending Hierarchical Clustering 
(DHC) begins with all of the words in one class and iteratively splits the full 
word list into two classes, then splits the biggest of these two into another 
two, and so forth. The process stops if the predetermined number of 
iterations (throughout I used the default setting of 10) does not result in 
further divisions. Each split is made by considering all of the possible ways 
in which the classes could be cut into two and accepting the division that 
produces two classes which are the most dissimilar to each other, according 
to a Chi-square criterion. Specifically, the text segments are split into two 
groups, and the group indicator is cross tabulated with the words. The 
squared difference between the observed and the expected word 
frequencies is then evaluated and the process repeated until the two 
maximally different classes are found (Stoneman et al. 2013). 
 
d. Thematisation  
Once the classes have been produced, the salient themes of each class need to be 
identified. This is done by looking at the words most strongly associated with a 
particular class. The strength of association between each word and its class is 
expressed by a Chi-squre value, which compares the distribution of words in the 
class (observed) with the way in which words would be distributed by chance 
(expected). Those most closely associated with the class are given as a list of 
significant words, characterising a class’s content and forming the basis of analysis 
for the researcher.  
 
Alongside the DHC analysis, Iramuteq also conducts a correspondence analysis, 
which crosses the whole list of words with each class, presenting the contingency 
table produced in stage 1 as a graph – showing the frequency and relationship of 
each word to the relevant classes. It also maps meta-data with which the researcher 
has tagged the corpus (in my case, report title and year) onto the classes, so it is 
possible to see which reports are most closely associated with each class. Although 
this does not produce any new information, it does help to visualise the way in 
which vocabulary in the corpus is used. 
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At the end of the process, the software produces a dendrogram showing a hierarchy 
of classes, an accompanying list of words that are characteristic for each class (and 
a Chi-square value showing the strength of that association with the class), along 
with various visualisations of this analysis – including a version of the original 
corpus, colour coded for each class; the correspondence analysis graph; details of 
the sentences characteristic of each class; and co-occurring words. 
 
Once the statistical, graphical and wordlist information has been produced by 
IRAMUTEQ, the researcher takes over again.  
 
e. Categorisation 
Finally, at the last step, the researcher’s interpretation and insight are brought into 
the methodology when meaning or ‘descriptors’ are assigned to the classes.  
 
The process described above does not produce any clear ‘results’. Instead the 
researcher uses all of the statistical material produced, along with the original text, 
to build understanding of the discourses and to help identify the most plausible 
inferences from the data. This is not an automatic process but one of abduction, 
with the researcher moving back and forth between the text and the statistical 
information to make sense of the classes and discourses they represent. 
 
I also checked back with the original text to investigate the nature of any text 
excluded from the analysis. The software produces a version of the original text 
colour coded with the classes identified – excluded text is left unmarked.  Using this, 
it was possible to check that any sections not included in the analysis were not of 
material significance. 
 
In order to be confident in the descriptions being assigned to each class (or 
discourse), I drew at least two possible interpretations of the word lists and tested 
them against the additional data and original text, amending my interpretations and 
rejecting the least plausible ones.  
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Issues to look out for/potential risks with the CATA methodology 
1. Robustness.  
My analysis relies strongly upon an automatically generated picture of the text. 
While I have made a number of decisions about the best way to generate this 
picture (as I have explained above, there is no ‘right’ picture, just the most useful 
one), it is still possible that some of the features we are describing are the 
manifestation of the software rather than the text.  
 
Schonhardt-Bailey (Schonhardt-Bailey 2012) argues that one answer to achieving a 
reasonable threshold of robustness is to ask whether the data look different from 
different perspectives or using different methodological toolkits. Traditionally this 
has meant comparing computer text analysis with traditional analytic techniques, 
which is problematic when using big data sources which go beyond the human 
scale (which CATA has been designed to work on), or, as in this case, if there is a 
strong risk of researcher bias. Alternatively, you could try multiple softwares, an 
approach that Schonhardt-Bailey tested, carrying out the same analysis of 
deliberations on US monetary policy using three different softwares (Alceste, T-Lab 
and Dtm-Vic). This approach to verification is problematic in my view as it implies 
that there is a ‘correct’ answer that can be proven. As I have explained above, the 
statistical software is a tools for viewing – more like a telescope than a calculator. 
Furthermore, the largest part of the analysis – the understanding and the 
interpretation is down to the researcher.  
 
For the purposes of this research, I have checked the robustness of the data in 
three ways – firstly by varying the settings of the software and ensuring that there is 
internal consistency in the results; secondly by challenging possible interpretations 
of the classes produced against the original text; thirdly, by re-situating my 
interpretations of overarching discourses, in the context of the literature which has 
interpreted particular discourses.  
 
2. Over emphasis on differences 
Hohl and Gaskell (Hohl & Gaskell 2008) have pointed out that DHC searches for 
statistically significant differences. As a consequence, software such as IRAMUTEQ 
and Alceste might accentuate differences between reports.  
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The solution they propose is to analyse each variable separately – this is precisely 
how I have set about the analysis, but looking at three separate corpuses – those 
containing public discourses, those containing expert discourses and those 
containing policy discourses. In this way, it is possible to be confident that 
differences identified between these corpuses are not the manifestation of the DHC 
algorithm. 
 
This emphasis on difference also makes it possible (although unlikely as the 
approach categorises more than single words) that similar ideas expressed in 
different language (for instance synonyms) might be mis-categorised or missed 
altogether. To ensure against this, the way in which the classes were interpreted set 
out to keep this in mind, looking out for synonyms in different classes, constantly 
moving between the word lists and the original text and checking any excluded texts. 
 
Furthermore, when looking within corpuses, this research is not interested in 
differences between the way in which different technologies are discussed, but the 
discourses that are emerging across the corpus. While I will discuss how the 
different discourses relate to particular areas of science, throughout I have kept in 
mind that there is likely to be more overlap than the analysis suggests. 
  
When looking at the discourses that emerge from the analysis of the public, expert 
and policy reports then, we should keep in mind that it is possible that differences 
within the corpuses might be manifestations of the methodology. This is not likely to 
be the case with differences between the analyses however.   
 
3. Algorithms could miss marginal viewpoints 
Certain points of view may be missed if the sentence segment overlaps several 
categories or if the sentence segment is too short and uses vocabulary too 
infrequently to be to be identified by the algorithm (Biquelet and Weale 2011). This 
is a particular concern that has been raised in the context of assessing the potential 
of text mining software for policymakers to use in analysing consultation responses, 
where a comprehensive understanding of the text is important. This research 
however does not seek to be comprehensive, but instead aims to identify the 
prevailing discourses, which would not fall into this category. This analysis is also 
situated within the wider body of work on individual cases and so any obvious 
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divergences or emissions from smaller-scale work can be identified and followed up 
with the corpus. 
 
Biquelet and Weale (2011) also identify the concern that automated lemmatization 
or stemming can generate problems by forcing the researcher to overlook important 
semantic variations. They give as an example the important difference between 
‘illness’ and ‘ills’, both of which would be stemmed to the same word. This is 
however amongst the reasons why throughout the analysis I return to the original 
text to check for sense, meaning and context – relying on the wordlists alone is not 
sufficient for interpretation. 
 
 
From discourses to sociotechnical imaginaries 
Once these discourses had been identified and described, a series of questions, 
drawing from the work of Jasanoff (Jasanoff & Hurlbut 2014) and Dryzek (Dryzek 
2005), were asked in order to understand the sociotechnical imaginaries at play: 
 
Framework for analysing sociotechnical imaginaries 
1. Basic entities recognised or constructed 
What boundaries relevant to governance are being drawn in the text and on what 
authority (e.g. ethics, law, nature, expert consensus, evidence, common sense)? 
How does life appear in the text? How is human life distinguished from other forms 
and on what basis? 
 
 2. Assumptions about natural relationships 
What statements does the text make about the ‘natural order’? What normative 
assumptions are made about social order? What is taken for granted and what is 
problematized? 
 
3. Agents and their motives 
How do material things ‘act; in the text? How is agency understood and allocated? 
Are assumptions being made about who has the right to speak on particular matters 
and how are these assumptions justified? 
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Does the text show an awareness of power? Does it itself perform power? How? 
  
4. Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices 
(Developed from Jasanoff 2014 & Dryzek 2005) 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
Following the comparison of public, expert and policy discourses and sociotechnical 
imaginaries, the initial conclusions were explored further in face-to-face, semi-
structured interviews with policymakers.  
 
This approach was chosen for the following reasons: 
• As I was only likely to achieve contact with the policymakers on one 
occasion, semi-structured interviews provided the flexibility necessary to 
gather all of the information needed in that one sitting.  
• I wanted to understand how a range of policymakers understood public 
dialogue and its outputs, what they saw as appropriate evidence for 
policymaking and how that feeds into decision making. The semi-structured 
setting allowed sufficient flexibility to explore various dimensions according 
to the policymakers’ experience, whilst still providing enough structure to 
allow comparisons to be made (Cohen et al. 2011). 
• My research was primarily focused on gaining insight and understanding into 
perceptions and values and so context, language and depth of meaning was 
important (Gillham 2000; Ritchie et al. 2013).  
The policymakers were selected to represent a spread of seniority, areas of 
experience and potentially different degrees of experience with public dialogue 
activities. They were identified by personal contacts and recommendations from 
previous interviewees. Such ‘snowball sampling’ or ‘chain referral’ is problematic 
because it contradicts many of the principles around random selection and 
representativeness (Atkinson & Flint 2003), but is considered appropriate to use 
when subjects are difficult to reach (Faugier & Sargeant 1997). It is particularly 
appropriate for this research as one of its main strengths is in accessing small or 
elite groups – such as policymakers (Atkinson & Flint 2003). In such situations 
where higher levels of trust are required to initiate contact, snowballing helps give 
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researchers the characteristics of being an ‘insider’ – which facilitates access 
(Atkinson & Flint 2003). Indeed, as I will present later, as well as aiding access, in 
practice the ‘insider’ status elicited by snowball sampling also appeared to generate 
some interesting and surprisingly frank answers to interview questions.  The 
interviews were conducted until the same themes appeared to be repeating and no 
new theoretical insights were being brought to light.  
 
The final group of policymakers for interview comprised: 
• 2 x Former Chief Scientists 
 
• 4 x Former Government Ministers.  
Two of these had been ministers in departments which made policy with 
science, two were from departments with responsibility for the Science 
Budget. Two were former secretaries of state, two were former ministers of 
state; Three were from the Labour Party, one from the Conservative Party. 
Three are MPs, one is a Peer in the House of Lords. 
 
• 3 x Civil Servants 
All three had had responsibility for issues with a strong scientific element or 
for overseeing a department’s evidence base. 
 
• 1x Former Special Adviser3  
The interviews were semi-structured, based around the same series of questions, 
but adapted for the particular interviewee’s background and the direction that 
responses took. The question framework is given in Appendix 5. Each interview 
lasted around an hour and was recorded and transcribed.  
 
The transcriptions were initially interpreted by a deductive approach – using a 
coding framework based on the hypotheses emerging from the computer assisted 
                                                3	  The	  role	  of	  a	  special	  adviser	  is	  to	  add	  “a	  political	  dimension	  to	  the	  advice	  and	  assistance	  available	  to	  ministers,	  while	  reinforcing	  the	  political	  impartiality	  of	  the	  permanent	  civil	  service	  by	  distinguishing	  the	  source	  of	  political	  advice	  and	  support”	  (Cabinet	  Office	  2010).	  Further	  descriptions	  are	  available	  in	  the	  report	  “Being	  a	  Special	  Adviser”	  (The	  Constitution	  Unit	  2014).	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text analyses. They were then revisited more inductively, using thematic content 
analysis which involves identifying themes within the transcript data and gathering 
together examples of those themes from the text (Burnard et al. 2008). This dual 
approach ensured that the text analysis had not biased the reading of the 
interviews, and that important insight hadn’t been missed. 
 
Transcriptions of the interviews have not been provided, as it is not possible to do 
so and maintain the interviewees’ anonymity, in keeping with the UCL ethics 
approval agreement. 
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Chapter	  4:	  Results	  –	  Analysis	  of	  Public	  and	  Expert	  documents	  
 
In this chapter, I set out to open up the content of the output of public dialogues – 
and to compare them to similar discussions that take place in the expert scientific 
community. By understanding more about the substance of the discussions, and the 
differences between them, I aim to build up a picture of the public perspectives, with 
a view to comparing them to policy perspectives and assessing whether or not they 
have been accounted for in public policy in Chapter 6.  
 
Taking the reports of public dialogue activities funded by the UK government from 
2002-2010 first, followed by the analogous expert report, this chapter examines the 
key discourses presented within these reports and compares them to each other. In 
particular, I set out to understand more about what it is that policymakers are 
appearing to ignore – is there anything useful in the substance of the public reports? 
How do the discourses and sociotechnical imaginaries presented in the public 
reports compare with expert discourses and which ones are more closely aligned 
with government discourses around the same subjects? Do the discourses within 
the reports reveal any fundamental differences between the public/expert/policy 
views? And what do these differences reveal about the socio-technical imaginaries 
being enacted? Does this help us understand more about they types of expertise 
used in policymaking? Finally, what can we learn that will help public dialogue have 
greater impact in the future?  
 
This chapter focuses on the results and interpretation of the classes produced from 
Corpus A: Reports of public dialogue activities funded by the UK government 2002-
2011, and Corpus B: Expert reports produced by UK learned societies and 
submitted to government alongside public dialogue reports.  A full list of the 
documents included in these analyses is given in Appendix 1. 
 
I initially present the interpretive labels that I have assigned to the classes emerging 
from the public and expert documents, along with some illustrations of the words 
associated with each class. The full list of significant words are given Appendix 2 
(public) and Appendix 3 (expert).  
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Following that, I use Sheila Jasanoff’s concept of sociotechnical imaginaries 
(Jasanoff & Kim 2009) and John Dryzek’s work on environmental discourse analysis 
(Dryzek 2005; Dryzek et al. 2008) to interpret the data further, to build up a picture 
of the sociotechnical imaginaries at play and to compare discourses and 
imaginaries across the public and expert texts.  
 
A. Public dialogue reports (Corpus A) 
 
Overall, the 18 texts comprising Corpus A contained 9062 unique words, 
lemmatised to 6602 words, of which 6055 were active words. The corpus contained 
5592 text segments and 3999 segments were classified in the analysis (71.5%). 
The analysis of the 18 public dialogue reports produced five classes, reflecting five 
distinct discourses. The full wordlists contributing to these classes are given in 
Appendix 2, but the top 10 words and their Chi-squared values (which indicates the 
strength of the relationship to the class, with higher Chi-squared values meaning 
stronger relationships), along with the documents associated with these classes are 
given in the table below: 
 
Table 1: Words contributing to the classes produced by IRAMUTEQ analysis 
of public dialogue documents. 
 
Class 10 most significant 
words 
Chi squared Associated 
documents 
Class A1 
(15.68%) 
drug 
young 
recreational 
outreach 
user 
person 
belfast 
illicit 
child 
parent 
	  
1701.98 
764.02 
486.28 
433.42 
389.79 
331.37 
327.59 
316.51 
314.57 
271.52 
	  
Drugsfutures (2006) 
Class A2 
(25.48%)  
application 
area 
227.42 
200.03 
Nanotechnology for 
healthcare (2008) 
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treatment 
biology 
potential 
science 
synthetic 
disease 
fund 
nanotechnology 
	  
184.55 
160.5 
138.19 
129.31 
114.87 
110.46 
107.63 
106.32 
	  
 
BBSRC Synthetic 
Biology (2009) 
 
Stem Cell Dialogue 
(2007) 
 
Science Horizons 
small groups 
(2006) 
	  
Class A3 
(23.38%) 
climate 
geoengineering 
change 
public 
event 
mitigation 
dialogue 
decision 
talk 
member 
	  
344.17 
289.72 
267.31 
210.07 
180.45 
110.57 
88.21 
76.57 
76.17 
75.67 
	  
Geoengineering 
(2010) 
 
SciHorizons 
deliberative panel 
(2006) 
 
Big Energy Shift 
(2008) 
 
Nanodialogues 
(2005) 
 
Small Talk (2005) 
 
Forensic use of DNA 
(2007) 
	  
	  
Class A4 
(17.65%) 
industrial 
biotechnology 
gm 
food 
crop 
environment 
product 
consumer 
release 
fuel 
	  
834.35 
794.78 
664.09 
618.96 
285.04 
223.68 
198.64 
165.86 
137.91 
136.12 
	  
	  
Industrial 
Biotechnology (2006) 
 
GM Foods (2002) 
 
BBSRC Synthetic 
Biology (2009) 
	  
	  
Class A5 animal 
human 
1509.84 
1320.22 
Animals Containing  
Human Material 
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material 
embryo 
research 
create 
hybrid 
egg 
agree 
welfare 
	  
842.35 
776.89 
405.32 
251.13 
242.16 
180.06 
164.41 
153.61 
	  
(2010) 
 
Hybrids and 
Chimera (2006) 
 
Stem Cell Dialogue 
(2007) 
	  
 
 
The dendrogram below (Figure 1) shows the relationship between the classes and 
their interpretive label:  
 
Figure 1: Classes produced by IRAMUTEQ analysis of public dialogue documents 
2002-2010, with interpretive labels. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Class	  A1	  (15.7%)	  
Drugs:	  cure	  or	  cause	  for	  medical	  or	  social	  
problems?	  
	  
Class	  A4	  (17.6%)	  	  
Challenging	  our	  way	  of	  life	  
	  
Class	  A2	  (25.5%)	  
Reaching	  potential	  whilst	  minimising	  risk	  
	  
Class	  A3	  (23.4%)	  
Precautionary	  in	  principle	  
	  
Class	  A5	  (17.8%)	  
Messing	  with	  nature	  –	  where	  do	  we	  draw	  
the	  line?	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The figure below shows the results of the correspondence factor analysis produced 
by crossing the words and classes in the contingency table. The 30 most related 
words for each class are shown. Word size reflects their association with that class 
(chi-square value) rather than frequency. It shows that the classes A2, A3 and A4 
are most closely related to each other while the other two classes (A1 and A5) are 
distinct and discrete. 
 
Figure 2: Correspondence Analysis of classes produced by public dialogue 
documents, with interpretive labels. 
 
Class A1 (15.7%): 
Drugs – cure or 
cause for medical or 
social problems? 
Class A5 (17.8%) Messing 
with nature – where do we 
draw the line? 
Class A4 (17.6%): 
Challenging our 
way of life 
Class A3 (23.4%): 
precautionary in 
principle 
Class A2 
(25.5%) 
Reaching 
potential whilst 
minimising risk 
Fa
cto
r 2
 =
 2
8.
43
%
 
Factor 1 = 33.58% 
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Corpus A Initial interpretation: Class descriptions 
In the following section, I will describe the five classes that the analysis of public 
dialogue reports produced and present the most plausible interpretive label. I also 
present a fictional illustrative paragraph for each class, to help explain its content 
more vividly. Both the interpretive labels and the illustrative paragraphs have been 
developed using all of the data produced by the analysis, along with the original text 
– as detailed in the methodology. 
 
Class A1 (15.1%): Drugs – Cure or cause, treating medical or social 
problems?  
From the dendrogram and the correspondence analysis above, you can see that 
Class A1, is the discourse that is most different to the others. It is also unique in this 
analysis as it relates to one issue only (drugs) and is drawn from the vocabulary of a 
single ScienceWise report – the report from the project DrugsFutures, which looked 
at public views of drugs, with particular regards to the potential of cognition 
enhancers.  It appears therefore that issues in this dialogue around drugs and 
cognition enhancers were talked about in a way that is very different to the way in 
which other new technologies (included in the other discourses) were discussed. 
 
Illustrative statement: 
“I know that drugs like heroin need to be illegal because of the harm they 
cause – especially for vulnerable young people. But I suppose we could say 
the same about other recreational drugs like alcohol or nicotine, which can 
also be addictive. And while prescription drugs can help people with mental 
health problems, where do we draw the line with social problems? Should 
people be allowed to take drugs that help them do well in education, for 
instance?” 
 
The majority of this discourse relates to attitudes towards recreational drugs. In 
particular, it focuses on the complexity of the situation – the way in which drugs 
have differing impacts on different groups of people (young people and those 
susceptible to addiction in particular) and our confusing attitudes towards and legal 
drugs such as alcohol. People were very much the focus of the discourse, with 
significant words including a long list of ‘people’ words – users, person, child, 
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parent, family, addict, teacher, peer, criminal. Regulation was framed as a legal 
matter with associated words including legal, illegal, law, criminal, prison. The 
following sentences from the original text illustrate this: 
 
“Harm to future health was the primary reason given for restricting drug use 
amongst young people. Some felt that the legal age for alcohol use should be 
raised to 21” 
Drugsfutures 2006 
 
“Teachers pointed to alcohol use by young children as the next big issue. 
They argued that alcohol was more socially acceptable and easily available 
than illicit recreational drugs.” 
Drugsfutures 2006 
 
The smaller part of the discourse, discussing cognition enhancers specifically, 
appears to focus on the question of under which circumstances cognition enhancers 
would be acceptable. Issues of fairness and equality rather than health appear to 
dominate, with words such as ‘inequality’, ‘stigma’, ‘weak’ and ‘vulnerable’ being 
significant. Alongside this, the unforeseen consequences of the drugs and lack of 
information about them, and the need to deal with underlying social problems that 
might be giving rise to a desire to use these drugs was important. For example, the 
following sentence from the original text: 
 
“They acknowledged that restrictions on legal use might increase the 
inequalities about which they were concerned, since the number of people 
with the money and inclination to try [cognition enhancers] would grow” 
Drugsfutures 2006 
 
Overall, this class contained no words that might be described as positive (such as 
cure, promise, potential, value) but instead included negative words such as harm, 
vulnerable, danger, stigma, weak. That said, the discourse also appears to keep the 
matters open – while harm and danger is discussed, this is not necessarily in the 
context of judging whether drugs and cognition enhancers are a good or bad thing. 
Instead, the discourse explores the issues around these developments and 
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considers the conditions under which they may be good or bad. Where the line 
between legal/illegal drugs should be drawn, for example. 
 
Class A2 (25.5%): ‘Reaching potential whilst minimising risk’ 
The biggest class, Class A2 (25.5%) ‘Reaching potential whilst minimising risk’ is a 
largely positive discourse that discusses how, while there are potential problems 
with particular new technologies, they also offer significant upsides. It is related to 
discussions around biomedical science, with the ‘Nanosciences for Health’, ‘BBSRC 
Synthetic Biology’ and ‘Stem Cells’ dialogues being the most closely associated 
reports.  
 
Illustrative statement: 
“These technologies show a lot of promise to develop medical treatments in 
the future. But there are also risks (some unknown) and the private 
companies involved will be driven by the need to make a profit. We need to 
think about how we govern and regulate this tension.” 
 
This is the most positive class produced by the analysis – with significant words 
including ‘aspiration’, ‘potential’, ‘innovation’, ‘advance’ and ‘progress’.  These are 
however tempered by discussions around risks and downsides, with words such as 
‘risk’, ‘concern’, ‘misuse’ and ‘uncertainty’ being significant too. While the risks are 
seen as inherent to the technologies, they are nevertheless discussed in terms of 
the best ways to minimise them without putting the brakes on the potential benefits 
that these technologies could bring. This is illustrated by the sentence below from 
the original text: 
 
“There was a view that there were inherent risks involved in developing new 
technologies but that if we were too careful with the development of 
nanotechnologies then this could lead to the field stagnating and loosing impetus.”  
Nanotechnology for Healthcare, 2008 
 
People in this discourse are spoken of in terms of their relationship to the 
technologies – patient, stakeholder, donor.  
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This discourse also makes reference to the role of the private sector, its need to turn 
a profit and questions around who benefits from these developments. The need for 
and role of governance is discussed in relation to this – in controlling the direction of 
science and making sure that these financial interests do not have a distorting 
effect. Associated words include ‘profit’, ‘investment’, ‘commercial’, ‘governance’, 
‘control’ and ‘regulation’. The following sentence from the original text illustrates this 
well: 
 
“Whilst participants generally did not consider academic scientists as doing 
research with profit as the main motive, the potential allure of private sector 
investments and the relative inexperience of researchers in brokering effective 
business deals could mean that ideas and innovations get taken in directions 
that are much less socially beneficial.” 
BBSRC Synthetic Biology Dialogue 2009. 
 
Class A3: Precautionary in Principle 
The next largest class is Class A3 (23.4%) Precautionary in Principle, talks about 
uncertainties around new technologies. It is particularly drawn from discussions 
about geoengineering, nanotechnology and energy, but also the HGC DNA 
Database dialogue and ScienceHorizons, which covered a range of technological 
futures.  
 
Illustrative Statement: 
“We need to know a lot more about these new technologies and to discuss 
them further before we can make decisions and policy about them. We need 
independent advice about whether they will work and what the costs and side 
effects will be.” 
 
Although only slightly smaller than Class A2 (Reaching potential whilst minimising 
risk), this class represents a more negative or sceptical discourse. The only positive 
word associated with the class is ‘appreciated’ but it is used in the sense of 
‘understand’ rather than ‘like’ – and indeed most often to indicate a lack of 
understanding (so preceded by the word ‘not’). Rather than seeking to reach a 
judgement on whether particular technologies are good or bad, this class focuses 
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on the consequences of technologies and how to control them. These 
consequences are however discussed using the term ‘hazard’ (rather than ‘risk’ 
used in Class A2). Going back to look at the word in the original text, it appears to 
be used in the report author’s voice (i.e. in sections of commentary rather than 
direct quotes) and points towards the concept of ‘moral hazard’ – rather than being 
inherently risky technologies, the danger lies in the direction that they take us. 
Illustrating this: 
 
“They were keen for new technologies to work with existing ones to maximise 
efficacy. They also wanted to avoid a particular moral hazard that investing in 
geoengineering activities might distract attention from mitigation.” 
Geoengineering dialogue 2010 
 
Naturalness is a significant word in this class, and, going back to the original text, it 
appears to be used as one of the key frames within which the technologies being 
discussed were considered. In particular, naturalness or nature is talked about in 
terms of it being a self-contained system in balance, with technology moving us 
away from nature and further away from this rightful balance. 
 
“Naturalness was an important theme underpinning many of the principles. 
Most participants believed that natural systems are balanced and self 
contained and that geoengineering should be considered in terms of how well 
it preserves natural systems”  
Geoengineering dialogue 2010 
 
In terms of regulatory words, this discourse is more specific about who has ultimate 
responsibility for the direction and course of science – the state. The vocabulary in 
Class A3 includes ‘decision’, ‘policy’, ‘policymaker’, ‘government’, ‘political’ and 
‘authority’. People are referred to in terms that indicate their relationship to the state 
or regulation too – words such as ‘citizen’, ‘expert’, ‘policymakers’ are significant. 
These regulatory words are however coupled with a scepticism or distrust in these 
authorities ability to act effectively – trust is an important word in the discourse: 
 
“Many people have doubts about regulatory authorities’ power and competence” 
Small Talk 2006 
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”Participants were somewhat sceptical of the motivation of commercial 
interest and governments to ensure that the fairest outcomes were achieved” 
Geoengineering dialogue 2010. 
 
“Some also believe that past actions and hidden agendas have shown that the 
government can’t be trusted”  
HGC DNA Database 2007. 
 
As well as regulating research, two other roles are articulated for policymakers: 
Firstly they are talked about as recipients of the outcomes of the dialogue 
discussions – that policymakers should listen to the views expressed by the public; 
secondly, they are talked about as givers of information. Indeed information and 
communication was an important part of this discourse, with significant words 
including ‘understand’, ‘inform’, ‘communicate’, ‘explain’ and ‘information’. This 
suggests a ‘deficit’ narrative within this discourse, which, going back to the original 
text, appears to be driven by the participants’ comments expressing a need for more 
information to make informed decisions. However this deficit narrative also appears 
in comments by the reports’ authors, which consider whether or not the process had 
informed people and changed their views:  
 
“There was a general concern that participants did not know enough about 
synthetic biology at this point to make an informed decision about it. They 
were also concerned that the media would hijack any debate about it.” 
Royal Academy of Engineering Synthetic biology dialogue 2008 
 
“We should inform people in the country as much as possible about what is 
being done, so they can get involved in decision making to the best of their 
abilities”  
Geoengineering dialogue 2010 
 
“Reservations and fears tended to be about specific technologies and policies 
and some of these faded when more information was given.”  
Science Horizons Deliberative Panel 2006. 
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Class A4 (17.6%): The slippery slope to challenging our way of life 
Class A4 ‘The slippery slope to challenging our way of life’ (17.6%) relates to 
industrial/agri biology’s impact on fundamental aspects of the environment and our 
food. The most associated dialogues are industrial biotechnology, the Food 
Standards Agency’s GM dialogue and the BBSRC’s Synthetic Biology dialogue. 
 
Illustrative statement: 
“These technologies might bring some economic benefits and cheap food, but 
I don’t think we have the right to do this to the natural world. In the long term, 
I’m worried about whether they are safe, their effects on the environment and 
where this will lead.” 
 
As with Class A3 (and Class A5, described later), this discourse shows 
considerable concern for what is natural, and science/technology’s potential to 
impact it. Words such as ‘natural’, ‘environment’ and ‘land’ are strongly associated 
with the class. But whereas nature was conceived as a system in Class A3, in this 
class it is conceptualized as a binary rule or law that we must obey or face the 
consequences. In fact there are no other regulatory words in this class. 
 
“Some farmers in Pakistan went into debt to buy GM seed, but they couldn’t 
sell the crops for enough money to afford the next year’s GM seed. GM 
technology violates natural law for economic gain” 
FSA GM Foods 2002 
 
“Science was often viewed as transgressing nature, both in terms of 
manipulating nature itself, altering distinctions between human and non 
human and modifying an organism and so on and the idea of natural balances 
and the revenge of nature.” 
BBSRC Synthetic biology 2009 
 
“A key concern was the natural/unnatural dichotomy, which many taking part 
struggled to reconcile” 
Industrial Biotechnology 2006 
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“The origin of the nanomaterials was a concern for participants, with the use of 
natural materials such as collagen and hyaluronic acids helping to alleviate 
concerns for certain groups.” 
Nanotechnologies for healthcare 2008 
 
Linked to that, an important feature of this discourse is questioning where the 
research/technologies will lead to. Rather than talking about the ‘moral hazard’ 
mentioned in Class A3 (which would take us down the wrong path) however, this 
class contains words such as ‘slippery’ and ‘slope’, suggesting a sense of science 
getting out of control – it’s not that we will choose the wrong direction, but that we 
won’t be able to stop it once it starts moving there. 
 
“Another view expressed was that the risks associated with the slippery slope 
argument are outweighed by the potential benefits” 
Hybrids and Chimera 2006 
 
“Concerns expressed about industrial biotechnology were actually a product 
of a wider fear of science and technological development. In general, people 
were worried about the capacity for science to take things too far.” 
Industrial Biotechnology 2006 
 
‘Safe’ is also an important word of the discourse and is talked about in terms of the 
reassurances necessary for public approval. Examples from the original text using 
the words in this sense are largely drawn from participant quotes: 
 
“We should just wait a little bit longer so we know that it is completely safe” 
FSA GM foods 2002 
 
“Everything has to be safe and beneficial. That’s how they’ll win people over”  
Royal Academy of Engineering Synthetic biology dialogue 2008 
 
People are talked about in the context of agri-industry, with words such as 
‘consumer’, ‘producer’ and ‘farmer’ being significant, suggesting that much of the 
discussion took place against a backdrop of industrialization. Reinforcing that, the 
word ‘labelling’ is important too. 
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Class A5 (17.8%): Where do we draw the moral line when we mess with 
humans?  
Class A5 ‘Where do we draw the moral line when we mess with humans?’ (17.8%), 
discusses where the limits of biomedical research should be. This discourse relates 
most closely to discussions around biomedical developments, specifically the 
dialogues around animals containing human material, hybrid embryos and stem 
cells, but with some contributions from synthetic biology, industrial biology and GM.  
 
Illustrative statement: 
“The things that scientists can do with these technologies is not natural and I 
am not sure we have the moral right to do this. I can see that they might help 
some people, but I think I can only accept it if it will help humans with life-
threatening conditions.” 
 
Like the previous classes, the discourse in this class relates to the acceptability or 
otherwise of (stem cell and embryo) technologies and how we manage this. But 
unlike the previous classes, talk is not about regulation or policy. Instead, Class A5 
discusses whether or not this research should be done and appeals to morality 
rather than legality. Words such as ‘moral’, ‘acceptable’, ‘controversial’ and 
‘boundaries' are important, as opposed to safety, risk and governance-related words 
in previous classes.  
 
“Why did you create something that ought to be a human being with the 
intention of never allowing it to be? Are you morally allowed to do that?” 
Stem Cells 2007 
 
“The first [concern] was around the ethics of using foetal material for clinical or 
research purposes, with certain participants uncomfortable as to whether this 
was morally acceptable” 
Stem Cells 2007 
 
“While overall animals containing human material research was seen as 
acceptable in principle, some things were seen to be towards or beyond the 
boundaries of acceptability” 
Animals Containing Human Material 2010 
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“Many appeared to view a clear rationale for the research as the key to 
determining whether it was acceptable or not” 
Hybrids and Chimera 2006 
 
A judgement about whether or not particular aspects of research is ‘unnatural’, and 
a sense of ‘meddling with nature’ is also an important feature in this discourse. 
Unlike in Class A3 whereby the term appears to refer to a state of balance, or Class 
A4 where it refers to a law or rule, words relating to nature and naturalness appear 
to be serving a boundary or ontological purpose in differentiating particular ways of 
being. Something is either natural or not natural. This difference demarcates the line 
between humans and others and between what should and should not be done in 
science. It is used in a very concrete way, as if it is a concrete and clear boundary 
that everyone can see and which science and technology should be guided by:  
 
“It seems unsafe to carry out procedures which are unnatural, in the sense of 
being not possible by natural processes”  
Hybrids and Chimera 2006 
 
“Many participants seemed to be more concerned about the possibility of new 
or unnatural creatures being created than they were about in vitro 
experiments in laboratories” 
Animals Containing Human Material 2010 
 
“The moral rights and wrongs of specific applications were also noted, with 
certain respondents questioning the motivations of scientists in creating Dolly 
the sheep or in undertaking cloning research more generally, which was 
described as an unnatural process.” 
BBSRC Synthetic Biology 2009. 
 
“Although participants could see the benefits, they would only be acceptable if 
they did not create something genetically different or unnatural in the process” 
Industrial Biotechnology 2006 
 
In keeping with that, people are discussed in terms of ‘human’, ‘man’, ‘woman’. 
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Alongside these concerns, the discourse does however contain recognition that 
these technologies could help in some circumstances – specifically when they could 
help people with terrible and life threatening diseases. Positive words such as 
‘possibility’, ‘supportive’ and ‘permit’ are associated with the class. Interestingly, as 
some of the quotes below show, some of these expressions of support appear to be 
interpretations by the report authors, rather than verbatim comments from 
participants: 
 
“There is a strong increase in agreement in creating embryos which contain a 
small amount of animal material if it may help to understand some diseases” 
Hybrids and Chimera 2006 
 
“Participants were sanguine about the idea of different animals containing 
human material research experiments because they did not really believe that 
what was being discussed was sufficient to threaten the boundaries between 
human and animal.” 
Animals Containing Human Material, 2010 
 
“Their outlook was strongly influenced by an underlying view that human life 
has pre-eminent value and that animals containing human material was seen 
to extend or enhance human life.” 
Animals Containing Human Material 2010 
 
“Nearly four fifths agree with using human embryos in research if it may help 
to understand some diseases, for example Parkinson’s or Motor Neurone 
disease. 
Hybrids and Chimera 2006 
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Summary of key features of public discourses 
a. Groups of technologies, groups of views 
Overall, the first thing that is clear about discourses identified by looking at the 
reports of public discussions on science and technology is that people talk about 
different technologies in different ways.  
 
Importantly, these different attitudes and ways of talking appear to cluster or group 
in a particular way. Specifically, I have found distinct discourses around drugs 
(Class A1); technologies with biomedical applications such as stem cells, 
nanoscience and synthetic biology (Class A2); non-biomedical technologies such as 
geoengineering, the UK DNA database, energy and non-medical applications of 
nanoscience (Class A3); technologies that work with the genetic building blocks of 
life, such as synthetic biology and GM (Class A4); and those which involve 
combining human and animal material, such as hybrid embryos (Class A5).  
 
b. Focus on people not technologies 
In terms of how the different groups of technologies were discussed, in all cases 
people (rather than the technologies) were the focus. The ways in which people 
were conceptualised changed however according to the technology being 
discussed: when talking about drugs (Class A1), people are described in relational 
terms, with family, child and parent being mentioned and distinctions made between 
young people (who need to be protected) and adults. Discussions around 
biomedicine (medical applications of nanoscience, synthetic biology and stem cells, 
Class A2), refer to people in medical terms – patient, donor, stakeholder. In Class 
A3, (discussions relating to Geoengineering, energy, nanoscience and the DNA 
Database) people are talked about in terms of their relationship to decision-making 
– government, expert, policymaker, citizen, scientist, and in discussions about 
Industrial biotechnology, GM and synthetic biology (Class A4), people are spoken of 
in terms of their economic roles: consumers, producers, industry, supermarkets, 
farmers. Class A5, discussing chimera, animal-human hybrids and stem cells talks 
at the species level – ‘humans’, ‘animals’, ‘man’ and ‘mouse’.  
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c. Sense of progress and potential, but also unease 
The discourses around biomedical applications of stem cells, synthetic biology and 
nanoscience were the most positive and in these cases maximising the benefits and 
minimising the ‘problems’ associated with them is talked about as the priority. The 
discourse indicates a belief that science does offer progress and the promise of 
human advancement, particularly in relation to its potential to cure diseases. While 
risks are recognised, they are seen as worth taking if it leads to cures. What is 
unclear however is the extent to which this enthusiasm was introduced by the 
framing or prompting of the facilitators – I will discuss this further later. 
 
Other technologies are met with a stronger sense of scepticism, or at least a greater 
need for balance. Importantly, none of the discourses indicated a ‘final’ view or clear 
line of action – calls for bans or moratoriums were not evident. There were however 
requests for more information, time or more control and on-going review and 
supervision. 
 
While there is no evidence of an outright rejection of any particular technologies, a 
number of reasons behind this sense of unease were evident in the discourses, 
including: concerns about unforeseen consequences and the moral hazards 
associated with technologies that might take us in a direction that we might not want 
to go as a society; that the science is out of control and is unstoppable; that science 
is too easily influenced by industry; that new technologies could lead to greater 
unfairness in society and that we are using them (especially drugs) to avoid dealing 
with more difficult, underlying social problems; and whether we even have the right 
to carry out many of the procedures that technologies (particularly those involving 
putting animal parts into human cells) are enabling us to do.  
 
d. Regulation and governance 
There were also differences in the way in which people talked about the regulation 
of different technologies. Drugs were spoken of in terms of criminal law. For 
biomedical applications of synthetic biology, nanoscience and stem cells, controlling 
and regulating the role of industry and the market was important. Controlling the 
development of non-biomedical technologies such as geoengineering was spoken 
of as a matter for government policy while regulating GM was discussed in terms of 
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consumer relationships, with labelling an important word, but also in terms of the 
laws of nature, and the potential of vengeance if they are not obeyed. Finally, 
control of more complex genetic technologies involving animal and human DNA was 
discussed in terms of morals – that morality rather than legality would be the basis 
of judging whether a technology should or should not be developed.  
 
In terms of who should make decisions about new technologies, the overarching 
mood appears to be that experts and policymakers should make decisions while 
taking public views into account. There is much talk of information – and the need to 
know more before decisions are made. Some of this appears to come from a ‘deficit’ 
framing of the dialogue events (or at least the reports), but it also does appear to 
draw on a genuine view of the public that while experts need to listen, they are also 
the ones best placed to make the decisions.  
 
e. Social and ethical issues discussed as inherent to technologies 
Besides this particular grouping of technologies, another important finding of this 
analysis is that the social and ethical issues are discussed in the context of the 
technologies themselves. The classes produced by the analysis are themed around 
the technologies rather than the issues – there is no class devoted to ‘aspirations’ or 
‘risks’ or ‘explaining the science’, for example, but instead ‘aspirations’ and ‘risks’ 
are found within the classes discussing particular ‘types’ of technologies. The public 
discourses then treat the benefits and risks of technologies as fundamental parts of 
the technologies themselves which cannot be separated out. They are different 
faces of the same coin.  
 
f. Role of nature 
At the heart of most of the discourses is the idea of nature and naturalness. This is 
not just in discussions around environmental technologies, but also in discussions 
about stem cells and hybrid embryos, which challenge people’s concepts of 
‘naturalness’. Even in the class relating to drugs, where ‘nature’ is not a significant 
word, there was nevertheless a sense of the concept of ‘naturalness’ in the way in 
which value judgements were being made between drug and non-drug based 
interventions – there was a clear preference towards non-drug based solutions to 
mental health problems, leading to the suggestion that we might be medicalising 
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social problems, for example. Similarly discussion about the potential of cognition 
enhancers to help student performance were clear that this was far less acceptable 
than other interventions such as additional tutoring, regardless of cost and safety.  
 
As I will consider further in the discussion (Chapter 7), others have previously 
identified a role for the concept of ‘nature’ or ‘naturalness’ in public conceptions of 
technology or risk (see for instance Jasanoff, 2005; Lock, Smallman, Lee, & Rydin, 
2014; Wagner et al., 2001). But while this analysis supports these findings, it also 
shows something new – that the public discourses are drawing on three distinctly 
different concepts of nature or naturalness itself – sometimes used together, but 
distinct nevertheless. Although these conceptions have been written about 
elsewhere (for example Gaskell & Bauer, 2001; Wagner et al., 2001) the distinction 
between the three appears to be unmade. They do however seem to be significant 
in revealing how people consider particular new technologies: 
 
(i) Ontological 
Firstly, throughout the discourses but particularly in discussions relating to gene-
technologies (especially those which mix the genes of different species) nature is 
conceived in ‘ontological’ terms – as a state of being. Something is either natural or 
it is not. This appears to be providing an important boundary between what is and 
what is not desirable, echoing previous research (Lock et al. 2014) that equated 
‘natural’ with ‘desirable’ in regards to climate change technologies.  
 
The degree of importance that participants put upon this distinction suggests that 
they have very certain ideas of naturalness, which they use as a yardstick to gauge 
the acceptability of a newly-encountered (uncertain) science. On the other hand, as 
others have argued that the boundary between the natural and unnatural is in reality 
much less certain and is actually a constructed, negotiated and contested boundary 
(Jasanoff 2005, p.131; Jasanoff et al. 1998; Cronon 1996; Latour 1993), it is likely 
that we are also seeing some of this negotiation and construction taking place 
during the dialogues – in the process of deciding what is acceptable and 
unacceptable, participants are also deciding what is natural and unnatural.  
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(ii) Ecological 
Secondly, in relation to non-biomedical technologies such as geoengineering and 
agricultural biotechnology, nature is conceived in ecological terms, as a balanced 
system within which we cannot necessarily anticipate what will happen when 
humans intervene. This lack of ability to anticipate what will happen is particularly 
important, as a view emerges that it makes no sense to develop more technologies 
to address the unforeseen consequences of other technologies – in the case of 
geoengineering, for instance. 
 
This ‘ecological’ conception of nature appears to draw upon the environmental 
movement’s narratives around ecosystems, Gaia and a spiritual sense of ‘mother 
earth’ (Nordhaus & Shellenberger 2007), but also to much earlier philosophies such 
as the Judeo-Christian religious doctrine of man’s downfall.  
 
(iii) Deontological 
Thirdly, nature is talked about in deontological terms – as a binary rule or law that 
we must obey or face the consequences. This conception is drawn from the 
discourses on the less human-related aspects of genetic research, such as GM 
crops and synthetic biology. It again appears to draw on environmentalist and 
Judeo-Christian narratives around a ‘vengeful nature’ and Adam’s expulsion from 
the garden of Eden and is often coupled with talk of transgression and nature as a 
system – upsetting the system will have consequences because you have broken 
the laws of nature.  
 
g. Role of industry 
Alongside conceptions of naturalness, the role of industry and the private sector is 
treated with suspicion. While its role in developments such as new medicines and 
drugs is accepted, it is at the same time talked about as a corrupting influence 
which scientists may not be able to resist. This appears to tie in with discussions of 
science as being on a slippery slope and in some way out of control. Controlling or 
tempering this corrupting influence, keeping the focus of science on the important 
problems is spoken of as a key role of government.  
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h. Contingency of science keeps issues open 
Throughout the discourses found in the ScienceWise documents, an understanding 
or acceptance of the contingent nature of science was apparent. The discourses 
tend not to form simple judgements of particular technologies but instead suggest 
that more information, consideration of different angles and balancing different 
needs is necessary. Class A2 – ‘reaching potential while minimising risk’ illustrates 
this most clearly, with respondents recognising that technologies are not all good 
nor all bad – that even those technologies with potential problems have potential 
upsides too (and vice versa) and that these need to be balanced. Similarly, the 
discourse in Class A1 around drugs discusses the difficulty of drawing a line 
between legal and illegal drugs and the way that drugs affect some people more 
than other. Contingency is expressed slightly differently in Class A3 (precautionary 
in principle), whereby the view appears to be expressed that as the science isn’t 
settled yet, with more research and information, different decisions are likely to be 
made. Even Class A5 (where do we draw the moral line?) displays a similarly subtle 
assessment of the technologies in question, with certain things being acknowledged 
as more tolerable under particular circumstances – when dealing with life 
threatening conditions. In Class A4 (slippery slope), associated with discussions 
around GM, industrial biotechnology and synthetic biology. Again a decision was 
kept open but the discourse was much more about the need for certainty and safety 
for reassurance.  
 
This latter point appears to raise a tension with the discourses, between the 
appreciation of the contingency of science and the desire for safety. If people 
believe that technologies are different in different circumstances and that risks need 
to be taken in order to progress, then why are they also asking for technologies to 
be proven safe before they proceed? On one hand this can be explained by the 
human ability to hold (and express) conflicting viewpoints (Festinger 1962). On the 
other hand, it is possibly an expression of a similar idea and not as conflicted as it 
might at first appear. In the absence of any other brakes on technological 
development, demanding assurances of safety could be the equivalent move to 
kicking the ball into the long grass, holding up ‘play’ sufficiently long for science and 
society to regroup, reflect and perhaps make a different move. Importantly, this 
contingent view of science also appears to keep matters open – or at least require 
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decisions to be revisited as and when more information or different moves become 
apparent.  
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B. Analysis of expert documents (Corpus B) 
 
Overall, the 12 texts contained 17791 unique words, which were lemmatised to 
13889 words, of which 12876 were active words. The corpus contained 14335 text 
segments and 9304 segments were classified in the analysis (64.91%). The 
dendrogram below (figure 3) shows the relationship between the classes and their 
interpretive label 
 
The analysis of the 12 expert reports produced five classes, reflecting five distinct 
discourses. The full wordlists contributing to these discourses is given in appendix 
3, but the ten most significant words are given in the table below.  
 
Table 2: Words contributing to the classes produced by IRAMUTEQ analysis 
of expert reports. 
 
Class 10 most significant words Chi squared Associated documents 
Class B1 
(17.16%) 
public 
issue 
nanotechnologies 
ethical 
dialogue 
science 
geoengineering 
scientific 
debate 
concern 
	  
1159.96 
693.2 
659.79 
633.17 
572.18 
530.83 
429.33 
390.07 
326.23 
304.6 
	  
	  Geoengineering (2009) 
 
Nanosciences (2004) 
 
UK DNA Database (2009) 
 
Nanodialogues response 
(2007) 
 
Synthetic biology 
Roadmap (2012) 
	  
Class B2 
(21.44%) 
crop 
gm 
plant 
herbicide 
gene 
flow 
3478.51 
3102.02 
1513.05 
787.86 
734.59 
716.42 
 GM Science Review (2003) 
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breed 
resistance 
food 
variety 
	  
536.03 
522.04 
521.69 
506.63 
	  
Class B3 
(24.69%) 
        drug 
      substance 
       mental 
       misuse 
      treatment 
      cognition 
       person 
        harm 
        child 
      disorder 
	  
2683.52 
638.49 
594.41 
472.08 
442.73 
426.5 
420.96 
381.47 
363.82 
348.13 
	  
Brain Science (2008) 
Class B4 
(17.61%) 
	  
        cell 
        human 
       embryo 
        stem 
       animal 
        mouse 
       tissue 
       hybrid 
       create 
      embryonic 
	  
3587.48 
2695.4 
2143.8 
1764.82 
1255.71 
832.73 
686.62 
650.85 
596.86 
569.82 
	  
Hybrids and Chimera 
(2007) 
 
Animals containing human 
material (2011) 
 
Stem Cells (2008) 
	  
	  
Class B5 
(20.1%) 
      chemical 
    nanoparticles 
     manufacture 
      nanotubes 
       device 
      industry 
     production 
         ib 
      particle 
      synthetic 
	  
1249.69 
1063.79 
685.28 
528.29 
517.01 
515.26 
419.55 
416.46 
374.79 
356.03 
	  
Nanosciences (2004) 
 
Industrial biotechnology 
(2005) 
 
Synthetic biology (2009) 
 
Synthetic Biology Road 
Map (2012) 
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The dendrogram below (figure 3) shows the relationship between the classes and 
their interpretive label. 
 
Figure 3: Classes produced by IRAMUTEQ analysis of expert reports, with 
interpretive labels 
 
 
 
The figure 4 shows the results of the correspondence factor analysis produced by 
crossing the words and classes in the contingency table. The 30 most related words 
for each class are shown. Word size reflects their association with that class (chi-
square value) rather than frequency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Class	  3	  (24.6%)	  ‘Brain	  Science’	  
	  
	  
Class	  5	  ‘Growth,	  economy	  and	  
planet’	  (20.1%)	  
	  
Class	  1	  (17.16%)	  ‘Addressing	  public	  
concerns	  on	  social	  and	  ethical	  
issues’	  
	  
Class	  2	  (21.44%):	  ‘GM	  reassurance’	  
	  
	  
Class	  4	  (17.61%)	  ‘The	  biomedical	  
science	  bit’	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Figure 4: Correspondence analysis of classes produced by expert reports, 
with interpretive label. 
	  
	  
 
Class B1 (17.16%) 
‘Addressing public 
concerns on social 
and ethical issues’ 
 
Class B4 (17.61%) 
‘The biomedical 
science bit’ 
 
Class B2 
(21.44%): ‘GM 
reassurance’ 
 
Factor 1 = 30.56% 
Class B3: (24.6%) 
Brain Science 
Class B5 (20.1%): 
growth, economy 
and planet 
Fa
cto
r 2
 =
 2
8%
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Corpus B Initial interpretation: Class descriptions 
As with the Public Dialogue reports, in the following section I will describe the five 
classes that the analysis of expert reports produced and present the most plausible 
interpretive label. I also present a fictional illustrative paragraph for each class, to 
help explain its content more vividly. Both the interpretive labels and the illustrative 
paragraphs have been developed using all of the data produced by the analysis, 
along with the original text – as detailed in the methodology. 
 
Class B1 (17.16%): ‘Addressing public concerns on social and ethical issues’  
This class discusses the social and ethical issues arising from the science being 
considered, particularly in response to the outputs of public dialogue activities. 
Reports most closely associated with the class are those on Geoengineering, 
nanosciences, UK DNA database and Synthetic Biology. 
 
Illustrative statement: 
“Developments in this area bring with them a number of social and ethical 
issues which were identified by the public in our discussions and which must 
be addressed if we are to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by 
this technology.” 
 
This discourse appears to draw heavily from the sections of reports which present 
the findings of the ScienceWise dialogues, with significant words including ‘public’ 
‘dialogue’ ‘debate’ ‘workshop’ ‘consultation’ and ‘deliberative’: 
 
“Public concerns about GM were reflected in the report on the review of public 
concerns, produced as a result of foundation discussion workshops” 
GM Science Review 2003 
 
“The dialogue revealed that most people are supportive of research but with 
conditions on how and why it is conducted” 
Synthetic Biology Road Map 2012. 
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Interestingly, as the two quotes above illustrate, the issues raised by the public 
engagement exercise tend to be packaged into terms such as ‘issues’ or ‘concerns’ 
and are focused on ‘social’, ‘ethical’ and ‘regulatory’ matters. Social and ethical 
issues are considered in the same discourse as public attitudes and the focus tends 
to be on the fact that support for the technologies has been expressed, rather than 
the details of the conditions under which this support is given.  
 
The discourse also contains a sense of a need (and ability) to resolve any issues 
and move forward – words like ‘address’, ‘acceptability’, ‘confidence’, ‘encourage’ 
and ‘resolve’ are all significant. The quotes below illustrate further: 
 
“The acceptability of geoengineering will be determined as much by social, 
legal and political issues as by scientific and technological factors. There are 
serious and complex governance issues that need to be resolved if 
geoengineering is ever to become an acceptable method for moderating 
climate change.”  
Geoengineering (2009) 
 
“Our attention has been directed at the distinctive ethical issues raised by the 
use of animals which include human genetic or cellular material. In discussing 
these, we have addressed a variety of concerns including utilitarian concerns 
about animal welfare” 
Animals Containing Human Material 2011 
 
“This independent report to government identifies a number of issues that if 
addressed will make a real difference and put in place the mechanisms to 
ensure that the UK truly seizes this global opportunity” 
Animals Containing Human Material 2011 
 
“The development of synthetic biology brings with it a key number of ethical 
and societal implications which must be identified and addressed” 
Synthetic Biology 2009 
 
This is not the same as a deficit approach (whereby these concerns will disappear 
as people learn more about the science) but indicates a desire/belief that it is 
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possible to separate, to deal with and move on from these problems so that the 
science can be pursued for the public good. 
 
Further to that, the fact that this is a distinct discourse is significant. Social and 
ethical issues are talked about in different terms to the other aspects of the expert 
reports. This is in direct contrast with the public reports, whereby discussions of 
social and ethical issues were found in the same classes as discussions of hopes, 
applications and risks.  
 
A number of ‘people’ words are used throughout this discourse, with ‘public’ 
‘stakeholder’ ‘scientist’ ‘expert’ and ‘citizen’ being significant words. 
 
 
Class B2 (21.44%): ‘GM reassurance’  
This is the second largest discourse identified in the analysis. It is drawn from one 
document alone – the GM science review. The focus of the discourse is on 
providing reassurance that the risks of GM can be minimised, bringing many 
benefits. 
 
Illustrative statement: 
“GM crops will bring huge benefits to the UK. Most of the risks associated with 
them are either not based on the scientific evidence, are reversible or can be 
avoided. In fact, many of the possible problems are no worse than the 
problems associated with current practices anyway.”  
 
Throughout the discourse the vocabulary is relatively technical as it maps out the 
promising areas of the field, with typical words including resistance, variety, 
biodiversity, bt [bacillus thuringiensis], glyphosate, transgenes. The only people 
words contained in the list of significant words is ‘farmer’ and it also contains only 
two emotional or sensing words – negative and undesirable. These words are not 
being used simply to describe possible downsides of GM however. ‘Undesirable’ is 
used to describe aspects of current non-GM practice; and while ‘negative’ aspects 
of GM are acknowledged in this class, it is within the context of descriptions of how 
they are being addressed:  
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“Mutation breeding for instance involves the production of unpredictable and 
undirected genetic changes and many thousands even millions of 
undesirable plants being discarded in order to identify plants with suitable 
qualities for further breeding.” 
GM Science Review (2003) 
 
“Most of the possible negative impacts of gm crops on biodiversity are likely 
to be reversible.” 
GM Science Review (2003) 
 
“There are potential negative impacts on non-target organisms but in the 
case of insect resistance, field studies on commercially grown bt crops have 
failed to identify any adverse reactions.” 
GM Science Review (2003) 
 
The three quotes above illustrate three further features of this discourse. Firstly, the 
discourse is formed around risk and safety. There is no discussion of social and 
ethical issues relating to what is right or wrong, nor to the direction the research is 
taking us – matters that were so important in the public documents. Secondly, there 
is a tendency to close down the discussion and provide reassurance. Thirdly, the 
rhetorical device of using the problems with current practice to minimise the 
perception of problems with GM (if you’re worried about GM, then you should be 
really worried about what’s going on already). Both these features are in direct 
contrast with the public discourses, which focus on uncertainty and the questions 
that can’t be answered by science yet or ever – acknowledging lack of knowledge 
and the limits of scientific understanding (the known-unknowns and unknown-
unknowns). Indeed this class contains none of the ‘risk’ words found in the public’s 
discourse about GM. Words such as ‘unintended’ and ‘probability’, both of which 
suggest a greater level of control and management, are significant however: 
 
“Therefore for some GM crops and constructs, the probability of a problem 
arising is lower and the environmental consequences less severe than 
predicted by the alien species model” 
GM Science Review (2003) 
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“Concerns over whether or not foods derived from GM corps might pose a 
unique safety issue or might have unintended effects was discussed earlier. It 
is necessary to put such concerns in context” 
GM Science Review (2003) 
 
The word ‘safe’ is also significant. As well as examples of the word being used in 
absolute terms (as the public discourses appear to use it), it is also used as a 
comparative word – arguing that GM should be considered safe as long as it is no 
more harmful than ‘traditional’ products: 
 
“Consumption of food is not risk free and requires any novel GM including 
food to be at least as safe and nutritious as any traditional food it replaces.” 
GM Science Review (2003) 
 
 
Class B3: Brain Science 
Class B3 (24.60%) is the biggest class and is also associated with one document 
only – the Academy of Medical Science’s report on Brain Science.  
 
Illustrative Statement: 
“People already use psychoactive drugs – legally or illegal. New brain drugs 
like cognition enhancers will help treat mental illnesses and things like 
Alzheimer’s disease but the members of the public we talked to were 
concerned that they could be abused and lead to new problems.” 
 
This report is the wider document that the public DrugsFutures dialogue (discussed 
above) fed into and the list of significant words is strikingly similar to that of the brain 
science class in the analysis of public documents. This suggests that there are 
strong similarities in the discourses within both the public dialogue report and the 
expert report on this subject.  
 
Like Class A1 above, this class contains descriptions of the views of participants in 
the DrugsFutures dialogue – with words such as ‘participant’ and ‘engagement’ 
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being significant. Like Class A1, regulation is also talked about in legal terms in this 
class too – with words such as legal, criminal, law being significant. And people are 
talked about in relational terms such as ‘child’, ‘adult’, ‘family’, ‘parent’, ‘addict’, 
‘criminal’.  
 
Looking at the original text, it clearly makes reference to the discussions in the 
DrugsFutures events, suggesting that the public dialogue had some impact on the 
expert report: 
 
“Many participants saw the use of cognition enhancers as valuable in helping 
young people cope with ADHD, but there were concerns about the impact of a 
child growing accustomed to using drugs to control mood and whether this 
heightens their risk of using recreational drugs.” 
Brain Science 2008 
 
“Views on acceptable and unacceptable methods of enhancing cognition were 
complex. Unlike recreational drugs or medicines for mental health, few 
participants could draw on personal experience of using such substances.” 
Brain Science 2008 
 
There are key differences however: Firstly, the language in this class is also 
technical as, again, it maps out the field and discusses the most promising areas for 
research – it contains words such as ‘psychoactive’, ‘receptor’, ‘neurotransmitter’, 
‘dopamine’ and ‘epidemiological’: 
 
“The activity of the nucleus accumbens is influenced by nerve cell neurons 
that contain the chemical messenger neurotransmitter dopamine.” 
GM Science Review (2003) 
 
Words relating to fairness and equality, that were so important in the public 
discussions of this subject (whether or not cognition enhancers could give some 
people an unfair disadvantage or address inbuilt disadvantages), are absent in this 
class. This class does however include the word ‘vulnerability’, but it appears to be 
used interchangeably with ‘risk’ in this discourse. For instance: 
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“Identifying the range of risk factors for substance misuse, it becomes 
possible to formulate strategies for mitigating their effects.” 
GM Science Review (2003) 
 
“There is also a much deeper understanding of the brain changes that result 
in chronic drug use and the range of factors associated with vulnerability to 
drug misuse.”  
GM Science Review (2003) 
 
Finally, unlike the ambivalence of the ScienceWise discourse (Class A1), this 
discourse contains slightly more positive words such as ‘enhance’ and ‘promise’.  
The discourse is talking about making things better for the future: 
 
“For the promise of neuroscience to be realised, the subject must be seen in 
the wider context of genetics and the behavioural and social sciences.” 
GM Science Review (2003) 
 
“Drugs called cognition enhancers, which can enhance brain performance in 
various ways.” 
GM Science Review (2003) 
 
 
Class B4: The Biomedical Science Bit 
Class B4 (17.61%) ‘The biomedical science bit’, describes the science behind 
current developments in biomedical science and how it can be applied in the future. 
It relates to expert reports on stem cells, animals containing human material and 
hybrid embryos. 
 
Illustrative statement: 
“Research in which human pluripotent stem cells are introduced into animal 
embryos will clarify the potential of such introduced cells to contribute to 
addressing questions around the advancement of knowledge into cancer and 
Parkinson’s.” 
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This class is largely technical, containing a significant number of technical terms, 
such as ‘embryonic’, ‘cytoplasmic’ ‘mitochondrial’ ‘oocyte’ and ‘pluripotent’. In 
contrast, it contains no emotional or value words (such as positive, benefit, 
negative, concern, advance, improve).  
 
People are referred to in scientific terms as ‘human’, ‘species’ ‘donor’, ‘recipient’, 
‘offspring’, ‘patient’, ‘scientist’ and ‘researcher’. 
 
“The only exception is that researchers can apply for a licence to create a 
hybrid embryo for the purpose of testing human sperm quality.” 
Human Animal Hybrids 2007 
 
“Proof of concept for cell replacement was by transplanting foetal ventral 
mesencephalic tissue and although there was clinical benefit in some patients 
there were problems with tissue availability and conclusive demonstration of 
safety and sustain efficacy.” 
Stem Cells 2008 
 
The class also contains a number of regulatory words such as ‘legislation’, ‘permit’, 
‘licence’, ‘regulate’ and ‘guideline’. These words are used in the context of 
descriptions of the situation, rather than as recommendations or asks.  
 
“Although the creation of true hybrids is permitted in the UK, it is illegal to 
keep or use hybrid embryos in vitro beyond very early developmental stages.” 
Animals containing human material 2011 
 
“The current legislation on embryos and stem cell research for these 
permissive countries is outlined” 
Human Animal Hybrids 2007 
 
Two illnesses that are included in the list of significant words are ‘Parkinson’s’ and 
‘Cancer’.  
 
The class contains no words relating to ethical and social issues. ‘Humanised’ is a 
significant word, which might suggest a discussion of the boundaries between 
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animals and humans (so important in the public discussions). It is however used in a 
descriptive/explanatory way to describe the action of creating animal/human hybrids 
– to explain that they are still not humans. 
 
“These approaches create an animal with a genetic sequence that in a specific 
part resembles the human. The animal’s DNA is humanised or made human 
like.” 
Animals containing human material 2010. 
 
 
Class B5: Growth, economy and planet 
Class B5 ‘Growth, economy and planet’ (20.1%) discusses how new technologies 
have the potential to transform UK industry, to create jobs and to solve social 
problems. It is most closely associated with reports relating to nanosciences, 
synthetic biology, industrial biotechnology and geoengineering. 
 
Illustrative statement: 
“Investing in the right aspects of these technologies will allow UK to be competitive 
in the global market place, grow our economy and help us solve some serious 
problems ahead, like identifying new sources of energy.” 
 
This class represents a positive discourse. The value/emotional words in the list of 
significant words are largely positive, such as ‘advance’, ‘attractive’ and 
‘opportunity’: 
 
“Opportunities will arrive through the exploitation of equipment capable of 
imaging, analysing and fabricating simple materials and devices at the 
nanoscale.” 
Nanosciences 2004 
 
“The market is most attractive when production of biofuels and their feed 
stocks is competitive with or preferably more cost effective than crude oil 
derived fuels.” 
Industrial Biotechnology 2005. 
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This positive discourse is however tempered with some acknowledgement of 
potential problems. The word ‘hazard’ is important and this appears to be used in 
mapping out which approaches might be the most promising/risky and when talking 
about the need to take a precautionary approach: 
 
“These could present a hazard because of their combination of fibrous shape 
and nanometre dimension” 
Nanosciences 2004 
 
“Field studies may often be essential to quantify ecological exposure to 
hazards and thus estimate risk” 
GM Science Review 2003 
 
“Until this hazard has been properly evaluated, this risk should be managed 
by taking steps to avoid large quantities of these nano particles becoming 
airborne” 
Nanosciences 2004. 
 
There is also strong mention of environmental benefits with significant words 
including ‘sustainable’, ‘land’ and ‘pollution’; although unlike the public, ‘nature’ or 
‘natural’ were not mentioned: 
 
“The ultimate goal of synthetic biology is to develop commercial applications 
that will benefit society. I.e. to design and build engineered biological systems 
that process information, manipulate chemicals, fabricate materials and 
structures that generate energy.” 
Synthetic Biology 2009 
 
“In the Industrial biotechnology sector, the shift from a chemical industry 
based on oil to one based on renewable biological substances will redefine 
chemical manufacture in the 21st century.”  
Industrial Biotechnology 2005 
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“The second set of drivers derives from the potential of bio based products in 
the longer term to deliver outcomes that are sustainable economically, 
environmentally and socially.” 
Industrial Biotechnology 2005. 
 
The most significant feature of the discourse is the focus on the economic impact of 
these technologies. Significant words include industry, market, business, economy, 
competitive, growth, sale, demand, investment, price, value, pound. People are 
spoken about as ‘consumers’, ‘workers’ and ‘engineers’. The class also contains 
words relating to the size of markets – ‘UK’, ‘European’, ‘Global’ and ‘World’: 
 
“In the years to come, the UK’s success will increasingly be defined by our 
competitive edge in this and other knowledge intensive industries” 
Industrial biotechnology 2005 
 
“It is estimated that 2010 revenues from Industrial Biotechnology in the US 
alone were $100bn. It is also estimated that £5bn may be added to the 
European bio economy by 2023 from on-going research activities” 
Synthetic Biology Road Map 2012 
 
“Although the world market for nanoparticles is expected to increase during 
the next few years, to provide perspective, it is worth noting that the global 
production rate of all chemicals is around 400m tonnes pa.” 
Nanosciences 2004 
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Summary of key features of expert discourses 
a. Positive discourses  
Overall, the expert discourses were positive discourses about the potential of 
science to tackle the big problems ahead and to generate wealth. Where concerns 
exist about the technologies, these are seen as issues raised by the public, which 
can be addressed. In the case of GM in particular, the expert discourse is focused 
upon providing reassurance that this is a technology to be supported, and a number 
of rhetorical devices (discussed further later) are employed to assist in this. Even 
where the public discourse helped shape expert discourses (eg brain science) the 
expert discourse was more positive than the public one. 
 
b. Technical language and science focus 
Technical language is a key feature of the expert discourses and the focus in most 
classes (except Class B1) is on the science itself. Going back to the original text, 
the reports typically include a survey of the state of the field, outlining to 
policymakers what the science/technology in question is capable of.  
 
This is perhaps not surprising given the different authors and apparent purposes of 
the reports. But this is significant when thinking about the kinds of evidence that 
policymakers take seriously and why the outputs of public dialogue might be treated 
differently to that of expert reports by policymakers – what does the language and 
ontological basis of the expert reports mean for credibility, authority and, ultimately, 
the perceived value of these reports? I discuss this further in Chapter 7. 
 
Furthermore, the use of scientific terms also appear to be used for what Gieryn 
(Gieryn 1983) describes as boundary-work – drawing clear lines between what is 
scientists’ business and what is policy/public business. 
 
The technical sections of the expert reports do serve more than rhetorical purposes 
however. They also provide information about new science and technology, which, 
from my own experience of working with policymakers is valuable to policymakers 
as it helps them learn how to engage with the scientific subjects and question in 
authoritative ways.  
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Putting it in terms of Collins and Evans’s ‘types of expertise’ (Collins & Evans 2009), 
the expert reports are using technical language to demonstrate their contributory 
expertise (and therefore authority to speak), which at the same time is helping 
policymakers acquire interactional expertise. Questions remain about the 
appropriateness of this expertise, particularly within the context of considering risk 
and social impacts, and about the relative value of this to policymakers – issues I 
will consider further later. 
 
c. Separation of social and ethical issues 
Unlike the public discourses, the expert discourses do not cluster around particular 
technologies in a straightforward manner. Three classes were based around 
particular technologies (GM, brain science and genetic technologies), but the other 
two classes were focused on ‘perspectives’ rather than the sciences or technologies 
– with one class regarding social and ethical issues relating to these science topics 
and the other regarding their potential for industrial exploitation.  
 
The way in which the subject matters group could be explained in a number of 
ways. Firstly, there is a question of timing. GM was seen as the example of things 
going wrong and the benchmark for improvement in the future. There has been a 
deliberate and official move to change practice from then on, with expert bodies 
being encouraged to include an element of public engagement, which feeds into the 
overall recommendations of the expert. You might therefore expect the later reports 
to look very different from those on GM – and therefore contain very different 
discourses. If this is the explanation, it is worth noting that even though these later 
expert reports include elements of public engagement, they tend to form separate 
discourses as they are discussed in very different terms, not as part of the wider 
matter of the development and purpose of the technology. The separate cluster 
(Class B4) around stem cells and embryology research appears to bring this 
explanation into doubt however as they were produced very recently (2007 and 
2011) yet still are very technically focused. 
 
An alternative explanation is that this particular pattern of discourses could be a 
reflection of the maturity of the science – and perhaps the interests at stake. GM 
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and Stem Cell research is very well developed and the potential industrial and 
medical applications are apparent. This is less so with geoengineering, nanoscience 
and synthetic biology, where fields of research and companies associated with their 
exploitation are yet to be fully established. There is time for these less developed 
technologies to be reflected upon, in still quite abstract ways perhaps. 
 
This division of the discussions of non-genetic technologies into social and ethical 
issues and industrial benefits is especially interesting. In these instances, the 
vocabulary used to talk about social and ethical issues is significantly different to the 
other discourses emerging from the documents.  Discussion of the social and 
ethical issues relating to nanoscience has more vocabulary in common with 
discussions of social and ethical issues relating to synthetic biology, than it does 
with discussions of the industrial potential of nanoscience. This perception of the 
social and ethical issues being separate from the science and technology itself is 
also evident from the rhetoric used within the discourses (discussed further later) 
whereby the impression is given that risks and concerns can be managed away 
from the technologies in question.   
 
Significantly, both these forms of separation is in direct contrast to the public 
discourses, in which social and ethical issues were discussed in the context of the 
technologies themselves and the wider potential and the risks associated them and 
points to very different perceptions of science overall. 
  
d. Management of risk and closing of debate 
Coupled with this separation of social and ethical issues, the expert discourses 
contain a sense that risk can be managed and uncertainty turned into probability. 
The implication is that it is possible to address the issues raised by the public and 
move on with the science. As well as there being a class entirely devoted to 
providing reassurance on GM, the class devoted to social and ethical issues relating 
to non-biomedical sciences is full of reassurance words such as ‘address’, 
‘confidence’ and ‘encourage’. Further evidence of this is detailed in my analysis of 
the metaphors and rhetoric later.  
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e. Regulation is described not prescribed 
As in the public discourses, regulation words appear in the expert discourses, but 
they are used in the context of descriptions of the situation rather than as 
recommendations or asks. Indeed, reference to current regulation is often made as 
evidence that sufficient controls are in place for a particular technology. 
 
f. Industry and economics important 
A whole class is devoted to the role of science in industry and markets. Industry is 
discussed as not just a beneficiary of these new science and technologies, but a 
key reason for pursuing them. This is often framed in a national context – ensuring 
the UK maintains a competitive edge over other countries. While the public 
discourse mentioned fairness as being important, the expert discourse gave no 
such indication, implying that these economic (and other benefits) were shared by 
everyone.  
 
g. Purpose of assurance/clearing the way 
The overarching tone of the discourses expressed in the expert reports is one of 
providing promise and reassurance that the benefits can be achieved with minimal 
risk or concern. 
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C. From Discourses to Sociotechnical Imaginaries 
 
The results and initial interpretation show that for both the public and experts, 
different technologies are talked about in different ways. It is also clear that there 
are significant differences between the way experts and the public talk about new 
and emerging technologies. These differences are likely to be important in helping 
us to understand why the experts appear to have more influence on policy than the 
public. Table 3 below summaries these.  
 
Table 3: Summary and comparison of key features of public and expert discourses 
Public Expert 
People focus Science focus 
Social and ethical issues part of science or 
technology itself. 
Social and ethical issues can be 
dealt with alone, allowing technology 
to proceed. 
 
Contingency/need for adaptive 
management/balance 
 
Reassurance 
Industry a diverting influence Industry main beneficiary of science, 
which is good for the economy 
 
Uncertainty and unforeseen/unforeseeable 
consequences 
 
Risk management 
Elements of “downfall of man from nature” 
narrative 
 
Strong “harnessing nature” narrative 
Beck & Giddens’s ‘manufactured 
uncertainty’ 
 
Beck & Giddens’s ‘external risk’ 
 
But do the discourses described above represent a fundamental difference between 
the public and experts in perceptions of science, its value, safety and role in our 
society? From the outset, moving towards an answer to this question was a key aim 
of my research, as different understandings of the place of science in our society 
could account for parallel differences in policy impact, particularly if one outlook is 
more aligned to that of policy.  
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As I have explained earlier, the concept of ‘sociotechnical imaginaries’ “collectively 
imagined forms of social life and social order, reflected in the design and fulfilment 
of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects” (Jasanoff & Kim 2009) is 
useful in understanding whether or not different views are at play.  
 
This section therefore aims to go beyond the initial interpretation of the various 
discourses identified by the statistical analysis produced by IRAMUTEQ, to carry out 
some additional analysis of the statistical material produced by IRAMUTEQ and the 
original texts, to build up a picture of public and expert sociotechnical imaginaries. 
As I have detailed in the Methodology chapter, this analysis of sociotechnical 
imaginaries uses a framework to guide the questioning of the source material. I 
have developed this framework based upon the work of Jasanoff (Jasanoff & Kim 
2009; Jasanoff n.d.; Jasanoff & Hurlbut 2014) and Dryzek (Dryzek 2005). The 
findings are summarised in the table below: 
 
Table 4: Summary of key features of public and expert sociotechnical imaginaries 
	   Public  Expert 
Basic entities 
recognised or 
constructed 
People 
Animals 
Nature 
Government 
Cures  
 
Science and technology 
People constructed in 
relation to this 
Scale: nanoparticles, 
cells, patient, ecosystem,  
Economy and market 
Nations 
Time 
Assumptions about 
natural relationships 
3 conceptions of nature 
Distinction between 
humans and animals 
Promise of advance/cures 
from science 
Role of government in 
regulating use and 
direction of science 
Progress 
Subordination of nature by 
science 
Competition between 
countries 
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Agents and their 
motives 
	  
Industry focused on profit 
making 
Scientists want to do 
science 
Government’s role to 
counter-balance both 
these excesses 
People need more 
information and should be 
listened to 
Experts needed to make 
decisions 
Government focused on 
economic gains 
Scientists solving big 
problems ahead 
Public concerned about 
change and new 
technologies 
Decisions should be 
based on expert scientific 
advice/authority of science 
Key metaphors and 
rhetorical devices 
Nature 
Slippery slope 
Hyperbolic framing and 
separation of specific from 
general to elicit support 
	  
Use of technical and 
scientific language 
Economic arguments for 
doing science 
Time limitations and 
international competition 
Hyperbolic framing 
Managing/closing risk 
Discounting uncertainty 
“Social and ethical issues” 
Normalising problems of 
new technologies 
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Public sociotechnical imaginary 
Overall, the public imaginary is positive but precautionary: 
1. Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed  
The overall ontology of the discourses identified in the public dialogue reports is 
about people, with typical ontological words including ‘person’, ‘public’, ‘woman’ or 
‘adult’. People are also referred to as ‘patients’, ‘experts’, ‘scientists’ and 
‘policymakers’. 
 
Other entities constructed as being distinct from people, are nature and animals, 
science, expertise, the economy and government. Cures are also important 
concepts. 
 
The boundary between humans and non-humans is important. This boundary is 
seen as fixed and refers to the difference between humans and other living things 
(i.e. different species) and the difference between man-made processes and 
‘natural’ processes. In this way, human life is very clearly distinguished from animal 
or other life on the planet, although all are seen as part of a system in balance. It is 
questionable whether humans have the right to interfere with this system. 
 
This boundary also acts as a guide to what is acceptable and what isn’t – it is seen 
as a line that should not be crossed. This is important for questions of governance 
as it appeals not to legal barriers but to the laws of nature, making particular areas 
of science that might breach these natural boundaries a matter of morality rather 
than regulation. 
 
2. Assumptions about natural relationships 
As I have described, nature is an important concept in the public discourses and is 
conceived in three different ways – as a system (ecological), as a state of being 
(ontological) and as a law that mustn’t be broken (deontological). The natural state 
of the world then is as a balanced system, which man-made processes cannot 
interfere with without serious and often unforeseen consequences. 
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Alongside the discussions about mankind violating nature, science is also seen as 
offering progress and human advancement, particularly when talking about scientific 
advances relating to biomedicine. This is particularly in relation to its potential to 
cure diseases, discussed further in the section on rhetoric below.  
 
Knowledge and information are seen as important to making decisions around 
science, although there is recognition that some things can’t be known or predicted. 
Experts are seen as the people who should be making decisions about these areas 
nevertheless. The public should also be listened to, but they also need to be 
equipped with sufficient information. 
 
Control and regulation are important themes in the public discourses. In particular, 
the role of government is seen as being to control and regulate the use and direction 
of science and to temper the distorting effect of the private sector.  
 
Throughout the discourses found in the ScienceWise documents, an understanding 
or acceptance of the contingent nature of science was apparent. The discourses 
tend not to form simple judgements of particular technologies but instead suggest 
that more information, consideration of different angles and balancing different 
needs is necessary.  
 
3. Agents and their motives 
The role of industry and the private sector is clearly discussed as being to make 
profit. Their role in funding innovation or creating jobs is never explicitly 
acknowledged but their potential to influence or divert research focus is.  
 
Government is understood as a theoretical counterbalance to this influence – the 
role of government is seen as to control the direction and use of science towards 
the public interest, although the view expressed was that government is not very 
effective at this as it is driven by hidden agendas rather than the public interest. 
 
Scientists are seen to be focused upon doing science, rather than considering the 
wider implications of their work. This is not seen as a positive attribute with people 
wanting to see a broader definition of ‘good science’ to take account of normative 
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and social senses of the word ‘good’; and arguments that there should be a duty on 
scientists to consider the social and ethical issues relating to their work. 
 
Throughout all of the classes, people (or the public) were seen as recipients of 
information about science and of the products of science. Indeed in Class A2, the 
term ‘patient’ was used and in Class 5 ‘consumer’, rather than any other more 
generic term. Distinctions between ‘patients’ and ‘professionals’, ‘public’ and 
‘experts’ are also made. A role for non-experts in shaping the path of science is also 
discussed in relation to geoengineering, nanoscience and synthetic biology. 
 
Science is discussed in terms that suggest it has a momentum of its own. Terms 
like ‘slippery slope’ convey something over which we have little control – something 
that is moving in an inevitable direction. 
 
Nature is also given agency – its ability to wreak revenge is evoked as a reason why 
we should not engage with certain activities that transgress what is natural. 
  
The reports do therefore show an awareness of power – on the part of policymakers 
in controlling; on the part of scientists in creating new issues; and nature in 
providing boundaries and laws. An awareness of the power being exerted by 
experts – and indeed the power of the dialogue events (which I will discuss later) is 
not apparent.  
 
4. Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices 
A number of important metaphors and rhetorical devices are used within the public 
discourse.  
 
The slippery slope metaphor is used in discussions around GM and industrial 
biotechnology, to signify science moving out of control, along a particular direction 
possibly chosen by others. 
 
A common metaphor throughout the classes is the idea of balance – the need to 
balance good against bad. For example: 
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”Overall, there was a sense that synthetic biology was both exciting and 
scary” 
BBSRC Synthetic Biology dialogue, 2009. 
 
“The biggest challenge to this area will be the tension between public and 
private interests” 
Stem Cell dialogue 2007 
 
Two particular rhetorical devices are repeated throughout the classes: 
a. Hyperbolic Framing 
In discussions of biomedical science, a rhetorical device is evident, which I have 
called ‘hyperbolic framing’. In this device, extreme conditions are used to test and 
exemplify the circumstances under which the technologies of concern would be 
acceptable. For instance, a well-known and frightening or incurable disease such as 
cancer or Parkinson’s is used as examples of things that stem cells could help. 
These examples are then usually followed by a report of approval or a change in 
perception of the technologies on the part of the public: 
 
“There was a tremendous potential to overcome serious diseases and injuries 
through the promise of biomedical science, with people highlighting hope for 
treatments including spinal injuries, neurodegenerative diseases and 
leukaemia.” 
BBSRC Synthetic Biology 2009 
“The potential of finding cheap and effective ways of tackling malaria and 
other transmissible diseases in developing countries was also seen as very 
positive.” 
BBSRC Synthetic Biology 2009 
 
“The use of stem cells to better understand cancers and develop new drugs 
treatments was particularly supported.”  
Stem Cell dialogue 2007 
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“Nearly four fifths agree with using human embryos in research if it may help 
to understand some diseases, for example Parkinson’s or Motor Neurone 
disease. 
Hybrids and Chimeras 2006 
 
Interestingly, the quotes that best illustrate this rhetorical device are all from the 
voice of the author, suggesting that the criteria for acceptability that this rhetorical 
device appears to elicit were produced in the interpretation of the discussions by the 
report authors. I will discuss this further in Chapter 7, in the context of how 
policymakers ‘read’ the input of the public. 
 
b. Abstracting 
In contrast to the rhetorical device above (but sometimes used along with it), the 
second device evident uses the converse – arguing that people don’t have a 
problem with the area of science/technology in principle, it’s the particular 
applications that they are concerned about – and therefore the research should go 
ahead.  
 
“Reservations and fears tended to be about specific technologies and policies 
and some of these faded when more information was given.”  
Science Horizons 2007. 
 
“In general, the discussion of specific medical applications for serious 
diseases was characterised by a debate on the risks and benefits of particular 
treatments rather than the wider implications per se.”  
BBSRC Synthetic Biology Dialogue 2009.  
 
“While overall animals containing human material research was seen as 
acceptable in principle, some things were seen to be towards or beyond the 
boundaries of acceptability”  
Animals Containing Human Material 2010.  
 
Again, this rhetoric appears to be drawn from the report authors’ voice, rather than 
the quotes of the participants. It is therefore not clear the extent to which it has been 
introduced by the authors/organisers in the framing of the dialogue. As with 
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hyperbolic framing however, it does lay out clear criteria by which scientists have 
public permission to continue their work – it’s the applications that we need to worry 
about, not the science itself. In both cases, it appears that the purpose of the 
rhetoric is to find a way forward, for the science to continue without any public 
objections. 
 
 
The public sociotechnical imaginary – contingent progress 
Drawing this together, the sociotechnical imaginary built by the public discourses is 
one of ‘contingent progress’.  
 
For the public, science has the potential to solve many of our biggest problems, 
especially to find cures for life-threatening diseases. But it also has the potential to 
produce other, new and unforeseen problems – particularly when it interferes with 
the natural balance of the world. Science needs to be carefully controlled by the 
government to make sure it produces social goods and doesn’t get diverted by 
industry into simply making a profit, that it doesn’t get out of hand, compromise 
nature or challenge what it is to be human. The views of the public need to be taken 
account of during this process, but decisions need to be made by experts. 
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Expert Sociotechnical Imaginary 
1. Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed 
The ontological focus of the expert documents appears to be around the science or 
technology itself – words like nanoparticles, mitochondria, and cell are common. 
When people are discussed, it is in relation to that science and technology – as 
‘stakeholders’ in relation to public concerns, or as ‘donors’ in relation to stem cells, 
for example. 
 
Within this however there are interesting variations in scale. For instance, about 
stem cells and animal-human hybrids is focused at the cellular level, with significant 
words including ‘cell’, ‘nucleus’ and ‘mitochondria. The discussion associated with 
GM technologies works on the landscape level with words including ‘environment’, 
‘ecosystem’ and ‘landscape’, while talk of economic concerns talks about both 
‘nanoparticles’ or ‘nanotubes’ but also national scale entities such as ‘UK’ and 
‘Europe’. 
 
The economy and markets are also important ontological terms in the expert 
discourses, as are time and temporality – a sense of urgency. Such a sense of time 
is almost completely absent from the public discourses – only one time-related word 
(urgency) appears in the lists of significant words from the public discourses and 
this word is used specifically when talking about climate change.  
 
2. Assumptions about natural relationships 
a. Progress 
As in the discourse identified in the public dialogue documents, the discourses 
within the expert reports contain a strong sense of the promise of advancement or 
cures from science. Unlike the public dialogue discourse however, this is not 
restricted to discussions about biomedical science nor restricted to delivering cures 
– this sense of progress is throughout all scientific and technological issues within 
the expert reports, and the benefits to accrue also include economic benefits, 
national dominance and efficiency/productivity. In the expert discourse, bringing 
about these benefits is the purpose of science, and to be assured of doing so, 
policymakers simply need to let science flourish. 
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This sense of progress is also present even when discussing potentially risky 
technologies – for example the promise of the environmental benefits that will come 
from Industrial Biotechnology are emphasised, despite the fact that potential 
environmental problems that this technology could bring are being discussed 
alongside. 
 
b. Subordination of nature by science 
While nature in this discourse is explicitly talked of in terms of ‘natural state’, the 
discourse indicates that external nature (the natural world) is problematic and 
subordinate to human problem solving. For instance, the rhetoric discussed below 
around managing risk suggests the belief that human ingenuity can overcome any 
problems of the natural world. Similarly, discussions around GM from Class B2 
imply that natural varieties or processes are problematic, which GM can improve 
upon. 
  
Following on from that, and drawing on the rhetoric around managing risk and 
hazards again, the implication within this discourse is that humans (or science) have 
the capacity to understand, anticipate and manage risk and hazards. This again 
reinforces the predominance of humans over the external environment. 
 
c. Competition between countries  
Science is often discussed in this discourse as a global race. As discussed above, 
time is a significant concept within the expert documents, as is UK, Europe and the 
World. Time is passing and others are getting on with the work. 
 
3. Agents and their motives 
The documents are targeted at policymakers in government. In light of that, it is 
clear that the expert documents see Government as motivated by economic gains, 
national prestige (hence the need to win the global race) along with the social goods 
that science promised to deliver. By nature of being the target audience, 
policymakers are also seen as having decision-making power, although these 
decisions should be firmly based upon the scientific evidence within the reports. 
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Scientists, the authors of the documents, appear to motivated by understanding 
more about the world, with a view to solving the big problems we face – indeed the 
potential to solve small (or local) problems is never discussed. Indirectly, via the 
private sector, science will also help build business/the economy. Importantly, the 
scientists are cast in the role of ‘experts’ who should be advising policymakers and 
the voices upon which decisions are made. 
 
The public are discussed in sections considering social and ethical issues. These 
are issues that will be dealt with and as such, the public is conceptualised as being 
somewhat irrationally or unnecessarily concerned about new technologies. 
 
Science itself is spoken about as a source of good – developing cures and solutions 
for the big problems ahead and driving the economy and future UK competitiveness. 
 
Power is clearly being exerted within these expert documents. As I explain below, 
there are a number of very effective rhetorical devices in use that both establish the 
authority of the expert report authors and demarcate their business from policy 
business, but also undermine the validity and importance of any concerns that might 
come into conflict with science’s authority and right to operate. But as Bachrach and 
Baratz (Bachrach & Baratz 1963) have argued, power has two faces – the power to 
make decisions and power to decide which decisions can be made. By raising new 
scientific issues, putting them onto the agenda and describing the shape of the 
issue, the expert reports appear to be exerting both faces of power. So while the 
reports explicitly acknowledge the role of the policymakers in making decisions 
affecting science (and indeed give them that power in being the recipients of these 
reports), they are at the same time creating and maintaining power of their own. 
 
4. Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices 
a. The use of scientific language 
As discussed above, the expert reports typically use large amounts of technical 
language and include a survey of the state of the field, giving a brief outline to 
policymakers of the nuts and bolts of the science. The use of technical language 
appears to be serving powerful rhetorical functions (as well as substantive ones) in 
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displaying competence and credibility and therefore winning the confidence of the 
audience (Hilgartner 2000), but also creating an exclusivity about the knowledge, 
drawing clear boundaries between what scientists know and what everyone else 
knows and therefore between what is scientists’ business and what is policy work. 
 
b. Economic arguments 
Throughout the reports, and in those about biotechnology in particular, economic 
arguments are used as evidence of the need for policy to make decisions to support 
the science and technology being discussed. Arguments are made that these 
technologies will create wealth and jobs, as well as allow the UK to be more 
competitive in the world: 
 
“Now the world’s seventh largest chemicals producer UK sales alone in this 
industry exceed £60 billion with exports worth £43 billion. This is one of our 
most high value manufacturing sectors employing thousands of people and 
has a trade surplus.” 
Industrial Biotechnology 2009 
 
“This would be equivalent to between 7 and 16% of total chemical industry 
sales. While UK ib manufacturing opportunities may remain comparatively 
modest for the foreseeable future a strong position in this knowledge intensive 
area would allow UK based companies to increase their share of the much 
larger global market” 
Industrial biotechnology 2009 
 
“They completed an assessment of global applications and forecast sales 
revenues over the coming five year period. They conclude that the value of 
the global synbio market will grow at a substantial rate.” 
Synthetic Biology Roadmap 2012 
 
c. Time and temporality 
Tying in with the economic arguments, time is also an important rhetorical concept – 
the sense that decisions need to be made now. Time is often combined with 
economic arguments and is used to create a sense of urgency and competition, the 
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idea of longevity – that decisions made now will affect our future, and as a way of 
making obstacles to progress (such as ethical concerns) temporary. 
 
d. Hyperbolic framing 
As with the public, extreme examples of benefits to be accrued or problems to be 
solved are used throughout – curing cancer and Alzheimer’s, climate change, the 
looming energy crisis and the need to feed a growing world population are all 
important framing devices.  
 
“The greatest changes we will see in the 21st century may be brought to us 
through developments in our understanding of the brain. These 
advancements may offer revolutionary treatments for the brain and could see 
the end of neurodegenerative disorders such as Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s.” 
Brain Science 2008 
 
“In the field of energy, synthetic biology is being used to develop far more 
efficient biofuels. These developments have the potential to alleviate current 
problems with biofuels. For example, competition for land use between energy 
and food crops.” 
Royal Academy of Engineering, Synthetic Biology 2009 
 
“Crops with enhanced tolerance of different stresses enables more flexibility 
within agriculture and leads to more productivity in problem soils or situations 
where this may be particularly important – in developing countries where poor 
soils are widespread.” 
GM Science review 2003. 
 
Superlatives are used throughout too, asserting the importance of science in solving 
these pressing concerns – science won’t just play a part, but is fundamental or vital 
to solving these problems: 
 
“Studies, particularly in mice, have played a fundamental role in research over 
the past 50 years to understand the complex processes underpinning cancer” 
Animals containing human material 2011 
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“A transition towards renewable bio-based feedstocks is vital for the 
production of chemicals, materials, fuels and energy, to lessen dependence of 
fossil fuels and achieve climate goals.” 
Industrial biotechnology 2005. 
 
f. Bundling and closing public concerns 
There is also a tendency to bundle complex public concerns, which are arguably 
often about matters that are created by and inherently part of the technologies being 
discussed, into ‘social and ethical issues’ which are then considered collectively.  
 
“Public concerns about GM were reflected in the report on the review of public 
concerns, produced as a result of foundation discussion workshops” 
GM Science review 2003 
 
This rhetoric is reinforced by the presence of a cluster in the IRAMUTEQ analysis 
devoted to social and ethical issues, indicating that the vocabulary around the 
issues is distinct from that of the rest of the reports.  
 
These issues are also closed down and treated as something that can be dealt with 
or solved. The scientists have public permission to act, they just have to address 
these issues.  In this way, public concerns, which the public discuss as inherent 
properties of the technologies, are interpreted as ‘conditions’ on how the research 
should go ahead and epiphenomena that can be dealt with apart from the science.  
 
“The development of synthetic biology brings with it a key number of ethical 
and societal implications which must be identified and addressed.” 
Royal Academy of Engineering Synthetic Biology 2009. 
 
“The dialogue revealed that most people are supportive of research but with 
conditions on how and why it is conducted.” 
Synthetic Biology Road Map 2012. 
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“This independent report to government identifies a number of issues that if 
addressed will make a real difference and put in place the mechanisms to 
ensure that the UK truly seizes this global opportunity.” 
Animals Containing Human Material 2011. 
 
“If geoengineering is to play a role in reducing climate change an active and 
international programme of public and civil society dialogue will be required to 
identify and address concerns about potential environmental social and 
economic impacts and unintended consequences.”  
Geoengineering 2009  
 
This tendency to separate out and then close down or solve social and ethical 
concerns is of obvious use to scientists. The message is compelling – if they are 
given the responses and opportunity to address these matters, science can proceed 
in a manner that is satisfactory to everyone. There is nothing to worry about here.   
 
Obstacles to progress (such as social and ethical concerns) are presented as 
temporary. Objectors are not saying no, but just not yet: 
 
“A further review following such studies in about a decade would be 
appropriate to reconsider the prospects for such approaches at that time, in 
the light of advances in relevant technologies and the likelihood of some more 
permanent geoengineering contribution possibly being needed” 
Geoengineering 2009 
 
“There are others who reason that this approach understates the distinct 
differences between GM and non GM and that because the technology is 
relatively new, we know too little. The uncertainty is too great and there are 
too many gaps in knowledge to pursue it safely at the current time.” 
GM Science Review 2003. 
 
In the case of GM in particular, two further rhetorical devices are used to reassure 
and close down discussions about uncertainty: 
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g. Normalisation of problems 
The problems associated with GM technologies are normalised by building 
comparisons with the problems with ‘acceptable’ technologies. While the new 
technologies might have problems/issues associated with them, they aren’t 
important when you compare them to the problems we are dealing with already. 
That this technique seems to be particularly well used when talking about 
biotechnology, might reflect an awareness of the value put by the public on 
‘naturalness’ – comparing new technologies to old ones highlights the 
‘unnaturalness’ in techniques we already accept and therefore might seem to put 
GM on a level footing of acceptability: 
 
“Mutation breeding for instance involves the production of unpredictable and 
undirected genetic changes and many thousands even millions of undesirable 
plants being discarded in order to identify plants with suitable qualities for 
further breeding” 
GM Science Review 2003 
 
“Concerns over whether or not foods derived from GM corps might pose a 
unique safety issue or might have unintended effects was discussed earlier. It 
is necessary to put such concerns in context” 
GM Science Review 2003 
 
“Might GM crops change agricultural practice in the UK? If so, what might be 
the likely consequences? It is widely acknowledged that modern non-GM 
agriculture has already had negative impacts on biodiversity and the wider 
environment in the UK.”  
GM Science Review 2003 
 
h. Discounting uncertainty 
Further to that, there is a tendency to discount uncertainty. The impression is given 
that we can and do know all of the risks associated with a new technology and it is 
possible to address them: 
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“Most of the possible negative impacts of gm crops on biodiversity are likely to 
be reversible” 
GM Science review 2003 
 
“There are potential negative impacts on non-target organisms but in the case 
of insect resistance, field studies on commercially grown bt crops have failed 
to identify any adverse reactions.” 
GM Science Review 2003 
 
 
The Expert sociotechnical imaginary: Science driving progress 
Together, these features build up a picture of an imaginary based around ‘science 
driving progress’. In this imaginary, with sufficient resources and freedom, science 
has the ability to solve the world’s problems. Any problems or risks arising can be 
managed and dealt with, by more knowledge and information. But in most cases, 
the risks associated with scientific and technological developments are no worse 
than those offered by nature anyway. The public are both potential consumers of 
new technologies, but are also barriers to progress and in need of reassurance that 
their concerns can be addressed. The state is a provider of many of the resources 
needed to do science, while industry is a beneficiary – going on to turn the scientific 
discoveries into wealth, jobs and economic growth.  
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Chapter	  5	  –	  Analysis	  of	  policy	  documents	  	  
 
In the previous chapter (Chapter 4), I looked at the content of the reports of public 
dialogues that are presented to policymakers, and the analogous reports from 
expert committees, with a view to understanding more about the impact of public 
engagement on policy and the possible reasons why this has been limited. I 
identified a series of public and expert discourses, which build up into two different 
socio-technical imaginaries – a public imaginary of ‘Contingent Progress’ and an 
expert imaginary of ‘Scientific Progress’.  
 
In this chapter I take a similar approach – analysing the discourses and 
sociotechnical imaginaries expressed within Corpus C, comprising the policy 
documents on analogous topics to those included in the public and expert analysis. 
This is with a view to (in Chapter 6) comparing them to the public and expert 
imaginaries already identified, and considering what similarities or differences in 
sociotechnical imaginaries and discourses mean for the impact of public dialogue on 
policy.  
 
Corpus C is made up of policy documents that relate to the issues considered in the 
public dialogue and expert reports. Typically these are ‘government responses’ to 
the expert submissions, but also include select committee investigations, to which 
the public and expert reports were submitted for evidence, as the public and expert 
reports fed into various stages of the policymaking process. These documents do 
not span precisely the same timeframe as the public and expert reports, as there is 
a time-lag in policymakers producing their responses. A full list of the documents 
included in the corpus is given in appendix 1.  
 
 
Results of Iramuteq analysis: Corpus C 
Overall the 11 texts comprising Corpus C contained 5909 unique words, lemmatised 
to 4470 words, of which 3785 were active words. The corpus contained 2589 text 
segments and 1561 segments were classified in the analysis (60.29%). The 
analysis produced four classes, reflecting four distinct discourses. The full wordlists 
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contributing to these classes are given in Appendix (iv), but the top 10 words and 
their Chi-squared values, along with the documents associated with these classes 
are given in the table below: 
 
Table 5: Words contributing to the classes produced by IRAMUTEQ analysis of UK 
Government policy response documents. 
 
Class 10 most 
significant 
words 
Chi squared Associated documents 
Class C1 
(16.72%) 
gm 
crop 
herbicide 
conventional 
grow 
gene 
maize 
plant 
farmer 
acre 
	  	  
947.01 
821.23 
147.18 
138.38 
118.06 
116.27 
100.91 
99.34 
97.73 
95.8 
	  
Genetically Modified Foods – 
Frequently Asked Questions (Defra 
2004) 
 
The GM Dialogue – Government 
Response (2004) 
	  
Class C2 
(29.15%) 
embryo 
human 
hybrid 
chimera 
animal 
creation 
hfea 
act 
draft 
cytoplasmic 
	  
714.23 
497.58 
434.78 
301.77 
291.69 
291.25 
202.38 
174.9 
135.13 
130.76 
	  
House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee: 
Government proposals for the 
regulation of hybrid and chimera 
embryos. Fifth Report of Session 
2006–07 
 
Government Response to the 
Report from the Joint Committee 
on the Human Tissue and 
Embryos (Draft) Bill (2007) 
Class C3 
(29.08%) 
commission 
nanotechnologies 
information 
member 
royal 
77.59 
72.06 
59.25 
51.61 
50.15 
Government Response to the 
House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee Inquiry into 
Regenerative Medicine (2013) 
 
Government Response to the 
House of Commons, Science and 
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public 
section 
society 
system 
regulatory 
	  
47.73 
38.09 
34.78 
31.13 
29.20 
	  
	  
Technology Committee 5th Report 
of Session 2009-10: The 
Regulation of Geoengineering 
 
UK Government Response to The 
Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (RCEP) 
Report “Novel Materials in the 
Environment: The Case Of 
Nanotechnology” (2009) 
 
Response to the Royal Society and 
Royal Academy of Engineering 
Report ‘Nanoscience and 
nanotechnologies: opportunities 
and uncertainties’ (2005) 
 
Class C4 
(25.05%) 
ib 
innovation 
council 
fund 
igt 
sector 
business 
pound 
industry 
bbsrc 
	  	  
322.75 
129.62 
123.61 
123.57 
115.08 
114.78 
104.61 
97.76 
95.09 
88.42 
	  
Response to ‘A Synthetic Biology 
Road Map for the UK’ (Letter from 
Science Minister, 2012) 
Government response to the UK 
Stem Cell Initiative report and 
recommendations (2007) 
Government response to the 
Industrial Biotechnology – 
Innovation & Growth team report to 
Government (2009) 
 
UK Government Response to The 
Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (RCEP) 
Report “Novel Materials in the 
Environment: The Case Of 
Nanotechnology” (2009) 
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The figure 5 below shows the dendrogram representing the relationship between 
the classes produced in the descending hierarchical clustering and their interpretive 
labels. 
 
Figure 5: Classes produced by IRAMUTEQ analysis of UK Government policy 
response documents, including interpretive labels 
 
 
The figure 6 below shows the results of the correspondence factor analysis 
produced by crossing the words and classes in the contingency table. The 30 most 
related words for each class are shown. Word size reflects their association with 
that class (chi-square value) rather than frequency. It shows that the classes C3 and 
C4 are the most closely related to each other, with some overlap in vocabulary, 
while the other two classes (C1 and C2) are distinct and discrete. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Class C1 (16.72%): Safety and choice so that 
we can get huge benefits from GM  
 
Class C4 (25.05%): Supporting technology 
transfer 
Class C3: (29.08%): Anticipating and managing 
risks and adapting regulation, to ensure UK 
maintains an international lead. 
 
Class C2 (29.15%): Regulation of human 
embryology research	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Figure 6: Correspondence Analysis for classes produced by UK Government Policy 
response documents 
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cto
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Factor 1=44.66% 
 
C1 (16.72%): Safety and 
choice so that we can get 
huge benefits from GM 
C2 (29.15%): 
Regulation of 
human embryology	  
research 
C4 (25.05%): 
Supporting 
technology transfer 
C3: (29.08%): 
Anticipating and 
managing risks and 
adapting regulation, to 
ensure UK maintains 
an international lead 
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Initial Interpretation: Class descriptions 
 
As in the previous chapter, in the following section I will describe the four classes 
that the analysis of Corpus C produced and present the most plausible interpretive 
label for each. I also present a fictional illustrative paragraph for each class, to help 
explain its content more vividly. Both the interpretive labels and the illustrative 
paragraphs have been developed using all of the data produced by the analysis, 
along with the original text – as detailed in the methodology. 
 
Class C1 (16.72%): Safety and choice so that we can get huge benefits from 
GM  
This is the smallest of the four classes identified. The discourse is focused on the 
government’s plans for regulating GM. It draws from the two documents relating to 
GM foods – the Government response to the GM Nation debate and Defra’s 
Frequently Asked Questions document. 
 
Illustrative Statement: 
“GM crops could offer real benefits to consumers and farmers in the future 
and our comprehensive research has found no reason to think they pose any 
risks to human health, nor are any less safe than conventional crops. We do 
need to monitor this for unforeseen problems though and consider each on a 
case-by-case basis but much will depend on whether consumers choose gm 
foods and on the ability of the regulatory system to continue to manage any 
risks effectively.” 
 
Throughout, the discourse is about balancing different interests in order to allow the 
technology to develop – the interests of organic and non organic farmers and 
consumers; the concerns of the public vs. scientific evidence of safety; evidence of 
safety vs. possible unforeseen risks; costs vs. benefits: 
 
“This precautionary and evidence based approach strikes the right balance 
between managing the risks and harnessing the potential benefits of GM 
crops”  
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
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The discourse is ‘agriculture’ focused – ‘farmer’, ‘crop’, ‘plant’, ‘agriculture’ and 
‘farmland’ are all significant words. The discourse also ranges in scale from ‘gene’ 
to ‘country’. The public are variably referred to as ‘consumers’ or ‘people’. The 
choice of these words appears to depend upon the issue in hand, with ‘people’ 
tending to be used when describing the ethical concerns of the public and 
‘consumers’ used when discussing more preference based concerns or potential 
benefits:  
“The debate has confirmed that people’s attitudes towards GM crops are 
shaped by a complex range of issues.”  
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
“We take public concerns very seriously and we recognise the need to 
address people’s legitimate anxieties around GM crops.”  
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
“Looking to the longer term, future developments in GM crops have the 
potential to offer more wide-ranging benefits to both farmers and consumers.” 
GM FAQ 2004 
 
“Consumers want to continue to be able to choose conventional and organic 
products if GM corps are grown commercially in the UK.”  
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
While the discourse acknowledges that the public has concerns about GM (although 
‘concern’ is not a significant word to this class) there is no discussion of these as 
ethical issues. Indeed the only evocation of ethical matters in the text segments 
most associated with this class is an argument that it would be unethical not to 
pursue GM research: 
 
“The Nuffield Council on Bioethics in its recent report on the use of GM crops 
in developing countries concluded that there is an ethical obligation to explore 
these potential benefits responsibly in order to contribute to the reduction of 
poverty and to improve food security and profitable agriculture in developing 
countries.”  
 Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
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Instead, public concerns around GM are discussed as safety issues, relating to 
human health and the environment, as well as matters of choice. These concerns 
are seen as matters to be addressed and resolved – and managing these concerns 
is seen is one of the key risks of GM technologies. An interesting turn is also put on 
the idea of the right to choice – that it’s not just about the right to choose not to 
consume GM crops but also the right to choose to be able to consume them too: 
 
“The science review sought to address all the key science related concerns, 
especially those which are most frequently raised about GM good and crops. 
It concluded that there is no evidence to suggest that current GM foods pose 
a greater risk to human health than their conventional counterparts.”  
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
“The balance of any costs and benefits will depend on a range of factors and 
there will inevitably be trade offs. Much will depend on consumer attitude 
towards GM food and crops and on the ability of the regulatory system to 
continue to manage any risks effectively.”  
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
“If farmers and consumers do not see the benefits of GM crops and GM foods 
then they will not grow or buy them.”  
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
“It is also important to bear in mind that freedom of choice works both ways. 
Not allowing GM crops to be grown in the UK would deny farmers access to 
the benefits of the technology which is available to farmers in other countries.”  
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
“Consumers want to continue to be able to choose conventional and organic 
products if GM crops are grown commercially in the UK and farmers must be 
able to maintain different production methods so that they can respond to 
consumer demand.”  
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
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Reassurance – both on the safety of GM and the strength of evidence drawn upon 
to reach this conclusion – is important in this discourse. Expert bodies such as 
ACRE are often mentioned as sources of evidence, for instance. At the same time, 
the discourse couples strong statements about the safety of GM (particularly in 
relation to traditional crops and foods), with a clear understanding that there could 
be unforeseen consequences that need to be monitored, and the contingency of the 
technology which means it needs to be monitored on a case by case basis. ‘Risk’ is 
a key word in the discourse, although the discourse is clear that any possible risks 
can be quantified and managed away. The discourse also uses the technique found 
in the expert reports, of normalising risk by comparing the risk of GM to the risk of 
non-GM: 
 
“The government advisory committee on releases to the environment (ACRE) 
has said that if GM herbicide tolerant crops transfer genes to other crops or 
wild relatives, this poses a very low environmental risk”  
GM FAQ 2004 
 
“It [an advisory body] found that worldwide there have been no verifiable ill 
effects reported from the consumption of products from GM crops over seven 
years and there is no evidence to suggest that current GM foods pose a 
greater risk to human health than their conventional counterparts.” 
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
“The science review concluded that this was a distant future possibility for the 
UK if different varieties of the same crop with different GM traits were 
proposed for commercial cultivation in the EU. The risks and any possible 
mitigation measures would be considered as part of the approval process. 
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
Environmental words are significant in this discourse, including ‘environment’, 
‘wildlife’, ‘biodiversity’ and ‘ecology’. Neither ‘natural’ nor ‘nature’ were significant 
words. A previous moratorium on growing GM crops is also highlighted – almost as 
a demonstration of how far the government will go to safeguard the environment/ to 
show that this is not a foregone conclusion. Interestingly, the quotes nevertheless 
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demonstrate a governance rather than a strong government approach – a voluntary 
agreement was reached with industry:  
 
“When English Nature and others raised concerns that the introduction of GM 
herbicide tolerant crops could further exacerbate the decline in farmland 
wildlife, we reached a voluntary agreement with industry to call a halt to 
commercial growing”  
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
“We put precaution into practice by commissioning a four year programme of 
GM crop trials, the farm scale evaluations – the largest anywhere in the world. 
Our voluntary agreement made clear that there would be no commercial 
cultivation of GM crops in the UK until we had assessed the results of the 
trails”  
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
Throughout the discourse, making sure the benefits of GM are gained is important. 
But where ‘benefit’ is a significant word, the sense of what these benefits are, is not 
concrete. Current benefits are recognised as limited, but those that could come in 
the future are the most important:  
 
“The central conclusion of the study is that existing GM crops could offer some 
cost and convenient advantages to UK farmers”  
GM FAQ 2004 
 
“The strategy unit’s study on the costs and benefits of GM crops concluded 
that any economic benefit from the crops presently available is likely to be 
limited in the short term but that future developments in GM crops could 
potentially offer more significant benefits”  
Government Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
“Looking to the longer term, future developments in GM crops have the 
potential to offer more wide-ranging benefits both to farmer and to consumers” 
GM FAQ 2004 
 
 127 
“More importantly, we should not turn our backs on the potentially significant 
benefits which future generations of GM crops could offer” Government 
Response the GM dialogue 2004 
 
 
Class C2 (29.15%): Regulation of human embryology research 
This class relates to the way in which advances in human genetics should be 
regulated. It is drawn from reports of the UK government’s response to the joint 
committee report of the Human Tissues and Embryos Draft Bill (2007) and from the 
House of Commons Select Committee Report on government proposals for the 
regulation of hybrid and chimera embryos (2006).  
 
Illustrative statement: 
“The government should open the door to research using human animal 
chimera or hybrid embryos, as it is likely to bring significant health benefits in 
the future. There is little opposition, besides that based on opposition to 
research on human embryos in general. Legal advice is needed to consider 
the humanness of embryos, so that it is clear whether such matters should be 
regulated by HFEA or another agency, and the regulation needs to provide a 
clear framework within which research can take place.”  
 
The discourse uses a range of ontological and technical terms, relating to embryo 
research. Significant words include ‘embryo’, ‘human’, ‘hybrid’, ‘chimera’, ‘animal’, 
‘women’, ‘egg’, ‘sperm’ and ‘cell’.  Specifically, the discourse considers whether the 
current legislation is sufficient or whether new rules are needed. Regulatory words 
include ‘law’, ‘licence’, ‘parliament’, ‘regulation’, ‘authority’ and ‘power. 
 
Overall, the discourse is supportive of science, with words such as ‘allow’ and 
‘permit’ being significant, and (the Select Committee report in particular) looks for a 
way to allow it to happen: 
 
“We believe that in general the creation of all types of human animal chimera 
or hybrid embryos should be allowed for research purposes if appropriately 
regulated.” 
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House of Commons Select Committee Report on Hybrid and Chimera 
Embryos 2006. 
 
“We find the government proposals in the white paper unnecessarily 
prohibitive and recommend the government ensure that its draft bill reflects 
the liberal view it claims to be taking in opening the door to research using 
human animal chimera or hybrid embryos.” 
 House of Commons Select Committee Report on Hybrid and Chimera 
Embryos 2006. 
 
The vocabulary in this discourse is not as enthusiastically supportive as the words 
found in other discourses identified however. Importantly the list of significant words 
also includes ‘prohibit’ and ‘ban’, suggesting that there are some aspects of science 
that are off limits, although the details of the text suggest that the reports question 
whether that should be the case: 
 
“We have conducted this inquiry in response to the publication of government 
proposals to prohibit the creation of human animal chimera or hybrid embryos 
for research for the time being.”  
House of Commons Report on Hybrid and Chimera Embryos 2006. 
 
“There is clearly some confusion surrounding the Government’s decision to 
omit from the draft bill the current provision which prohibits the genetic 
modification of embryos for research purposes”  
Government Response to report on Human Tissue and Embryos (draft) 
Bill 2007 
 
Overall, the role of the government is to regulate these activities. Specifically, the 
purpose of the regulation is to provide rules under which research can take place: 
 
“The new legislative structure should permit the creation of animal human 
hybrid and chimera embryos for research purposes subject to regulation and 
should aim to reduce the risk of litigation on borderline cases.”  
House of Commons Report on Hybrid and Chimera Embryos 2006. 
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Beyond this, while the discourse acknowledges the ethical issues relating to the 
activities under consideration – and to the public dialogue that has fed into the 
evidence base – ethical issues are problematized and/or dealt with as legal matters. 
Neither ‘moral’ nor ‘ethical’ are significant words in this discourse, although ‘law’ is. 
For example the question of the humanness or otherwise of hybrid embryos – an 
issue that was very important in the public discourses – is looked at as a legal 
question that will define who regulates: 
 
“HFEA receives revisited legal opinion on whether cytoplasmic hybrid 
embryos should be regarded as human for the purposes of the HFE act and 
whether such creations would be prohibited or licensable under the act.”  
House of Commons Report on Hybrid and Chimera Embryos 2006. 
 
The public dialogue itself is also problematized, with the representativeness of the 
views expressed brought into question. Further, the text calls for ‘experts’ and 
‘scientists’ to be identified who have scientific objections, suggesting that objections 
on scientific grounds had higher status than moral and ethical objections:  
 
“We have seen no conclusive evidence to indicate the true state of public 
opinion on the creation of animal human chimera and hybrid embryos for 
research.” 
House of Commons Report on Hybrid and Chimera Embryos 2006. 
  
“Establishing where there is specific opposition to the creation of human 
animal chimera or hybrid embryos for research purposes is important if an 
accurate assessment is to be made of whether there is significant opposition 
to this research from those who like the government otherwise support human 
embryo research.”  
House of Commons Report on Hybrid and Chimera Embryos 2006. 
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Class C3 (29.08%): Anticipating and managing risks and adapting regulation, 
to ensure UK maintains an international lead. 
Class C3 is most closely associated with the government responses to reports on 
nanoscience, geoengineering and regenerative medicine, discussing how the risks 
associated with these technologies can be anticipated and managed and how public 
concerns can be understood and addressed, in order to be world leaders in these 
fields. 
 
Illustrative Statement: 
“The government will ensure a coordinated approach to developing this 
technology, which will be reviewed at 5 and 10 year intervals. This approach 
will bring together a wide range of stakeholders and the public, so that we can 
anticipate, understand and manage potential risks, address public concerns 
and ensure the responsible development of these fields while maintaining our 
international competitiveness.” 
 
The discourse represented by this class is focused around anticipating and 
regulating the risks and problems that might stop the successful development of 
these technologies.  
 
Uncertainties or unknowns about the technologies are recognised, but they are 
seen very much as knowable – it is a problem of lack of information rather than the 
unpredictability of these technologies. More research, collaboration and information 
sharing is seen as the solution. While the approach to managing technologies might 
need to change as more is known (for instance, the review points are seen as 
important in the government’s strategy), these factors are considered to be 
knowable – words such as ‘understand’, ‘information’ and ‘sharing’ are important: 
 
“In particular, the government shares the Royal Commission’s understanding 
that there is no evidence of actual harm resulting from the use of 
nanotechnologies, but accepts that this is a possibility and that there is a need 
to develop our understanding further.” 
UK Government response to RCEP report on nanoscience 2009 
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“MHRAS internal nanotechnology working group which has been in existence 
since June 2003 comprises regulatory scientific and technical specialists who 
meet on a regular basis to carry out horizon scanning share information and 
raise internal awareness of issues that may arise from nanotechnologies” 
Government response to the Royal Society Report on Nanosciences 
2005 
 
“… and nanotechnologies as the basis for a continuing science and society 
dialogue that will seek to ensure that we have a regulatory system which will 
address public concerns and which allows the development of 
nanotechnologies in a responsible and innovative way.” 
Government response to the Royal Society Report on Nanosciences 
2005 
 
Furthermore, problems associated with these new technologies are seen very much 
in terms of risk, rather than ethical problems such as moral hazards (i.e. relating to 
the kind of world we want and the appropriateness of these technologies). These 
risks are seen as manageable and matters that can be separated from the 
technologies themselves – the role of government is to manage these risks whilst 
allowing the technologies to develop. The term ‘responsible development’ is used to 
describe research that has addressed these issues: 
 
“Nanotechnologies have already been identified as a key area in a number of 
contexts. For example, the Defra science forward look identifies the 
development of nanotechnologies as a key driver in determining the future 
evidence base that Defra requires to deal with potential risks to the 
environment”  
Government Response to the Royal Society Report on nanoscience 2005  
 
“The government will continue to ensure an integrated and co ordinated 
approach to nanotechnology through bringing together a wide range of 
stakeholders with a focus on understanding and managing potential risks and 
ensuring the responsible development of nanotechnologies.”  
UK Government response to RCEP report on nanoscience 2009 
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The outputs of public dialogue activities are talked about in this discourse, with 
specific reference made to debates such as the Royal Society’s public dialogue on 
nanosciences. In the first instance, these dialogues are seen as a way to map out 
the social and ethical dimensions of the technologies, so that experts can 
understand which issues need to be ‘addressed’, allowing the technologies to 
develop ‘responsibly’.  
 
“The public dialogue involved workshops in Birmingham, Cardiff and Cornwall 
where around ninety members of the public heard about potential 
geoengineering ideas and had a chance to discuss their ethical, social and legal 
implications.”  
Government response to Geoengineering Report 2009 
 
“Policymakers will want to hear about and then respond to public concerns 
related to ethical social health safety and environmental issues. To help meet 
this aim, the government is already supporting a number of activities such as 
Sciencewise.”  
Government Response to Royal Society Report on Nanosciences 2005 
 
“The government’s aim for public dialogue around nanotechnologies is to elicit 
and understand people’s aspirations and concerns around the development of 
these technologies through the dialogue process scientists and the public can 
jointly explore existing and potential opportunities”  
Government Response to the Royal Society Report on Nanosciences 2005. 
 
Interestingly, the potential benefits coming from nanosciences and geoengineering 
are not described or discussed in this discourse – the only specific mentions of 
possible benefits relate to the need to maintain international competitiveness and to 
monitor possible medical uses for their effects on human health and of new 
materials on the environment. Future benefits do however appear to be assumed – 
the main thrust of this discourse is about enabling these technologies to develop. At 
the same time, there is recognition that the precise applications and outcomes of 
research are unknown – much of this discourse is about the need to monitor future 
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uses in order to take account of them. In many cases, this involves collaborating to 
share and create more information that might help anticipate risks: 
 
“Instead, government will explore alternative ways of obtaining early 
information about new materials and products, through existing structures and 
stakeholder networks and will keep this horizon scanning function in mind 
during the forthcoming development of the UK’s strategy for 
nanotechnologies.” 
UK Government Response to RCEP Report on Nanoscience 2009 
 
“The Royal Commission recommended that responsible organisations set up 
structured systems to keep a watching brief on the development of novel 
materials and to enhance the sharing of information and the opportunities to 
work together to identify and manage emerging problems”  
UK Government Response to RCEP Report on Nanoscience 2009 
 
“We recommend that regulatory bodies and their respective advisory 
committees include future applications of nanotechnologies in their horizon 
scanning programmes to ensure any regulatory gaps are identified at an 
appropriate stage.”  
Government Response to Royal Society Report on Nanoscience 2004 
 
“Government will explore alternative ways of obtaining early information about 
new materials and products through existing structures and stakeholder 
networks and will keep this horizon scanning function in mind during the 
forthcoming development of the UK’s strategy for nanotechnologies”  
UK Government Response to RCEP Report on Nanoscience 2009 
 
 
Class C4 (25.05%): Supporting technology transfer 
The discourse in this class is focused around structural and financial support being 
put in place to help the translation of basic research into businesses. It is most 
strongly related to government responses to reports on industrial biotechnology, the 
UK stem cell initiative, nanosciences and synthetic biology.  
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Illustrative statement: 
“The government recognises the importance of the UK’s science base in 
providing the new ideas and innovations for translation into applications. The 
government will provide funding for such research over the next decade and 
develop a strategy to support businesses in exploiting this.” 
  
The focus of this discourse is around money, business and industry, with words 
such as ‘pound’, ‘industry’, ‘technology’, ‘skill’, ‘company’ and ‘work’ being 
significant. The only people word is ‘engineer’. A typical text segment is: 
 
“Government and industry can work to create an encouraging and enabling 
political and economic framework to catalyse the growth of the market for IB 
produced products, processes and technologies.”  
Government response to the Industrial Biotechnology – Innovation & 
Growth team report to Government (2009) 
 
The vocabulary is positive, with words such as support, lead, invest, train and 
opportunity being significant. There are no negative or critical words associated with 
the class. In particular, the active words appear to be used to describe the active 
role of the government in pushing this agenda forward. These active words also 
tend to be powerful in nature – for instance, ‘drive’, ‘lead’, ‘accelerate’, ‘build’, 
‘launch’ and ‘strengthen’. The discourse also has significant number of ‘new public 
management’ words, such as ‘strategy’, ‘forum’, ‘programme’, ‘strategic’, ‘deliver’, 
‘priority’, ‘plan’ and ‘facilitate’, indicating that the role of the government is to ‘enable’ 
the desired future (rather than legislate or regulate):  
 
“The implementation plans for the Industrial Biotechnology IGT will directly 
drive the success of industrial biotechnology in the UK. The utilisation of the 
technology strategy board’s knowledge transfer networks coupled with the 
continuation of industry led activity is the minimum requirements for 
implementation of the IB IGT recommendations.”  
Government response to the Industrial Biotechnology – Innovation & 
Growth team report to Government (2009) 
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“Government’s role will be to continue to create the climate in which the 
research initiatives described above may flourish. Work has already begun – 
in May 2012, the government boosted innovation to stimulate growth in 
synthetic biology by investing some £6million.”  
Response to ‘A Synthetic Biology Road Map for the UK’ (Letter from 
Science Minister, 2012) 
 
Within this discourse, science appears to be seen as a solution, a producer of 
technologies and driver of growth, with words such as ‘technology’, ‘product’, 
‘solution’, ‘economics’ and ‘growth’ being significant. Science or application related 
words are not common – the only words in the significant list are ‘bio’, ‘energy’ and 
‘chemical’: 
 
“The Government accepts the importance of the UK’s science base in 
providing the new ideas and innovations for translation into industrial 
biotechnology applications.“  
Government response to the Industrial Biotechnology – Innovation & 
Growth team report to Government (2009)  
 
“Synthetic Biology could produce solutions to many of humanity’s most 
pressing issues and at the same time presents significant growth 
opportunities.”  
Response to ‘A Synthetic Biology Road Map for the UK’ (Letter from 
Science Minister, 2012) 
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Summary of key themes emerging from policy discourses (Corpus C) 
a. Focus on supporting science  
Overall the focus of all the policy discourses is on enabling science and innovation, 
in order to grow the economy and maintain national competitiveness. Specifically, 
they look at the government’s role in regulating and providing support for the various 
areas of science. Within this, the role of regulation is in balancing interests, 
providing infrastructure and coordination and ensuring no harm is done.  
 
b. Benefits of science assumed, not specified 
Beyond economic benefits, the purpose to which the science being discussed is 
generally not specified in these policy discourses. Applications are implied rather 
than described. One of the texts contributing to class C3 acknowledges this – 
pointing out that the potential applications of some new technologies are unknown 
and need to be monitored. Even without clear applications however, science is seen 
as an automatic and unquestionable good. The implication is that doing more 
science will undoubtedly develop more social benefits, as that is what science 
‘makes’.  
 
c. Uncertainty, risk and unforeseen consequences acknowledged 
The policy discourses raise the possibility of uncertainty and unforeseen 
consequences and the need to monitor and look out for these, and to adapt the 
regulation to cope with these new consequences, is described. This uncertainty is 
however seen as a reason to seek more information or knowledge (i.e. to do more 
research), rather than to put on the brakes. For policymakers, the unknowns were 
knowable (but as yet unknown) rather than unpredictable futures.  
 
d. Social and ethical issues as epiphenomena and questions of risk or 
legality 
Connected to the previous point, throughout the policy discourses, social and ethical 
issues relating to science and technology are acknowledged, but are not discussed 
beyond that. Instead, they are sought to be ‘addressed’ or balanced, while still 
allowing the research to take place. Social and ethical issues are seen as 
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epiphenomena that can be dealt with separately from the science itself. They are 
also seen as ‘public’ matters – concerns raised in public dialogues in particular. 
 
The policy discourses also talk about the problems associated with new science and 
technologies as matters of risk or regulation. As with uncertainties, these are seen 
as matters that can be quantified, managed or resolved with more information, more 
research or better regulation.  Such a view of science and its associated problems 
appears to provide a practical way forward that allows the science to happen while 
still minimising the problems, but at the same time, perhaps without intending to do 
so, they close down potentially important matters of ethics and morality – matters 
that are important to the public.  
 
Class C2, which discusses the legislation around animal human hybrid embryos is a 
particularly interesting example of this. The policy discourse recognises that the 
question of whether hybrid embryos are animal or human is an important one. But 
for them this is a matter to be settled in order to work out who would regulate them – 
if they are human embryos then the HFEA is responsible, if animals, then the Home 
Office. For the policymakers, a clear, settled answer is the important thing and so 
the law is turned to in order to settle this very moral matter decisively. As I will 
discuss further later, turning social and ethical issues into risk or legal matters keeps 
the issue in the expert domain and allows it to ‘slot’ more readily into existing ways 
of decision making or into categories of evidence that policymakers know how to 
process.  
 
e. Reliance on ‘expert’ advice 
As well as the tendency to turn social and ethical issues into ‘expert’ matters of risk 
and legality, the policy discourses also appear to draw very heavily on expert 
advice, with scientific organisations being mentioned and quoted and scientific 
language being used throughout.  
 
f. Public dialogue mentioned but problematized 
Public dialogue events are mentioned in the policy discourses. In particular, they are 
discussed as ways of identifying public issues to be addressed. They are however 
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problematized, with questions raised about their representativeness and calls for 
similar views to be sought from ‘experts’ in order to verify their validity.  
 
 
From Discourses to Sociotechnical Imaginaries 
As with the public and the expert corpuses, I have looked at these policy discourses 
together to understand the underlying sociotechnical imaginaries at play: 
 
1. Basic entities recognised or constructed 
In terms of the basic entities recognised, the focus of the policy discourses is split 
between people, technology, government and the economy. 
 
People are variably referred to in terms of their relationship to the technologies in 
question – farmers and consumers in the case of GM; patients, men and women in 
the case of embryology research; the public in the case of nanoscience and 
synthetic biology; and as engineers, workers or professionals in discussions about 
technology transfer and funding. Perhaps surprisingly for a corpus that includes 
parliamentary documents, there are no references to citizens or voters. 
 
Scientific and technological concepts are also discussed – words such as 
nanoparticles, embryo, chimera and gene are significant. 
 
Government is discussed in terms of ministers, regulation, bill, committee.  
 
The economy is also an important matter for these discourses, with concepts such 
as markets, business sector, pounds, investment being key. Tying in with the idea of 
government and the economy, words relating to countries and nations – the UK, 
Europe, international are also important. 
 
In terms of boundaries, when talking about embryo research, the boundary between 
human and animal is very important for the policy discourse – but this is seen as a 
legal rather than an ontological boundary. 
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2. Assumptions about natural relationships 
a. Science drives progress and solves problems 
The policy discourses contain a strong sense of the promise of advancement or 
cures from science. Science and technology is seen as the provider of solutions – 
for healthcare, for sustainability and for the economy. The precise nature of the 
solutions or benefits offered by such developments is unspoken – indeed their 
unknown nature is mentioned – the implication being that more science will 
inevitably bring social goods as this is the purpose of science. 
 
b. Risks and uncertainties are knowable 
Coupled with this however is the acknowledgement that uncertainties and risks 
surround some of these new developments. These risks and uncertainties are seen 
as knowable or manageable with more information and are epiphenomena.  
 
c. Social and ethical concerns can be addressed 
Concerns about social and ethical issues are matters that have been created by the 
public and matters, which can also be addressed with more information or legal 
clarity. 
 
3. Agents and their motives 
Science is seen as producer of goods and solutions. More science therefore brings 
more social goods. 
 
The public are discussed as a group who have concerns and objections not shared 
by the scientific community – public dialogue is a way of finding out what these 
concerns are, so that experts can decide which ones are valid and address them. 
 
The source of most advice on the matters being considered are ‘experts’ – 
specifically the scientific members of august bodies such as the learned societies. 
They have the right to talk on these subjects and verify/challenge public concerns. 
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The law is also an important source of advice and seen in the policy discourses as 
the way to settle social and ethical issues. Legal decisions are often used as a 
proxy for discussion of moral and social issues. 
 
Industry is an important partner in developing these new technologies and 
translating them into businesses, jobs and economic growth to keep the UK 
internationally competitive.  
 
Above all this however, is the role of Government in hearing these different interests 
and standpoints, balancing interests and providing rules to ensure that science 
causes no harm and is able to proceed effectively. 
  
4. Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices 
The sense of progress and the potential future benefits to come from science is a 
key theme running throughout the policy discourse. The future therefore is a key 
rhetorical device in the policy discourse – it is not about what science is doing now, 
but what it can do in the future. As I have already mentioned, this is not necessarily 
based upon any specific benefits in the pipeline, but the idea of science as a 
producer of solutions in the future. 
 
Alongside that runs the idea of the need for the UK economy to compete in a global 
market. Throughout the discourse the role of science and innovation in driving the 
UK economy is important, as is the suggestion that this will keep us ahead of the 
game – giving us an international lead, for instance. This ties in somewhat with the 
expert rhetoric of time and urgency. 
 
The advice of others is also evoked throughout the policy discourses, providing third 
party endorsement to policy proposals or allowing particular issues to be raised by 
‘others’ – for example, social and ethical issues are raised by the public. Expert 
advice appears to have the most currency and is also used to neutralise more 
problematic discussions – legal expertise is drawn upon to settle the ontological 
questions at the heart of the hybrid embryo legislation, and scientific expertise 
guides judgements about the potential risks of environmental technologies, for 
example.  
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The Policy sociotechnical imaginary: Science driving economic progress 
Together, these features build up a picture of an imaginary of ‘science driving 
economic progress’. In this imaginary, with sufficient resources and freedom, 
science has the ability to solve the world’s problems. Any problems or risks arising 
can be managed and dealt with by more knowledge and information. Social and 
ethical issues raised by the public can be addressed by anticipating and managing 
risk or by the law. Industry is a partner in developing these new technologies and 
converting them into jobs and wealth and the role of government is to ensure that 
the partnerships and infrastructures are in place to ensure this happens in a way in 
which the different interests are balanced. 
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Chapter	  6:	  Comparison	  of	  public,	  expert	  and	  policy	  
sociotechnical	  imaginaries	  
 
In the last two chapters I have described how I have identified various discourses in 
the public, expert and policy documents that build up into a public sociotechnical 
imaginary of ‘Contingent progress’, an expert imaginary of ‘Scientific progress’ and 
a policy imaginary of ‘Science driving economic progress’.  
 
In this chapter, I compare these three imaginaries and consider what the similarities 
and differences in sociotechnical imaginaries and discourses mean in terms of the 
impact of public dialogue on policy. Are there any traces of the public or expert 
discourses in policy documents? How do policymakers perceive public dialogue and 
what role do they see for the public in decision-making? What does the policy 
sociotechnical imaginary look like and what role do policymakers see for science in 
government and society? Instead of the traditional approach to evaluating impact by 
examining how particular thoughts move through the paperwork, I am seeking to 
understand impact in terms of how the high-level ideas and visions, and general 
approaches to the subjects in hand, are reflected and expressed in the different 
corpuses. 
 
At this point I would like to put forward a series of initial hypotheses that aim to 
provide an explanation for the level of impact of public dialogue on policy that is 
evident. In the context of these hypotheses, I compare the three sociotechnical 
imaginaries and revise the hypotheses before analysing the interviews. In this way, I 
aim to shed light on whether or not these hypotheses are reasonable and whether 
there are further explanations that help understand the impact of public dialogue on 
policy, how evidence is used and balanced in policy, how public dialogue fits in, as 
well as to get a clearer picture of the sociotechnical imaginaries at play.  
 
• H1a: Public dialogue has had very little impact on policy 
• H2a: The policy sociotechnical imaginary is more aligned with the expert 
sociotechnical imaginary than with the public imaginary 
• H3a: Policy discourses draw more strongly on expert advice 
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Comparing Sociotechnical Imaginaries 
 
The key features of the public, expert and policy sociotechnical imaginaries is given 
in the table below: 
 
Table 6: Key features of the public, expert and policy sociotechnical imaginaries 
derived from the text analysis. 
	   Public  Expert Policy 
Basic entities 
recognised 
or 
constructed 
People 
 
Animals 
 
Nature 
 
Government 
 
Cures  
 
Science and 
technology 
 
People constructed 
in relation to this 
 
Scale: nanoparticles, 
cells, patient, 
ecosystem,  
Economy and 
market 
 
Nations 
 
Time 
People constructed 
as citizens and 
consumers 
 
Science and 
technology 
 
Economies and 
market 
 
Law 
 
Countries/nations – 
UK, Europe,  
 
Assumptions 
about natural 
relationships 
3 conceptions of 
nature 
 
Distinction between 
humans and animals 
 
Promise of 
advance/cures from 
science 
Progress 
Subordination of 
nature by science 
 
Competition 
between countries 
 
Risks manageable 
Progress 
 
Role of government 
in enabling science, 
balancing interests 
and looking after 
economy 
 
Expert and non-
experts 
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Role of government 
in regulating use and 
direction of science 
 
Uncertainties 
knowable 
 
 
Risks manageable 
 
Uncertainties 
knowable 
 
Competition 
between countries 
Agents and 
their motives 
	  
Industry focused on 
profit making 
 
Scientists want to do 
science  
 
Government’s role to 
counter-balance 
both these excesses 
 
People need more 
information and 
should be listened to 
 
Experts needed to 
make decisions 
Government focused 
on economic gains 
 
Scientists solving big 
problems ahead 
 
Public concerned 
about change and 
new technologies 
 
Decisions should be 
based on expert 
scientific 
advice/authority of 
science 
Government 
manages economy 
and enables things 
 
Law settles matters 
 
Industry a partner in 
converting science 
to wealth 
 
Science is producing 
social goods – 
benefits assumed 
not specified 
 
Public has concerns 
about things and 
need to be 
reassured 
 
‘Experts’ & scientists 
have the right to talk 
on these subjects 
and verify/challenge 
public concerns  
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Key 
metaphors 
and 
rhetorical 
devices 
Nature 
 
Slippery slope 
 
Hyperbolic framing 
and abstracting to 
elicit support 
	  
Use of technical and 
scientific language 
 
Economic 
arguments for doing 
science 
 
Time limitations and 
international 
competition 
 
Hyperbolic framing 
 
Managing/closing 
risk 
Discounting 
uncertainty 
 
Separation of social 
and ethical issues 
Normalising 
problems of new 
technologies 
Economic 
arguments for doing 
science 
 
International 
competition and 
urgency 
 
Social and ethical 
issues converted to 
risk = public matters 
 
Third party advice 
and endorsement 
 
 
 
It is possible to see some overlap between the public and the policy discourses 
described in chapters 4 and 5 – the sense of uncertainty and the need to monitor 
outcomes in particular. But comparing the public, expert and policy sociotechnical 
imaginaries above, it is apparent that the policy imaginary is much closer to the 
expert imaginary than the public imaginary. While the expert imaginary is perhaps 
more centred around the science and technology and the policy imaginary taking 
more account of people and regulation, this can be accounted for by considering the 
different functions and audiences of each set of documents. The core 
understandings and imaginaries of the way that science is and ought to be within 
our society are however strikingly similar: the (unquestioning) understanding that 
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science will solve problems and deliver social goods; that science is a driver of the 
economy and of international competitiveness; the perspective that social and 
ethical issues are matters of risk and understanding, which stand aside from the 
technologies themselves and that can be quantified and resolved by more education 
or more research; the role of science to support and serve industry, which in turn 
supports and drives the economy. 
 
This is in contrast to the public imaginary, in which the science and technology are 
seen as producing goods and solutions, but also as producing problems too; where 
industry is a necessary but distorting influence that needs to be managed; and a 
sense that science can get out of hand, compromise nature or challenge what it is to 
be human.  
 
This suggests that what we are looking at is an ‘elite’ imaginary of ‘Scientific 
Progress’, held by policymakers and scientific experts, and a ‘counter-imaginary’ of 
‘Contingent Progress’, expressed by the public in public dialogues. While these two 
imaginaries are not a million miles away from each other (they are more similar than 
the “promethean elite meets precautionary public” description that Dryzek et al. 
(2008) has characterised around GM, for instance) the differences are significant – 
particularly when thinking about the impact of public dialogue. As I will discuss later, 
this is not least because the way we see and understand science shapes the way 
we believe it needs to be managed and controlled. The shape of regulation is 
therefore likely to reflect the shape of the sociotechnical imaginary held by those 
designing regulation (Jasanoff & Kim 2009; Hurlbut 2015). 
 
What does this tell us about the impact of public dialogue? 
From the outset, I have been aiming to answer the question of whether public 
dialogue has had any impact on public policy in the UK. Having identified the public 
and expert discourses that feed into policymaking, as well as the policy discourses 
that emerge, is there any evidence that the public discourses have had any impact? 
And does this analysis provide any evidence to explain this? At this point, I will 
reflect on the evidence to date, to test my initial hypotheses, with the aim of 
developing them further, ready to be tested with my interviews with policymakers 
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H1a: Public dialogue has had very little impact on policy 
To begin, by comparing the discourses and high level sociotechnical imaginaries 
expressed in these discourses, there is evidence that some aspects of the outputs 
of dialogues are reflected in policy – not least because there are specific mentions 
of the public concerns being raised in dialogue events and to ScienceWise. The 
policy discourses also share with the public discourses the recognition of 
uncertainty around science and the need to anticipate and monitor for unforeseen 
consequences that might emerge from new sciences and technologies. 
 
However, while the policy discourses also acknowledge the social and ethical 
issues raised in public dialogue, these issues are not explored or considered much 
further. Rather than being seen as an integral part of the science and technologies 
themselves, the social and ethical issues are seen as separate matters that can be 
dealt with and minimised – which is similar to the way in which expert discourses 
treat these issues. Further, while the public are seen as the sources of these issues 
in the policy discourses, this is problematized and the veracity of the public as 
sources is brought into question. Instead, the authority to deal with these issues is 
seen as lying still with experts – in the domains of risk management or the law.  
 
Beyond the specific mentions of the outputs of public dialogue, it is difficult to 
establish whether the other similarities (such as the acknowledgement of 
uncertainty mentioned above) are the result of the influence of public dialogue or 
whether they are the result of shared views or the effect of other influences such as 
lobbying from other sources or alternative pieces of evidence. I explore this later in 
interviews with policymakers, although, as I have described in the introduction, it is 
difficult it is to trace particular decisions back to particular pieces of evidence.  
 
In light of this, I would like to amend H1a to: 
 
H1: Public dialogue has had some, but limited impact on policy. 
 
H2a: The policy sociotechnical imaginary is more aligned with the expert 
sociotechnical imaginary 
As I have described above, I have found that the expert and policy sociotechnical 
imaginaries are closely aligned, creating an ‘elite’ imaginary of ‘scientific progress’. 
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The outputs of public dialogue in contrast contribute to a ‘counter-imaginary’ of 
‘contingent progress’. This counter imaginary could be seen as challenging or 
undermining the ‘elite’ imaginary – and be given less currency as a result. In 
particular, the elite imaginary, with its focus on economic growth and managing risk, 
provides an efficient way to close down issues around science and technology and 
to move on. It also provides a clear role for government that is in keeping with the 
wider political narrative about reducing the role of the state. The public discourse in 
contrast begins to question whether profit should be at any cost, potentially holding 
back economic growth, or at least making the UK a less appealing place to do 
science. It also presents a more challenging and problematic role for government, in 
balancing interests and ensuring science is used for public good, rather than not 
causing harm. It also tends to keep issues open, which perhaps presents problems 
if the policy system needs clarity and closure. 
 
The rhetoric and ontology of the public counter-imaginary might also undermine its 
power and therefore mean that views based around this imaginary are not taken as 
seriously as those based around the elite imaginary. As I have already described, 
the expert discourses use much more technical language, especially compared to 
the public discourses. Hilgartner (Hilgartner 2000, p.8) who looked at scientific 
advice through the metaphor of ‘performance’, argued that scientific advisory bodies 
use their technical knowledge to display competence and credibility and therefore 
win the confidence of audiences. Its presence in these reports could therefore be 
seen as a rhetorical device that instils the experts authoring the reports with 
authority by reinforcing the privileged and expert nature of their knowledge. At the 
same time, the public discourses’ ontological focus on people rather than 
technology could be deepening the perceived differences in credibility between the 
two sets of reports. Cook and colleagues (Cook et al. 2004) talking to GM scientists 
involved in public engagement activities, reported that the public were seen to be 
making emotional (rather than rational) assessments of technologies, and to 
therefore be vulnerable to manipulation by the press, NGOs and politicians. If this 
view is shared by policymakers, then it might work to undermine the credibility of the 
public reports as a source of advice, by reinforcing this perception that the public’s 
views on new technologies are irrational and susceptible to change – and therefore 
not worth building into policy. 
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Reflecting this, H2a is therefore amended to: 
 
H2: The impact of public dialogue is limited because of differences between elite 
and public sociotechnical imaginaries 
 
 
H3a: Policy discourses draw more strongly on expert advice 
It is clear from the policy discourses that ‘expert’ sources are valued in policymaking 
– and that the outputs of public dialogue are not seen as ‘expert’ sources. As I have 
described above, the public discourses are people focused and appear to have less 
rhetorical power than the expert discourses. Furthermore, the evidence from the text 
analysis suggests that policymakers sometimes look for ‘expert’ opinion to verify the 
public views put forward. 
 
As I have explained in the introduction, expertise can be seen as both relational and 
substantive. Either understanding could provide an explanation for the preference 
for expert advice in this instance – the policymakers might not see ScienceWise as 
the right kind of institution to provide policy advice, that the public have no particular 
knowledge (besides their lay perspectives on social and ethical issues) of value to 
policymakers, or policymakers might not consider lay perspectives to offer any 
valuable insight.  
 
So, from where do policymakers get their advice? How do they decide who to listen 
to? What kind of knowledge or expertise are they looking for? And how are the 
views of the public and the outputs of public dialogue in particular seen in this 
context? I will explore these questions further in my interviews with policymakers. In 
the meantime, H3a is amended to: 
 
H3: ‘Expert’ sources are valued in policymaking – and public dialogue is not seen as 
a source of expertise.  
 
In the following section, I will go on to test and develop these hypotheses in light of 
the information gathered in my interviews with policymakers.
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Interviews with policymakers 
 
As detailed in the methodology chapter, my group of policymakers for interview 
comprised two former Chief Scientific Advisers (CSAs), four former Government 
ministers from the two main political parties, three civil servants and one former 
special adviser. The interviews were semi-structured, based around the same series 
of questions, but adapted for the particular interviewee’s background and the 
direction that responses took.  
 
As I have explained in the methodology, the interviews were analysed in two ways – 
firstly, using a framework that was developed around the three hypotheses that 
emerged from the text analysis; secondly, they were revisited more inductively, to 
identify any themes and messages that were important but outside the initial coding 
framework. I present the findings in this order in this chapter – first presenting the 
data from the interviews that test and develop my three hypotheses and then 
presenting any additional points that add to the picture of the impact of dialogue on 
policy and suggest a further fourth conclusion. 
 
Throughout this chapter I use quotes from interviews, but do not attribute the quotes 
to named individuals. Instead I use the designations above, so that the comments 
remain anonymous while allowing any differences in opinion related to roles to be 
apparent. In order to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees, I have not been 
able to provide the full transcripts. Instead I have used lengthy quotes in order to 
ensure the comments are understood in context. 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Public dialogue has had some, but limited impact on 
policy. 
Evidence of the impact of public dialogue events on policymakers was variable. 
Dialogue appears to have had the most impact on civil servants. All three of the civil 
servants spoken to had experience of ScienceWise public dialogue events and were 
enthusiastic about them. In contrast, none of the ministers were familiar with 
ScienceWise nor public dialogue. The views of the former Chief Scientific Advisers 
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were in-between – they were aware of public dialogue but had not necessarily been 
involved themselves nor understood how such an activity could be useful to them. 
 
Civil Servants 
The civil servants (some of whom had worked for the ministers interviewed) were 
the most familiar with dialogue and Sciencewise and all three had been actively 
involved with at least one event. They understood that the aim was to involve public 
perspectives in the policymaking process. The impact on policy of policymakers’ 
experience with public dialogue was difficult to quantify or account for however. In 
many instances, interviewees reported that the public hadn’t expressed anything 
that they (policymakers) hadn’t considered already, but that the process was useful 
as a sense check or grounding, or that it simply felt like the right thing to do: 
 
Interviewer Do you get involved with any of the public engagement or public 
dialogue activities? 
	  
Civil Servant I’ve been involved in one, which was on data... It was done as part 
of the Royal Society ‘Science as an Open Enterprise’ report and 
some of the administrative data taskforce work. Basically a 
dialogue was done on how the public felt about their data being 
used for policy reasons. And it was really great actually… the 
cohort that was involved in the dialogue started with a kind of, the 
whole concept of open data and data sharing is a bit of a, its not 
of a high interest prima face until you start talking about it. And 
just a little bit of discussion about what it was really got people 
engaged and by the end of the dialogue they had become, the 
group had come up with a sort of set of principles around which 
data sharing was and wasn’t ok. So, from a standing start to have 
been able to do something so sophisticated, I thought was 
excellent. 
	  
Interviewer Did they tell you anything new that you hadn’t given any thought 
to? 
	  
Civil Servant Erm. Well I was new to the policy area, so a lot of that was new. 
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But in hindsight, I was part of an expert round table [details 
removed for confidentiality] that came up with the same, well 
similar concepts in terms of contextual, the importance of context 
to data sharing rules and regs. There were differences and a 
different level of sophistication, but everyone’s a member of the 
public, so it’s kind of, the public dialogue thing, it’s quite hard to 
think of the public as a generic mass actually. It’s not really, I 
wonder if that’s not helpful either.  
	  
Interviewer So what happened to the guidelines or principles that they drew 
up then? 
	  
Civil Servant They are in the report and I have personally shared that report 
with quite a number of people across government. Whether they 
have read it or not, I have no idea. But it certainly, it sits with me, 
as someone, one of the people in government who cares about 
these things, as a rather important piece of evidence that I was 
part of and saw how it was done and I had confidence in it as an 
exercise. I knew the limitations of it as an exercise, but for quite 
an abstract area like data, it’s just useful to have something that is 
grounded in reality. What has always struck me about public 
dialogue stuff, it feels ready-made quite minister friendly because 
by definition it can’t be pointy headed and techy because it’s non-
experts usually. It’s lay people. And that is a useful thing.  
	  
Interviewer What is the purpose of it from a policymaker’s perspective? 
	  
Civil Servant Public dialogue? Erm. Well I think it’s to, I think it’s, I think there 
are a number of purposes aren’t there. It’s partially to generate 
ideas. It’s partly to quality or sense check ideas, it’s to, coming 
back to the delivery ball, the dialogue can help understand how 
you can land [policy], you know. It’s this co-creation point which is 
I think extremely of its time.  
 
Civil Servant But the public dialogue was quite affirming for the research councils 
because their policy was pretty much presumption of openness but 
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you need to make judgements about privacy about commercial 
security about confidence about when you release incomplete 
datasets, all of these questions was already there and the public 
actually, a very small number of members of the public involved 
with the dialogue, reinforced those views and suggested they were 
sensible views. The nature of the research matters, that privacy 
matters, but that sometimes you might trade some of that off.  
 
	  
Interviewer Have you come across any of the Sciencewise dialogues? 
	  
Civil Servant Yes, some of them. I was heavily involved in, not the big GM 
Nation thing quite a few years ago, but recently I was involved in 
quite a bit of that. Synthetic biology I’ve been involved with, ones 
on that as well. I think Sciencewise is generally a good thing 
because it gets government trying to think in different ways trying 
to engage with the public in different ways and that’s gotta be a 
good thing. Whether it’s right or whether it’s doing everything it 
should be, I don’t know. But having a group of people who are 
trying to encourage some different ways of working on that has 
got to be a good thing. 
	  
Interviewer Did it influence any of the sorts of directions you were thinking? 
	  
Civil Servant [Pause] the report was delivered shortly before I left. But I’m not 
[inaudible] since. I’ll be honest. When I remember reading the 
report from that dialogue, I remember thinking I think I would have 
guessed all of that. What did we learn? I don’t know. I don’t know 
whether there’s been an assessment to what Sciencewise the 
impact it’s actually had. It’s a good thing. I’ve always enjoyed 
engaging with, it makes me think differently. It makes me think a 
bit more openly and that’s gotta be a good thing.  
	  
Interviewer Did you go to any of the meetings? 
	  
Civil Servant Yeah. I was sitting on a steering group for a little while in the run 
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up to it. And that was good. And the techniques they were using to 
engage a very small sub-section of the public on synthetic biology, 
it was good. It was good to get people engaged and all that. But 
then I remember getting what I think was the final report that had 
conclusions about what became extracted from this process about 
what the public feels about synthetic biology. And it was useful to 
see, but it would have been what I guessed. People have got 
some hopes, they’ve got some concerns, they’re generally more 
positive in health care, they don’t really want the leaked stuff 
changing the environment, they want to see that it’s regulated 
properly. They think scientists, I think there was one interesting 
point actually, they wanted scientists to be guided a bit more by 
what they should be doing in this space rather than a free for all. 
That was kind of interesting. That was one point that made me 
stop and think. 
	  
Interviewer The fact it wasn’t interesting, are you saying things you’d thought 
about or weren’t things that were in your powers? 
	  
Civil Servant No no no they were in my power but I guess apart from that last 
point, none of it was stuff that I hadn’t already assumed. So I 
guess in some ways there is value in it in confirming what we 
thought because we are members of the public after all. So there 
was value in it bringing some kind of level of rigour to confirming 
most of what we thought the public were at and throwing up a 
couple of additional interesting things that we needed to take on 
board. 
	  
 
One interviewee was however specific about the insight that the public can bring to 
discussions about science and technology, pointing out that the addition of the 
public dialogue element to the Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering report 
on nanotechnologies had actually increased the value of the report to policymakers 
by presenting a more nuanced view of the technologies that moved beyond simply 
cheerleading for science: 
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Interviewer 
 
Were you involved with nanoscience when there were the various 
debates around that? 
	  
Civil Servant Yes. I did a bit of the work on policy at the point at which the 
Royal Society report was being published. And of course that 
Royal Society work was quite interesting because it was the first, 
and I think it’s not happened again, the first time the royal society 
took some account of public views as part of their deliberations 
on a subject. So that report was quite a nuanced report that 
talked about potential risks in quite a transparent way, talked 
about potential benefits of the technology and also raised issues 
around public views about the technology. And because of that, 
the report was quite influential I think. And it was also in contrast 
with GM, this was all happening at the point at which there was 
no regulatory framework in place, so there was scope in order to 
develop things in the light of that, the regulatory framework. 
 
Interviewer Why do you think the public stuff made it more influential? 
	  
Civil Servant Because it gave a nuanced view I guess and brought that together 
with the scientific analysis around the costs and the benefits and 
the risks. I think that work was pretty good at taking both the 
benefits and the risks seriously. So I’d contrast it with the work the 
RS did on Fracking recently, where I think a lot of commentators 
would say it was a bit of a cheerleader type report that focuses on 
the benefits and doesn’t talk much about the risks and almost 
abrogates any responsibility for understanding what the societal 
views are and taking them into account. 
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The potential for reinforcing prejudices or bias in policymakers’ views was 
highlighted by one civil servant however: 
 
 
Civil Servant 
	  
But the GM area is interesting because there was a large body of 
already carried out public dialogue work on GM. My sense was 
that was acknowledged in the policy process but not particularly 
drawn upon nor used particularly effectively. In a sense it was 
used in that the broad conclusion was, this is generalised, but an 
anti GM conclusion and this was essentially valued very highly by 
those ministers who were anti GM and not valued at all, or 
criticised as being flawed by those who were keen to promote GM 
as a technology. It didn’t really help in that sense, it just 
reinforced people’s prejudices.  
	  
 
 
Chief Scientific Advisers 
The former CSAs interviewed were less familiar with ScienceWise and public 
dialogue than the civil servants. They did however appear instinctively to feel that is 
was a good thing. One was clear of the benefits that could come in terms of 
behaviour change and bringing science and society closer together, but had never 
been involved nor advocated for such a dialogue; the other had been involved and 
was clear that the purpose is about sense checking and evidence building:  
 
CSA I’m not sure how you bring in the average person on the street. I’m 
not sure. It’s an interesting question. To what, I mean this sounds 
a bit snobbish I know, to what degree does the average person on 
the ground know what the issues are? I believe, and you might 
want to check, I believe the Royal Society had a small project, a 
policy project, asking almost your exact question. Now what you 
would have to do is to have some sort of um, what they call 
citizens juries, local meetings and um you can do two things. I 
mean I’m not a social researcher. I could imagine you could 
 157 
construct some really good survey questions, being very careful 
not to be leading, because you can always get any answer you 
want by phrasing the question, but you could combine doing some 
really good surveys with some, I’ll call them focus groups, where 
you bring 20 or 30 people together, you might ask them the same 
questions you might have on the survey, then spend half a day 
discussing the issues and then see if they came up with the same 
answers afterwards. But we haven’t done that. Not for any of the 
assessments I’ve been part of. Should we? It would be an 
interesting idea. Costs money, but maybe not outrageously so, so 
maybe. 
 
Interviewer Why do you think it’s important to do? 
 
CSA I think it is, well I suppose actually at the end of the day, what does 
society care about? What is their concern? … Understanding what 
people care about is rather important because... I gave a talk in 
Scotland yesterday, I give a couple of weekly forums, and someone 
was saying what’s one of the most important things? And it’s 
behaviour change... Big behaviour change. If we want change, the 
public have to buy into these issues. The more they own the issues 
they’ll do three things potentially. 1. Modify their behaviour to waste 
less food, waste less energy. 2. Send a message to government 
these are important issues to them. Dammit we want action 3. Send 
a message to the private sector, we want environmentally and 
socially sustainable products. So an informed public can send 
multiple messages. And then also, once we understand the issues, 
the scientists working can then think through, OK so to address 
their issue these are the sorts of research questions we need to be 
asking.  
 
 
Interviewer You know that there has been a move to try to involve the 
public in decisions around science. Have you been involved 
with any of these? 
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CSA We did a, it’s not so much science, well I suppose it is. We did a 
consultation when I was at DFT on road user charging. So we did a 
Saturday morning workshop in Reading where we just got the lay 
people to turn up to a school I think. 
 
Interviewer Was it a useful exercise? 
	  
CSA It was useful in what it showed was that the package of policies as 
it was, was incomplete because it was only about charging 
motorists. It wasn’t about funding public transport to replace, sorry 
to offer choices on how to make a journey. 
	  
Interviewer Presumably you could have worked that out without a public 
consultation? 
	  
CSA 
	  
Yes but it actually gave us the social science evidence. Through a 
set of focus groups. And they went all around the country and got 
very similar answers, as you might expect. 
 
Significantly, this last interviewee was talking about some focus groups that were 
commissioned by the social researchers within that particular government 
department. This is distinct from a ScienceWise public engagement exercise which, 
beside methodological differences, would have operated at arms length from the 
policymakers and evidence teams. This appears to be an important distinction to 
make when considering impact. 
 
This difference in the levels of familiarity and engagement with ScienceWise and 
public dialogue activities in general suggests that the policy influence of such 
activities functions at a civil service level. While the outputs might feed into the 
‘evidence mix’ presented to ministers, there is little evidence that ministers are 
aware of this or directly engaged with public dialogue. The quotes above also 
suggest that the issues discussed in public dialogues function at a sub-ministerial 
level – that the discussions reflect decisions made by officials rather than decisions 
made by ministers. This is an important point that I will discuss later, in the context 
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of the policy models being described by interviewees and what that means for public 
dialogue. 
 
Furthermore, the outputs of public discussion appear to have more impact when the 
policymakers themselves have attended and participated – none could recall 
reports, only experience of being at the events. This is supported by the quote from 
a civil servant below: 
 
Civil 
Servant 
I don’t know how much exposure ministers would have had to formal 
public dialogues and the whole stuff around GM like citizens juries. I 
think they got that in a digested format from their advisers, so I don’t 
think that they would… and this is a problem in a sense that if my 
argument is that the value you get from these public debates is the 
nuance, then actually that nuance is lost once a policy official has 
converted a 50 page report into two sentences, which is the reality. 
 
	  
 
 
Former Ministers 
Former Ministers (and the special adviser) interviewed were unfamiliar with the idea 
of public dialogue and ScienceWise. None had been involved with a ScienceWise 
dialogue and all seemed to understand it to be a public education exercise. As I will 
discuss later however, this does not mean that they were not enthusiastic about 
involving the public in decision-making: 
 
Interviewer And I don’t know if you’ve come across this, but there’s a part of 
government called Sciencewise that is trying to enable public 
debate? 
 
Former 
Minister 
[Shakes head] 
 
Interviewer You haven’t come across this? 
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Former 
Minister 
Well obviously that’s something within the civil service, within the 
department that’s obviously what we give a lot of thought to. The 
team talks we’d have about how to do this would be decided 
between the senior civil servants and the ministers. The chief 
scientist, he was present at all decision-making meetings 
absolutely because that matters to me that we have the evidence 
base right. But you would also have a director of communications 
whose job it is to try to advise on how to communicate this. And 
we had a very good head of news who is still there and we had to 
think very carefully how do you bring across to the public a very 
difficult message. 
 
 
 
Interviewer Were you involved in ScienceWise? 
 
Former 
Minister 
Sciencewise? Is that the public education stuff? 
 
Interviewer Yes, sort of. It’s public dialogue. 
 
Former 
Minister 
Yes, well we funded [first name removed] what’s her name down 
in Bristol. I was very keen on that. Yes. 
 
Interviewer But you weren’t involved in any of the events they ran? 
 
Former 
Minister 
I may have been but I don’t recall it as a huge thing. But 
we did do a lot on the public education science 
engagement thing. 
 
 
 
Interviewer Sciencewise was in your bit wasn’t it? 
 
Former 
Minister 
Yes. I found that, and I was trying to encourage more of this, so the 
‘Science, So What?’ campaign, all of the encouragement of STEM 
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subjects, women in science and engineering, were about one core 
idea, which is that motivating the people who are working in 
science and engineering, to feel that they had a voice, which 
needed to be listened to collectively and to try and provide a 
platform for that. Both in terms of to encourage them to engage in 
the debate on these topics – not…now how can I put this… 
Sometimes I felt in the scientific community… there’s a feeling that 
this is all pointless. I’ll just get on with my science and those idiots, 
you know. And I feel that’s wrong. That’s too depressing if you sort 
of give up like that. You have to say, if you’re a scientist or 
engineer, you’ve made a choice to work in that area because you 
believe it is important. It’s your life’s works. And so surely you feel 
that engaging with people who don’t get it is something you should 
do. Because if you don’t, who’s going to? And therefore if the 
scientific community doesn’t make its voice heard, no-one’s going 
to do it for them. 
 
 
Special 
Adviser 
So, was I involved in any public debate type of thing? Not really, 
no. It was probably more the media person who did that kind of 
thing, it was much more engagement with representative groups 
than the public. 
 
 
Overall, the interviews with policymakers appear to support H1 – that public 
dialogue has had some, but very limited impact on policy. The interviews have also 
indicated that the impact is largely focused at a civil-servant level but that, even 
then, the civil servants interviewed were unable to articulate very clearly what the 
impact had been – beyond a sense-check and feeling that it was the right thing to 
do.  
 
The policymakers did however appear to value public input –recognising that they 
had interesting and useful perspectives. This rules out one possible hypothesis for 
the lack of impact – the public don’t have anything useful to say: 
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Civil Servant [in this department] ultimately the people who make decisions 
are ministers. And their decisions aren’t just based on science. I 
mean, in the UK generally our ministers try to make decisions in 
line with the science. That’s often the way the UK governments 
of all colours want to go and that’s a good thing. It’s not like that 
in a lot of other countries. But they shouldn’t just take it on the 
basis of that. They weigh up public feelings of course, they 
weigh up what’s going on in parliament they weigh up what’s 
going on in the media, they weigh up what’s going on legally, 
they weigh up the science, the economics. I don’t think they’d 
want to make a decision that was totally out of kilter with the 
science, that probably wouldn’t work, but undoubtedly there 
would be instances where they have to respond to the public’s 
wishes. They are elected, that’s what they are there to do. So we 
don’t live in a technologically driven decision making state. That 
probably wouldn’t be a good thing. There are times when it might 
seem like a good thing but it wouldn’t be a good thing. People’s 
views and opinions are what really matter and so ministers are 
the place where you bring all of these considerations together 
and try and work out ways. As officials, it’s our job to try and 
present them with all the evidence and the legal, the science, the 
economics, the policy, the views about stakeholders and public 
and then try and arrive at some advice as to what decision they 
want to make on that basis. 
	  
 
Civil Servant But something like GM. I’ve heard experts say, look hey, we can 
say through all our regulatory systems that they’re safe and 
therefore people should just accept that and move on. Well. 
Rightly or wrongly that’s not how the world is working on this kind 
of issue. Like you were saying at the start, quite a lot of the 
ScienceWise stuff was focused on nature and people sort of 
relationship to it. So stuff like GM obviously, at least in Europe are 
taking an approach to listen to the science and make a decision. 
That’s not working for the public rightly or wrongly. So you do 
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need to adapt and take a different approach. Otherwise we are 
never going to break through that logjam. So a deeper 
understanding of why people are reacting in the way we do, or is it 
geopolitical forces at work here, it probably is to some extent, then 
you need to be alive to that and adapt. But unless the public don’t 
care about the issue I don’t think you can just close down an issue 
from the public and move on from it from there. I think it’s always 
going to be more complicated.  
	  
 
One of the former ministers interviewed explained the importance of the public in 
pushing issues onto the policy agenda, using the particular example of European 
Fisheries policy: 
 
Former 
Minister 
Now we had been struggling to articulate this [the problem with 
fisheries policy] within the European Union for some time and to 
find likeminded countries who would come with us on a journey 
where we could actually come to a point of ending the policy of 
throwing away good fish, good protein. And denuding our marine 
biodiversity. It was a preposterous situation, but nobody frankly, 
very few people were interested beyond the academics and the 
policymakers.  
 
All of a sudden, it comes out in the public domain because of 
some high profile television documentaries. Next thing, we have 
campaigns running with celebrity chefs and so on. And all credit to 
it, because sometimes that is quite helpful for a policymaker. 
Finally you can stand up and say hey, we are now going to move 
on this because it is suddenly a live issue.  
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Possible explanations for this limited impact 
Besides the fact that there appears to be a low level of understanding of the 
purpose and potential of public dialogue, particularly amongst ministers and CSAs, I 
have put forward two further hypotheses to explain the limited impact of public 
dialogue: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of public dialogue is limited because of 
differences between elite and public sociotechnical imaginaries 
Hypothesis 2, from the text analysis, proposed that public dialogue had little impact 
on policy because it presented a sociotechnical imaginary that is counter to the 
‘elite’ imaginary held by experts and policymakers.  
 
To begin, is my description of an elite imaginary held by policymakers reflected in 
the way in which policymakers talked about science during the interviews? In 
analysing the interviews with policymakers, I argue that it is reflected. Furthermore, 
the interviews also provide some insight to the way in which this imaginary 
precludes the accommodation of public perspectives. 
 
1. The interviews supported my characterisation of an elite imaginary 
a. Economic focus 
The importance of the economy, which is at the heart of the proposed ‘elite’ 
imaginary of ‘scientific progress’ does appear to be reflected in the interviews with 
policymakers. In particular, the interviews with former ministers who had had 
responsibility for the science budget illustrated this especially well when talking 
about their roles, and the role of investment in science, within government:  
 
Former 
Minister 
The important thing is that you’re in cabinet and that you’re able 
therefore to make the case for science. And you remember at the 
end of 2008 the financial crash was just really starting to bite and so 
it was very topical – the rebalancing of the economy, initiatives to 
address the crash and questions around investment in science. 
There were regular COBRA committees about policies for stemming 
the financial downturn and some of those were to do with the 
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promotion of innovation in areas which were seen to have a really 
quite a quick win…. 
 
What I found as Science Minister, was that you are presented with 
the need to defend the science budget, the science ring-fence in 
particular. And your ability to do that is largely to do with convincing 
the Treasury the merits of the case. It’s partly within that 
departmental budget, but it’s also on a stand alone basis and you 
have to be able to make your case. Now one of the problems at that 
time was that we didn’t have any data that the Treasury would regard 
as coherent and convincing on the impact that science investment 
would make. Therefore you were always relying on either, well it’s a 
statement of the bleeding obvious, or you were giving some 
anecdotal examples and people were able to do that, but there was 
no financial analysis or regular collection of data.  
 
Former 
Minister 
I think it was essentially that you made the best case for investment 
in research and investment in higher education if you aligned them 
with the most economically productive parts of the economy, which 
didn’t mean that everything then became applied science, far from it. 
But understanding where these activities stood, their critical 
relationship with the development of skills, their critical relationship 
with innovation policy and their CR with future innovation and 
productivity and products needed to be seen as a whole, so you 
were really taking a lot of higher and further education and saying 
you have many, many different important and different activities but a 
core rationale is your relationship with innovation growth and the 
economy. 
	  
 
Given this deliberate alignment of science and economic objectives, it is possible to 
understand that a public perspective that challenges this in any way – even by 
simply questioning the motives of industry – would be difficult to accommodate and 
could in fact result in such views being excluded.  
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Interestingly, one of the former ministers goes on explain how the scientific 
community had been encouraged to think about their research in these economic 
terms, and how a situation of mutual self-interest had been created in this way – a 
situation in which a public that questions the correctness of this relationship – and 
indeed sees a different role for government in regulating rather than facilitating the 
relationship, would be problematic: 
 
Former 
Minister 
There is, there was at the time this philosophical argument about well 
why should we have to do this [talk about the benefits of research]? 
Isn’t it obvious? And I think that a lot of the politics around science 
come from the basis that people in the science community think that 
this is so obvious. Why do we have to go through these hoops? And I 
think that fundamentally they’re right. It should be that obvious. The 
problem is that’s not how politics actually works in government. And 
therefore it’s self-interest for the scientific community to provide the 
evidence to back up its assertion and not to see it as an attack on the 
fundamental public good that investment in blue sky research has. I 
got into quite a big political hoo-haa at the time in saying to people 
it’s not that I’m questioning fundamental research is a public good, 
what I’m saying is that you need to move beyond the assertion that 
good things come from it. We have to show the data and it’s a 
reasonable requirement for us to do that. And if we do do it, it will put 
future science ministers in a much stronger position to argue the 
case. 
	  
 
 
b. Social and Ethical issues as epiphenomena  
The finding that the policy discourses and elite imaginary see a distinct division 
between the science and the social and ethical issues was also supported by the 
interviews. For instance the following quote from a civil servant, in which the ‘social’ 
part of GM is very clearly being seen as separate from the ‘science’ itself: 
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Civil 
Servant 
You could argue that a lot of the anti GM lobby is much more about 
mechanisation and over technologicalisation of agriculture and 
capitalism and the food chain and lots of things that have absolutely 
nothing to do with GM and the science. 
	  
 
One of the former CSAs puts it even more sharply when he compares attitudes to 
data security of the public (which he later characterises as not rational because they 
are not consistently applied to every technology) to his own view that data 
technologies in themselves aren’t problematic, we just need to identify and manage 
the problems that might come from them: 
 
Former 
CSA 
Obviously the debate in the House right now, or probably in the 
Lords by now, on information security and data security is an 
example. People don’t see it like that. They see it as snooping. 
Actually, it’s about knowing what the bad guys are doing in advance 
of them doing it so we can stop them. 
	  
 
One former CSA also reinforced the view that social and ethical issues can be 
separated from the science in arguing that academics’ outlooks on the world should 
not and do not affect their science. They were explaining the role of the CSA in a 
political setting, which they refer to as ‘belief based systems’: 
 
Former 
CSA 
I think that academia is in a position where it ought to be able to 
strengthen its ability to do that [give impartial advice] because the 
one thing we ought to be able to be is agnostic as to where the 
answer is. And a lot of policy think tanks have been hijacked by belief 
based systems so they are partial. And the one thing I think 
academics should hang onto like grim death is their ability to be 
agnostic with regard to any pre-conceived idea of what is right or 
wrong. 
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Such an outlook would present two further problems for a more nuanced public 
perspective that sees the benefits and problems of science and technology as two 
sides of the same coin. Firstly, if the expectation is that social and ethical issues are 
separate from the technology, then the views of the public would be heard as such – 
reports from dialogue would be seen to be providing lists of things to be dealt with or 
the conditions under which research could proceed. This was evident from the text 
analysis, but is also expressed by one of the former CSA’s in response to a 
question about why listening to the public is important, whereby he explains that the 
public would be able to say what they are concerned about but not really formulate 
any questions or comments about the science: 
 
 
Interviewer 
 
Why do you think it’s [listening to the public] important to do? 
	  
Former 
CSA 
I think it is, well I suppose actually at the end of the day, what does 
society care about? What is their concern? … On climate change, 
are you concerned, why are you concerned and what are the issues 
you are concerned about? It would probably have to be at a fairly 
macro level and it might come to is there evidence that it’s changing? 
Well what I really care about, will it affect food security, will I get 
more drought, and what will that do, will it give me more floods? So 
you know, what is the issue when they think about climate change, 
that hits them in the mind. So they wouldn’t come up with specific 
science questions, they could talk about the issues they care about.  
 
Secondly, regulation and policymaking structures are likely to be shaped by such an 
understanding too. As a result, the public imaginaries and discourses are unlikely to 
be reflected in the policy responses as there are simply not the structures to 
accommodate such complexity. One of the civil servants expressed this possibility: 
 
Civil Servant Having been involved with a few public dialogues around different 
topics, one of the general conclusions that we draw from them is, 
and in a sense this isn’t a very helpful conclusion, is that the public 
can often see both sides of the argument about things. And they 
see the nuance and the challenge of balancing the two sides and 
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that’s what comes out of the public dialogue across a whole range 
of subjects. In a sense, it’s often the, you can argue that it’s 
objectively the right, if there’s a right answer about these things – 
it’s neither the benefits are absolutely fantastic you need to do this, 
nor the risks are dreadful you can’t possibly do this. The answer is 
obviously, is often we need to proceed with caution. And that’s what 
comes out of public dialogue most of the time. And it seems to be a 
difficult ball game for the policymakers to square. 
 
Because I think the minute you give a hint that you take a… you 
know, let’s take fracking as an example. The minute the 
government acknowledges that there are risks, then that gives very 
strong ammunition to lobby groups that are trying to stop something 
and I would guess it works the other way, but it’s easier to think of it 
in terms of the risk. So I think proceed with caution is quite a difficult 
line to ride because you’ve got almost always two powerful lobbies, 
one of which is saying you need to do this – often an industry lobby 
or whatever, and then you’ve often got activists lobby that may be 
informed by all sorts of things in addition to the risks, trying to stop 
something happening. And almost with proceed with caution, you 
end up batted from both sides and it’s almost easier for government 
to say ‘oh we’re just going to go with this’ and ignore one side or 
another of the debate. So I think that’s sometimes why. The most 
recent at RCUK I was involved in a dialogue on open research 
data, which is a completely different area but has exactly the same 
characteristics where on one side you have the open data activists 
who are painting this nirvana that will be created by opening up all 
of the data that we can, and on the other extreme you’ve got the 
privacy campaigners who say that this is the [end of the] world as 
we know it, the end of civilization as we know it and the public 
dialogue that we did said ‘yeah the data should be open, but there 
are lots of reasons why you might close it, so you need to make a 
judgement.’ And that’s not very sloganable. Whereas the other two 
are more… 
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In particular, one civil servant, who was able to reflect on their experience in 
government dealing with GM foods, described this situation precisely when he says 
that regulation often cannot accommodate the social concerns of the public: 
 
Civil 
Servant 
I’m looking back on what they said, you could say that the public 
dialogue in the sense of public opinion had a very strong effect on 
policy where it could. But where you had this European framework 
that was very strictly linked to the scientific evidence, then the 
government was playing with a very straight bat and voting where the 
direction of the scientific evidence was pointing. 
	  
 
Conversely, a civil servant explained how more nuanced perspectives can be taken 
into account if the discussion takes place before regulation has been designed: 
 
Civil 
Servant 
So that report was quite a nuanced report that talked about potential 
risks in quite a transparent way, talked about potential benefits of the 
technology and also raised issues around public views about the 
technology. And because of that, the report was quite influential I 
think. And it was also in contrast with GM, this was all happening at 
the point at which there was no regulatory framework in place, so 
there was scope in order to develop things in the light of that, the 
regulatory framework. 
	  
 
 
c. Risks and uncertainties can be known, quantified and managed (by 
experts) 
 
The sense that uncertainty can be quantified and managed, that was so strong in 
the policy and expert discourses, also came through in the interviews. For example, 
one of the former CSAs, who was explaining that one of the challenges of the CSA 
was to convince policymakers that science always operated within the area of 
uncertainty and unknowns: 
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Former 
CSA 
Again my own discipline of [removed] is one of sceptical disbelief of 
anything you observe. And even when you think you’ve completed it 
it is still a hypothesis. You never say this is the truth. It is always a 
hypothesis that is moving towards being able to interpret better what 
you are seeing by you never get to a situation where you are not 
prepared anything and everything about what you believe to be true. 
Which is sort of how you manage uncertainty because you’ve got to 
live the basic tenet that everything is uncertain. That does not stop 
you making a decision however. And I think that’s where politicians 
have difficulty. They want, they believe they want certainty in order to 
make decisions. Wrong. What you need is sufficiently, sufficient 
understanding of the impact of the uncertainties on the 
consequences of your decision so that as you go forward you can… 
it is more likely that certain things you want to happen are going to 
happen, rather than less likely. And there is a lot of writing by that 
professor from Cambridge who has done a lot of work on public 
understanding of uncertainty. He has a very unusual name. He’s just 
been knighted actually in the honours. He’s on the today programme, 
the Radio 4 discussion programme meetings late at night or early in 
the morning. I’ve worked with him. [name removed] did a review of 
what he called black swan events. He said, how we look after black 
swan events and one of the things this guy said, wow it’s really 
smart. And it was very nice to hear him say that because this was his 
subject. He said, basically we need an imagination lab, because 
once you’ve imagined it, it is not a black swan event. The black swan 
event is one that you did not actually know anything about before you 
have evidence to show it has happened. Ahh, that’s interesting he 
said because once you’ve imagined it then you can start thinking 
about what if this ridiculous thing that nobody had imagined 
happening before happens. Then you get into the semantics about 
how you communicate uncertainty in the extreme. 
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One of the former Ministers interviewed also echoed this point about the ability to 
know unknowns, talking about the potential for more information to resolve potential 
uncertainties or conflicts: 
 
Interviewer How do you know when the evidence is incomplete? 
	  
Former 
Minister 
Ermm. The..sometimes it’s very obvious because it’s scientifically 
disputed that the evidence is there. And a clear one of this I would 
say from a year ago would be the conflicting scientific views over 
neonicotinoids, where some were saying the widespread global 
empirical evidence clearly suggests that the precautionary 
approaches has to be taken. But there was conflicting evidence and 
this is sometimes the unintended consequences that says that well 
one, it’s not actually conclusive and there needs to be more data and 
I think that is still the case today. 
 
These interviews appear to confirm hypothesis 2, that the impact of public dialogue 
is limited because of differences between elite and public sociotechnical 
imaginaries.  As I will discuss further later, these differences act in two ways. Firstly 
the elite imaginary acts as an indicator of the direction of travel that policymakers 
believe should be taken, thereby distinguishing which views can and cannot be 
taken into account. But at the same time, it also acts as lens through which the 
public’s views are seen – the tendency to hear public views as acceptability criteria 
rather than alternative imaginaries, for instance.  
 
Secondly, the public sociotechnical imaginary, in which government acts as a 
counter-measure to the excesses of the market or of uncontrolled scientific 
developments, and in which the risks of technologies are inseparable from the 
benefits, also struggles to be accommodated within an elite imaginary dominated by 
the need to support the market and economy and to manage and minimise risk.  
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Hypothesis 3: ‘Expert’ sources valued in policymaking – and public 
dialogue is not seen as a source of expertise.  
 
The text analysis highlighted how the policy discourse drew heavily from the expert 
discourses, and that the outputs of public dialogue were not seen as ‘expert 
sources’. As well as holding up this hypothesis, the interviews also shed more light 
about policymakers’ understanding of expertise, which indicates that this preference 
for ‘expert advice’ is not entirely driven by shared imaginaries, but that there is also 
a desire to access substantive expertise and knowledge. 
 
To begin, it was clear that expertise was extremely important for policymaking. 
Every policymaker interviewed referred to experts of various kinds. The quote below 
from a former CSA illustrates this well, emphasising the breadth of expertise drawn 
upon: 
 
Former 
CSA 
Science and evidence, good science and good evidence is a 
necessary condition for informed policy formulation. It is necessary, 
but not sufficient. And that is to say that there are other factors 
beyond even the natural sciences. So what is the evidence they 
[policymakers] should need? Well they need natural science 
evidence, evidence from the economics, statistical information, social 
science information, if it’s an animal health issue, obviously 
veterinary information and even some operational research and 
obviously some statistics, I mean things on trends etc. So my job 
therefore was to make sure the best evidence is being used, but not 
being silly enough to believe it gave you the answer. All I would ever 
ask from a policymaker, whether that be an official or a minister, is 
simply that they don’t selectively use information or distort the 
information. 
 
a. Substantive Expertise 
Expertise was described in substantive terms – people are asked to be involved in 
policymaking because they know something about the issue under consideration. 
For example, the former CSAs and Ministers told stories about how their 
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backgrounds in science (contributory expertise in Collins and Evans’s classification 
of expertise (Collins & Evans 2009)) helped them understand the issues they were 
dealing with, but also to make judgements about other areas of science (referred 
expertise in Collins and Evans’s framework), which was a significant skill sought in 
their appointments.  
 
Former 
Minister 
Previously I did 15 years in [name of industry removed] before I 
went into politics and when [the Prime Minister] was appointing me, 
he said, I want you to do this job because you have worked in 
farming and I know that you will understand the [name removed] 
industry and also that you’ve worked at a European level and that 
you’re a linguist so that when it comes to all these meetings in 
Brussels, actually you will be able to represent the UK well because 
you understand how it works. The [specific name removed] policy is 
very very technical. You almost need a lexicon to deal with all the 
jargon that comes with it, but you know I grew up with that. 
	  
 
Former 
Minister 
So [the Prime Minister] said why don’t you come and do this. 
Because of your background you’re a practitioner and your own 
experience, someone with a PhD, done research, built companies 
based on [relevant subject removed]. You speak with some 
authority. 
	  
 
Former CSA So [Government CSA] asked me to do a review. Because I’m a 
physicist he thought that I’d get all the wave mechanics and the rest 
of it. So I sat down and read through all of this stuff. I can’t say I 
understood it all but I got the general picture and I said well this is 
ok as far as it goes but you seem to have stopped thinking about 
the impact of waves, other than what appears to arrive south of 
Ireland. And I said, we are actually talking about an ocean that will 
sustain waves where the wavelength is the width of the Atlantic… 
…So I said, why aren’t we thinking about the Atlantic on this and 
they said, gosh it’s far too difficult to do. So I went away and dug 
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around and found an oceanographer in Liverpool University, who 
had been doing studies of the impact of long wavelength 
oceanographic phenomena on coasts. So I said, would you be 
interested in helping us to understand it? …. So he went away and 
did some calculations and came back to a meeting which I 
remember, because the guys who had been doing this work, who 
had done things to some extent along the brief they’d been given. 
And this guy came in and said, well what I’ve discovered is 
Morecombe back silts up…. And everyone said, oh my god. That 
changes things doesn’t it? So that was an intervention from my sort 
of basic physics of how do waves work, because I’m an optics 
person I know that you have to understand all of the wavelengths 
not just those that you think are interesting for the little phenomena 
you are worried about. Especially if you are talking about long 
timescales. So there was some basic understandings of how things 
work that allowed me to ask a question that they hadn’t asked in the 
way they’d set up the study in the first place which changed the 
outcome and everyone went away and said, oh, well now then, let’s 
think about that. 
 
Interviewer Do you think that your scientific expertise was one of the main skills 
you drew on? 
	  
Former CSA 
	  
Yes, I mean I had the privilege over my career of working in whole 
bunch of different science and engineering disciplines, so although I 
started life as a physicist, because of the different work I did in 
defence I got engaged with electronics, with IT, sensors, with 
atmospheric effects, space technology, and a whole raft of different 
things. There was almost nothing I hadn’t seen in some shape or 
form outside the bio and medical area. That’s where I felt 
vulnerable. But in [government departments with physical science 
foci] that was ok. Actually, when I got into [named department] 
proper there were bits of [the department] that had policy 
obligations with regard to some medical aspects because they are 
the body that licences and in particular, this is a sensitive subject, 
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which is to do with the use of non-human primates in research. I 
won’t say any more about that because I think it’s too delicate for 
this conversation, but that took me out of my depth and I said so. 
And that’s the other thing you learn to be able to do is to say look, 
here’s an area I believe I am expert, here’s an area I believe I know 
enough to be able to say something sensible, here’s an area I don’t 
have enough knowledge. I’ll offer what will be some intelligent 
commentary, but recognise this is not my area of expertise. 
	  
 
Former CSA We had a lady sat at our sage meetings who had done her PhD on 
that volcano. Not any volcano. That volcano. She knew exactly 
what was going on in great detail. 
	  
 
Ministers also reported how keen they were to hear ‘from the horse’s mouth’ i.e. 
from people who were engaged with the research or working at the coal face, 
although in many cases these were people who also shared their views and which 
might be contrary to the views of advice coming from officials. 
 
Former 
Minister 
So the chief vet would be very important in all of that. I thought he 
was excellent and actually I have to say, the veterinary scientists 
were probably in the end the ones who had most influence on me. 
Because they are on the sharp end between understanding 
epidemiology of the disease in the wildlife and in the domestic herd. 
And interfacing with the farmers and the integrity of their profession 
globally about how do we deal with tuberculosis. It’s a serious 
disease you can’t ignore it and what should we advise the decision 
makers to do in this situation. And they were very good and I spoke 
to more than one vet through all this and vets in Ireland, vets in 
Australia because they’re trained to try and tackle disease aren’t 
they? You know they’re not trying to make money out of raising 
cattle. 
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Former 
Minister 
I always found that when it came to the most difficult decisions and 
the most controversial decisions or ones which frankly I disagreed 
with, then there was no substitute for actually bringing in the people 
who had written the briefing documents. 
	  
 
Former 
Minister 
You would get the advice that came in from officials, but you would 
have a lot of contact, I mean we would go and spend quite a bit of 
time with some of the Cambridge firms to understand how their 
model actually operated. 
 
b. Expertise as a role/relational 
Alongside this idea of substantive expertise however, policymakers also referred to 
expertise as a role – that people working in the relevant institutions held the right 
expertise and therefore their institutional affiliation is a sufficient proxy for any 
further examination of credentials: 
 
Interviewer When you were looking for evidence (not necessarily just in this 
case) where did you look and how did you know where to look? 
	  
Former 
CSA 
Partly by knowing enough about what was going on in various 
universities, by going to the research councils with whom I have a 
good relationship, so I just rang people up and said are you funding 
work in xyz and if so, where. And so they sent me some links to 
projects they had funded in various universities, ring up the 
universities and it turned out that if I said that I was the CSA, there 
was a sort of, yeah we’ll tell you anything we want to know. 
 
Former 
CSA 
So one of the challenges I had and problems when I did this [named] 
assessment, the one I mentioned earlier where I had the bureau of 
60 people, was how did we select the 6 NGO groups or the 6 
consumer groups or the 6 private sector groups. So should they self 
select? That’s obviously the right answer, but how do you set up a 
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process across the world, where all of the private sector can agree 
on who their six representatives are, or the NGOs across the world. 
So in the end, to be honest, much of it was pre-selected by me and a 
few others, not just me, based on who had been to the consultation 
processes. So we had a bit of a consultation, so we had 
Greenpeace, we had Oxfam, so we did listen to people, but we did 
not go to self-selection, which is the ideal one in my opinion. 
	  
 
Interviewer When the emergencies happen, where do you get advice and 
evidence from? Who helps you with that? 
	  
Former 
Minister 
They put a lot of resource into evidence gathering and there are a 
high proportion of scientists in the department. So I’ve referred to 
they contract with organisations like the Met Office in terms of 
weather. In respect of plant or animal disease, it has animal and 
plant health laboratories that work to a capacity to deal with rapidly 
escalating disease. It has state of the art laboratories in Yorkshire at 
FERA and animal health laboratories in Worcestershire.  
 
Civil 
Servant 
We’ve been trying to come up with, in the last year, a new way of 
assessing quality based upon some fundamental questions about the 
design of the process – who has done it? Who has funded it? How 
have they reached their conclusions? The sort of peer review 
process it has gone through? 
	  
 
Civil 
Servant 
In an organisation like government where the quantity of things that 
go past a minister’s desk or an official’s desk is such that that it 
reduces the opportunity to go back and read those really sort of 
academic papers, so you are relying as you go up on trusted parties. 
Whether that’s learned societies, or whoever else, or groups, to sort 
of synthesise that evidence. So to go back to your core question, 
where does evidence come from? Well it’s commissioned reports, it’s 
statistics, it’s ONS, it’s scientific papers, it’s the media erm. 	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c. Networks 
Networks and contacts also appear to be key ways in which experts are identified. 
The two former CSAs and the special adviser interviewed in particular referred to 
their contacts in science on numerous occasions and used it as an illustration of the 
kind of skills they brought to their roles: 
 
Former 
CSA 
One of [the permanent secretary’s] questions, one of the early 
questions, she said – I’ve just had a phone call. You’re now working 
for me as chief scientific adviser. It’s nine o’clock at night. Sorry to 
phone you at night. But it’s nine o’clock, the Secretary of State has 
just called me and he wants a briefing tomorrow morning at one 
o’clock on Bovine TB. He doesn’t know very much about the subject, 
what are you going to tell him. I said, well I hate to say it, I’ve never 
even heard of Bovine TB, so he knows a hell of a lot more than I do! 
[Laughter] It’s clearly an animal disease of cows and it’s obviously 
TB [laughing] but that is literally all I know. But that’s not a problem. 
I’ve got a science advisory council that’s got three animal health 
experts on it. I’ll phone them immediately to see what they 
understand to be the big issues on it and what do we know about the 
issue. I’ll get them to give me names outside of my science advisory 
council, so I’ll quickly go through what’s the disease, what are the 
issues and what are the policy issues at stake, so that by tomorrow 
morning can tell him how bad the disease is, what are the potential 
and how serious is it, whatever view and what are the potential 
approaches when it looks at it from a policy point of view. So I’ll 
make sure that I feel that I’ve got, I’ll wake up the people and make 
sure that I’ve got a good briefing for him by tomorrow morning. If I 
don’t know the answers to any of his questions by tomorrow morning 
then I will tell him I will make a note of each question I can’t answer 
I’ll then work with this community and the large community and get 
back to him 24 hours later. 
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Former 
CSA 
And the volcanic ash story was similar in so far as again, I knew the 
right people in the right place. I can find two stories out of that. One 
was this ash cloud was appearing and we hadn’t got any sensors. 
We’d got satellites that were delivering certain types of information, 
but basically we needed an aircraft that could safely fly somewhere 
near this stuff and get some sensors on it. Now I used to be a 
professor at [named] University.... So I happened to know the guy 
who ran the whole of the aeronautics operation [at that university] so 
I rang him up and said what’s happened to this aircraft. He said it’s 
grounded. Its instrumentation is being changed. So I said so if we 
said here are the instruments we want on the aircraft and we want in 
airborne in 48 hours, what could you do about it? He said, yeah, we 
could do that. So I said, and what about the airworthiness 
certificates? And he said, well I’m the only person now who has the 
CAA licence to say this aircraft is airworthy but if that’s you wanted to 
do, that’s what I’ll do. And that’s what we did. I knew the right people, 
I knew where to go, I knew where the aircraft was and it was flying 
within 48 hours and we got data which allowed us to say Hmm. And 
it’s got no sulphur in it, that means it’s no medical hazard. 
 
Civil 
Servant 
In terms of gathering of evidence – what keeps coming up – it always 
comes down to people. It’s always people providing the evidence 
and it’s always human networks. 
	  
 
Former 
Minister 
And another key person, if you’re mapping it, was [name removed] 
who was Chair of Research Councils UK. By coincidence, another 
[city name removed] connection. So I had known him when he was 
doing his original demography/epidemiology at [city name 
removed] …we had mutual friends who I played cricket with. It is a 
funny world. 
 
 
Interviewer The people, the stakeholders you were involving, were they people 
that you had worked with before?  
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Former 
Special 
Adviser 
Mostly. Mostly my network yeah. But then others. You know that it’s 
a small circle and if you wanted to get into the network, all you had to 
do go to a handful of drinks receptions or policy events in 
Westminster and suddenly you’re a face. And you’re a name and you 
know the people and you can just get back and have a conversation. 
 
Interviewer How did you decide who to hear information from? 
 
Former 
Special 
Adviser 
To be honest, it was largely contacts and networks. And yeah. That 
kind of thing. But it wasn’t so it wasn’t always contacts in terms of oh 
I knew you from ages ago, come and tell me this. Because there 
would be so many people coming that it would be like, ok that seems 
like an important person to see. 
 
 
Interviewer How were people picked to go on those [advisory] groups? 
 
Civil 
Servants 
Erm. That’s an interesting question. Largely through personal 
contacts I guess. So the CSA would know people who were experts 
in particular fields and he’d consult with them and they might be 
involved themselves, they might make recommendations for other 
people who were involved, so quite a sort of word of mouth. 
 
 
One former minister went on to explain how their networks, and the networks of the 
expert he worked with, allowed them to manage controversy around a particular 
policy:  
 
Former 
Minister 
And I said we are going to need somebody to review [a field of 
science] in the UK. So this was before there had been any public 
fuss. And so by the time the announcement was made, I was able to 
announce that [name removed] was going to do the review. I was at 
the advantage of knowing him because he was the vice chancellor of 
[name removed] university. So [a senior civil servant] suggested him, 
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gave me a ring and said what do you think about [name removed] 
and I went Hurray! And he did a fantastic job although there was a 
terrible period of time of criticism from the community and we ended 
up getting [former Royal Society President] to hold a dinner at the 
Royal Society in which I said, look, this is where we are. We’ve got 
[name] doing a report. You all trust him so call the dogs off because 
all you’re doing is damaging British Science’s reputation around the 
world. You can’t shift anything here…. and it all died down then. 
	  
 
d. Public dialogue not seen as sources of expertise – but ‘stakeholders’ are. 
In terms of how the public are conceived by policymakers, while civil servants and 
politicians saw them as a useful source of perspective, or at least as sense-checks, 
the Chief Scientists questioned whether the public were able to make sense of the 
issues at stake: 
 
Former 
Minister 
My feeling is that the general public out there is pretty smart. They 
can figure these things out. They need to be given the information. 
 
Former CSA I’m not sure how you bring in the average person on the street. 
I’m not sure. It’s an interesting question. To what, I mean this 
sounds a bit snobbish I know, to what degree does the average 
person on the ground know what the issues are? 
 
Former CSA The reason for saying this is that there’s no rationale in the public 
response to some of these things. It’s not rational…  
	  
Interviewer Does it matter if the public aren’t rational though? 
 
Former CSA No. If the public aren’t rational it doesn’t matter, but if you expect 
them to be you end up in difficult places. It doesn’t matter. Oh no, 
I’m not looking for rationality I’m just saying you need to work in a 
context where you understand what you’re observing. Your model 
may be wrong if you think it’s rational. 
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On the other hand involving stakeholders – organised groups of the public or 
organisations that represent the perspectives of the public (or particular parts of the 
public) – in decisions was seen as important. While this wasn’t seen as 
unproblematic, there were two compelling reasons given why it was an effective 
approach. Firstly, this was to ensure that a range of views had been considered. 
This reason was particularly important in controversial areas (such as bovine TB), 
where there was a risk of a judicial review, in which evidence of having consulted 
with a range of stakeholders would be vital. Secondly, involving stakeholders was 
important in order to ‘bring people along’ with decisions. Building a consensus isn’t 
necessarily the important issue here, rather than being accountable and sharing the 
decision process and rationale: 
 
Civil Servant We rely on getting a sense of what the public think is through 
groups who may represent groups of the public – NGOs, 
Charities, companies, or whoever. But that’s not necessarily 
where the public are. And the Labour administration really kind of 
pushed the idea of consultations and that was a good thing. But 
did we really reach the public with that? Were the public really 
going to read a consultation on Defra’s new water quality policy? 
Then there’s got to better ways of doing it.  
 
Former 
Minister 
Well I think we were exceptionally good at what that horrible old 
term of stakeholder engagement. We did tend to not only in terms 
of regular meetings with the most important partner organisations 
in different portfolio areas, but also in terms of those sort of the 
real partnership working where you would develop policies with a 
group of people. In that situation, not everybody gets everything 
that they want all of the time, that’s the nature of it, but I think we 
were good at developing policy alongside people rather than just 
piling it on top. 
 
Former 
minister 
The agriculture industry was beside itself with the slaughter of 23,000 
cattle a year, the bill is rising, rising to over £100m a year to deal with 
that, and so there was a lot of pressure to make a decision but the civil 
servants were good because I said I’m not ready to make this 
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decision. I don’t feel I’ve exhausted every possibility and until I have 
I’m not going to make it. And I also want to hear from everybody who’s 
got a locus on this before I reach that decision. It’s going to be 
judicially reviewed because it’s so controversial so I want to get this 
process absolutely right because the worse thing to do would be to 
make the decision and then to have made a mistake by not knowing a 
key fact, or making an error in how we made the decision. And to 
Defra civil servants credit, they really did the process extremely 
thoroughly and they we pushed back the timescale for making the 
decision and I met I think it was 23 different stakeholders on a full 
spectrum of, from don’t you dare touch a badger through to the only 
thing to do is to cull the badgers. The full spectrum. And that was very 
important. 
 
Civil 
Servant 
How do you judge whether you’ve got enough around a particular 
intervention? It is a judgement call. I mean for that this is where you 
bring in engagement with stakeholders, engagement with the public, 
engagement with academics as to whether they feel that the proposals 
government is putting forward for what to do, based upon what we 
know, part of the evidence, whether we think the proposals are right, 
especially on hugely contentious issues where people are really 
polarised, we are never going to reach consensus, arm. Well, really if 
a government is doing its job right, laying out the facts about what is 
the situation and why we think an intervention will work. If we get 
enough people to agree with that and people can see clearly and 
transparently our train of thought our logic behind it then that’s 
probably quite a positive place to be for rolling out a new policy.  
 
When the public do need to be accessed directly, the ministers and civil servants 
described how this was via the politicians’ and departmental mailbags and advice 
surgeries. Understanding public perspectives was thought to be built into the 
fundamental business of being a politician: 
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Interviewer How do you know what the public is thinking? 
	  
Former 
Minister 
Well it’s interesting because of course they write to us. And the 
letter writing department within Defra of course keeps a close tally 
on the issues people write to us about. There were fewer letters 
about the badgers than there were about the forestry saga, so 
actually it’s one way of measuring. 
 
Civil Servant But I think most successful politicians have the views of the public 
ingrained in their psyche. Cos that’s, they’ve had to win public 
arguments to get elected in the first place. So every decision they 
make always will be floating around what will the public think 
because that’s what wins and loses elections 
 
Interviewer How did you know what the public were thinking? 
	  
Former 
Special 
Adviser 
I guess a few things. Firstly, we did get a regular opinion 
collections of analysis of polls and opinion surveys, so that came 
through the department. Second, I know it’s a bit anecdotal but I 
was always impressed by the fact that our ministers spend every 
Friday talking to people. And that shapes a lot of their thinking, so 
it’s kind of public opinion. 
 
Civil Servant But they are heavily, heavily influenced, ministers, by their 
personal correspondence. So one minister in particular in the time 
I was working on GM, I remember him saying that he was getting 
50 letters a week about GM and they were all anti. So why should 
he even think about taking a positive pro-GM view? He was 
representing the people and they were writing to him. And you 
know not ignoring the fact that the minister’s postbag is not 
representative, but that’s the immediate thing that they are seeing 
in a very direct way of getting a sense of public opinion.	  
 
The interviews therefore not only support hypothesis 3 – that experts sources are 
valued in policymaking and that public dialogue is not seen as a source of expertise, 
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but it gives us a more detailed understanding of what is valued in experts. 
Policymakers appear to value substantive experience in the field and a knowledge 
of the subject, but this also appears to be evaluated on the basis of roles. In other 
words, it is having the appropriate job in a relevant institution, rather than 
expressing any indications of knowledge, that confers the status of expertise upon 
an individual. While it seems reasonable to suppose that the two are related – that 
these individuals are in those positions as a result of their knowledge – the 
interviewees give no indication that knowledge was evaluated or formed part of their 
assessment of suitability of experts. 
 
Furthermore, in highlighting the importance of networks as sources of expertise, and 
the involvement of organised groups of the public in such networks and (therefore) 
in the policymaking process, the interviews put forward another explanation for why 
dialogue has little influence. The outputs of dialogue is not included in the 
policymaking process because it is not part of the network of ‘stakeholders’ from 
which policy advice is drawn. 
 
 
Models of policymaking 
Further to these three explanations for dialogue’s limited impact on policy 
(conflicting sociotechnical imaginary; not expertise; outside networks) the interviews 
brought up a further idea that has some explanatory value in this context – that 
dialogue perhaps targets the wrong issues in the wrong place in policymaking. 
 
While talking about evidence and public dialogue, although not all explicitly said so 
and few used the same words, the policymakers interviewed described a clear 
‘model’ of how policy works – and a hierarchy of policy issues in particular. While 
different value judgements were made on this model (the CSAs tended to 
problematize it, the politicians and civil servants tending to be more matter of fact 
about it), it was implicitly described by all of the ‘types’ of policymaker interviewed.  
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a. Hierarchy of policy exists, from ‘meta narratives’ to ‘specific policies’ 
To begin, the policymakers described a two (or three) tier structure in which there 
are ‘meta narratives’ that describe the overarching framework within which sub-
narratives sit. Beneath that, comes the individual ‘policies’.  
 
The special adviser interviewed described this hierarchy most concisely:  
 
Former 
Special 
Adviser 
There are a macro narratives around like, the role of climate 
change or the role of nuclear, the role of the state and the private 
sector. And then within those there are a kind of sub narratives like 
the role of energy efficiency vs. the role of renewables and the role 
of technologies. And then within those there are specific policies, 
like what are we going to the do CERT? What are we going to do 
on fuel poverty? 
 
 
b. The meta narratives are set by the political party in power. 
One of the civil servants described meta narratives as ‘the parameters’ in which 
policymaking takes place.  
 
Civil Servant [a former science minister] is really interesting on this... People 
vote for politicians based on a sort of value framework and a kind 
of, they vote for a party because they know that party will make 
decisions in a consistent way. If a party simply started making 
decisions on the basis of purely evidence every time, as [the 
former minister] says, it would be way too unpredictable for voters 
and it would be chaotic. He likens political parties to research 
agendas – so you have the parameters of the agenda as set, but 
then you can play around inside those parameters a little bit more. 
So that’s the first thing – the evidence is always in that kind of 
context. 
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c. Science won’t overturn meta narratives but is powerful at a policy level 
The distinction between political/meta-narratives and specific policies is important 
because it governs the extent to which evidence and public opinion can influence 
decisions. As the interviewees described, science can put an issue on the 
political/meta- narrative agenda, but public and political will is needed to allow 
policymakers to act on the issue. Science is unlikely to overturn a decision at the 
political/meta narrative level, as a former minister explains: 
 
Former 
Minister 
There were certainly ones where there… I can remember once I 
said to – and I won’t mention what area this was in, which portfolio 
area – but I said, I need a briefing on all the options to resolve 
this. And some of the options that came back were frankly beyond 
the pale... And I instantly red lined those, and said I don’t want to 
see this briefing until those are taken away from it. Go back and 
reconsider the other options on this part of the spectrum and give 
me more detail on those. 
	  
Interviewer 
	  
And why were they beyond the pale? 
	  
Former 
Minister 
Politically unacceptable. Politically unacceptable. Policy wise, you 
could have done it with an ultra-right wing government. Politically, 
yeah. I just didn’t even want to entertain the idea. 
 
At the policy level, decisions will be made by balancing different sources of 
evidence with the politics of the situation and the delivery objectives. One of the civil 
servants and a former minister both put this well in describing how evidence, 
political objectives and delivery need to be aligned in order for policy to be 
acceptable: 
 
Civil Servant So, you can have the best most evidence-based policy in the 
world, but if you can’t land it what’s the point? The IFG have done 
a lot of work about this policy window and the stars really need to 
align quite often in order to get things through. 
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Former 
Minister 
For example, one of the debates that we had must have been now 
about 6 years ago was on the langoustine, sorry the Northern 
Ireland nephrops fishery of langoustine. So the shellfisheries off 
Northern Ireland, and which also goes onto parts of NW Scotland 
as well. And the science at that point was saying one thing 
conclusively, that it was at such a point of overfishing that you’d 
have to shut the fisheries. Where do the politics come into that? 
Politics come into that because there are communities there which 
entirely rely on that fishery. And if you shut them down there are 
no communities anymore. And you’re not going to suddenly give 
them a lump sum to sit and twiddle their thumbs. So that’s where 
politics interferes with pure scientific based decision making. 
Policy of course is always a combination of the two. 
 
It is at this policy level however, that scientific (and other) evidence and the public 
can put issues on the agenda and form the basis of a decision, provided it fits within 
the political narrative and politics: 
 
Former 
Special 
Adviser 
For example, water, south east incredibly water stressed. A lot of 
evidence showing we had less water per capita than Cyprus, huge 
pressure and the Thames gateway was putting enormous 
pressure on, so there was a big scientific argument in that favour 
… So therefore we needed to look at regulation so that people 
couldn’t pave over their driveways or look at building regulations 
to make sure that homes were more sustainable both in terms of 
water absorption and usage. And then we had to fight the 
economic case with the other government departments who were 
coming from a different perspective. 
 
d. There is a hierarchy of evidence 
In this evidence mix, there also appears to be something of hierarchy of evidence – 
as well as science, economics evidence is very important, but even more so is legal 
advice. The earlier quote from a former minister about the need to consult 
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stakeholders in light of a risk of a judicial review illustrates this well, along with the 
following explanation from a civil servant: 
 
Civil Servant The economic advice would be quite up front in a way when it was 
put to ministers, for example. They would be interested in the 
costs and benefits of policy options. The science is almost used 
as the gatekeeper to get the policy options into play and then it’s 
the economics and legal advice and things like that… 
Ministers don’t like breaking the law…I think it’s true that if they’ve 
got scientific advice that says do x and they’ve got legal advice 
that said if you do x then you’ve got a 50% chance of a legal 
challenge, then they wouldn’t do it. Law would sort of trump the 
science, which is probably quite right. 
 
Furthermore, ministers collectively (across departments and across government) 
make decisions at the political/meta narrative level, while policy could be developed 
by ministers or civil servants.  
 
Former 
Minister 
Any significant decisions, certainly, when I was a minister, were 
always round tabled and they would certainly be round tabled at 
ministerial level amongst all of the minsters and sometimes it 
would be round tabled at a senior board level as well at Defra. 
 
 
Former 
Special 
Adviser 
But don’t forget. I was aiding and advising decision making. In 
addition the officials would be doing a lot of input and consultation 
and all of that, and that will be the primary source of information to 
the minister. They would get meetings with officials, briefings with 
officials, meetings with stakeholders themselves. What I especially 
did was just lubricate and supplement that add to it, sometimes 
guide and shape it. 
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e. But science presides in an emergency 
Interviewees described how this situation changes during an emergency or crisis. 
Here the rules about politics appear to dissolve and much more focus is put on 
evidence. This is especially so when safety is at stake. 
 
Civil Servant And never waste a good crisis falls out of that. So usually when 
bad things happen, that’s a trigger point for movement on a 
particular area. And you have to be ready for that as well. 
 
Interviewer Presumably the science was only part of the story [on volcanic 
ash clouds]. How do you think when it came to ministers looking 
at the science, how did they do that? 
	  
Former CSA The science dominated because basically the CAA, who were 
given the responsibility of saying this thing can be where we can 
fly safely because they had the international authority to say 
where it was safe to fly, so [the Secretary of State] kept his hands 
off it. He knew that was the right place to be. 
 
 
This implicit model is important when thinking about how the outputs of public 
dialogue can feed into policymaking, since it is often argued (by for instance Irwin, 
Jensen, & Jones, 2012b; Macnaghten et al., 2005; Stirling, 2007; Wynne, 2006) that 
an important purpose of public dialogue is to discuss the general direction of travel 
or shape of the world, rather than to comment on the details of particular policies 
and that dialogue should be discussing science and technology at an upstream 
phase. These direction of travel, upstream issues would appear to fall into the 
category of political or meta-narrative decisions and therefore be difficult to change 
on evidence alone and would definitely be those issues considered by ministers 
rather than civil servants.  
 
In this chapter then, I have tested the hypotheses emerging from the text analysis 
that explain the impact of public dialogue on policy, using interviews with 
policymakers. Specifically I have tried to move beyond describing the tension 
between public and policy perspectives. In describing and analysing policymakers 
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views on public dialogue and other sources of evidence and expertise that are 
expressed in these interviews, I have aimed to develop a more detailed 
understanding and begin to theorise the institutional response to the outputs of 
public dialogue. In the next chapter I will consider this further and reflect more fully 
on what this means for public dialogue as a practice. 
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Chapter	  7-­‐	  Discussion	  and	  Conclusions	  
 
In this research, I set out to understand more about how public opinions and 
discourses influence the course of science and technological development. 
Specifically, I wanted to know whether the move in the UK to involving the public in 
decisions around science through a series of public dialogue events, has had any 
success in strengthening the public voice in decision-making around technoscientific 
issues. In particular, I was interested in the substance of the discussions within 
these dialogue events, not only to try to understand these questions further, but also 
to shed light on how we as a society learn to live with technoscientific developments 
and on how expertise and evidence is understood, valued and used in policy.  
 
In this chapter I draw together the results presented in the earlier chapters and set it 
in the context of previous work in the field, to answer these questions and draw 
conclusions about the extent to which public dialogue has and could impact on 
public policy. I also reflect on the methodology used in this research. Finally, I raise 
a number of further issues for public dialogue which would be worthy of further 
research and set out some suggestions for how practice can be improved on the 
basis of this research. 
 
Overall, I conclude that the public talk about new and emerging science and 
technologies in a way that is very different from the way in which experts and 
policymakers discuss the same subjects. In particular, the public see the social and 
ethical issues and concerns arising from technologies as inherent to the 
technologies themselves, while the experts and policymakers see them as external 
epiphenomena. I argue that these different ways of talking about science and 
technology are both a result of and a reflection of two different socio-technical 
imaginaries that I have identified – a dominant ‘elite’ imaginary of ‘scientific 
progress’, which is shared by policymakers and scientists, and a counter-imaginary 
of ‘contingent progress’ which emerges from the public discourses. Since these 
imaginaries both shape and describe how science and the role of the state is seen, 
the public imaginary and discourses are seen as oppositional, but are also difficult 
to accommodate within the ‘machinery’ of policymaking and so have limited 
influence. Furthermore, public dialogue exercises are not seen as a source of 
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expertise, nor are they part of the networks that influence policy, further limiting their 
potential to influence policy. 
 
Using a computer assisted text analysis system to looking across the outputs of 
public dialogues however shows that the dialogues do generate some interesting 
discussions and that the public do have contributions to make to public policy 
around science and technologies. To increase impact, thought needs to be given to 
the type of decisions that dialogues seek to influence, to engage policymakers in 
discussions about the sociotechnical imaginaries that are shaping their perceptions 
of policy and the public, and to ways in which public dialogue can be brought into 
policymaking networks and coalitions. 
 
So what has been the impact of public dialogue? 
1. Dialogue offers insight into public perceptions 
 
To begin, it is clear that the dialogue events have been successful in exploring 
public perspectives and provide a rich source of insight into how the public talk 
about and come to know new science and technologies. 
 
By looking at the content of the reports of public dialogue events over the last 10 
years, I have identified a series of public discourses around new and emerging 
science and technologies (Class A1: Drugs: cure or cause for medical or social 
problems?; Class A4 Challenging our way of life; Class A2 Reaching potential whilst 
minimising risk; Class A3 Precautionary in principle; Class A5 Messing with nature – 
where do we draw the line?). By comparing these discourses to those that were 
produced by the analogous analysis of ‘expert’ documents, I have identified a 
number of features unique to the public discourses: 
 
a. The public express an optimism towards science that is tempered by a 
sense of contingency;  
b. The public discourses cluster around particular groups of technologies, 
rather than being ‘generic’ for all science and technology, or specific to each 
technology; 
c. Social and ethical implications of new scientific developments are 
considered to be inherent parts of the developments;  
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d. The focus of public discourses is on people rather than technologies; 
e. Nature plays a key role in shaping conceptions of the acceptability of 
technologies and in the way they should be regulated; 
f. The public see an active role for government in controlling the direction of 
research. 
 
Others have previously identified individual aspects of the analysis I describe, but 
the statistical methodology I have adopted has enabled me to look at subjects side-
by-side and to focus on what was said rather than any institutional framing or 
normative assumptions about the dialogue process, thus bringing new insight to the 
material. Comparing public and expert discourses has also allowed patterns to be 
identified that others have not recognised. For example, MacNaughten and Chilvers 
(Macnaghten & Chilvers 2014) have carried out a similar analysis of public dialogue 
reports, but focusing exclusively on ScienceWise dialogues from a marginally 
different timeframe and carrying out the analysis by hand. They identified five cross-
cutting themes which they argued were strongly affiliated to which of three ‘models’ 
of public engagement had been employed. While there was some overlap between 
the themes they identified and some of the issues arising in my discourses (for 
instance, they identified the speed and direction of research as a key public 
concern), their groupings did not map onto my discourses, suggesting that the 
groupings that I have identified are not a manifestation of the type of dialogue being 
undertaken but reflect different discourses that are taking place regardless of the 
style of dialogue being undertaken. Supporting that point, Chess and Purcell’s 
review of empirical evidence of the success of different participatory techniques 
concludes that “factors other than the mechanism for the participatory process 
undoubtedly account for variation in public participation success (Chess & Purcell 
1999).  
 
a. Contingent optimism 
Firstly, the public discourses conveyed a sense of progress and optimism about 
science, especially biomedical science, but this was coupled with a strong sense of 
contingency. The public understood that there are good sides and bad sides to 
every technology. How they felt about a particular science and technology therefore 
depended upon how it was being used and the special circumstances of each case, 
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rather than an inherent quality of the technology. The direction that the technology 
was taking society and the morality of the research (particularly in relation to human 
embryo research) were also important in guiding discussions. As such then, the 
public discourses did not tend to form simple judgements of technologies, but 
instead to suggest that more information, consideration of different angles or 
perspectives and a balancing of different interests and needs was necessary. 
 
This is somewhat in contrast to the expert and policy discourses, which were more 
positive and aiming to enable the science to happen. While the expert discourses 
highlighted possible benefits to come from these technologies – particularly in 
providing cures to terrible diseases and growing the economy. The policy 
discourses tended to assume any benefits beyond economic ones as given. Policy 
discourses rarely discussed the application of particular technologies – more 
science was by its nature seen to be a good thing. Concerns or risks were 
acknowledged as public concerns, but were treated as obstacles that need to be 
addressed or overcome (I will discuss this further later). 
  
b. Clusters around technologies 
Secondly, the public discourses group around particular technologies. Specifically, I 
found distinct discourses around drugs (Class A1); technologies with biomedical 
applications such as stem cells, nanoscience and synthetic biology (Class A2); non-
biomedical technologies such as geoengineering, the UK DNA database, energy 
and non-medical applications of nanoscience (Class A3); technologies that work 
with the genetic building blocks of life, such as synthetic biology and GM (Class A4); 
and those which involve combining human and animal material, such as hybrid 
embryos (Class A5).  
 
This pattern of classes suggests that people talk about different ‘types’ of 
technologies in different ways. This is reinforced by the analysis and interpretation 
of these classes. In particular, depending on the technology being discussed, 
people appear to express different levels of optimism/sense of progress, different 
types of concern, and different conceptions of nature and see different kinds of 
regulation as necessary. 
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While none of the discourses were outrightly hostile to the technologies in question 
and all expressed a sense of balance and contingency – that it all depended upon 
the use, circumstances and future information – the discourses around biomedical 
applications of stem cells, synthetic biology and nanoscience were the most 
positive. Other technologies generated a greater sense of scepticism, questioning 
whether they were really moving us forward. Discussions around drugs, for 
instance, questioned whether they were masking rather than addressing the real 
problems; questions around environmental technologies asked whether they had 
the potential to make things worse. 
 
The types of concerns expressed also appear to be tied to the types of 
technologies. For biomedical sciences, the concerns related to the involvement of 
the private sector and whether this would distort the focus of research into more 
profit making developments and whether this might make treatments beyond the 
reach of some. On more environmental technologies such as nanoscience and 
geoengineering, the concerns were around hazards, and moral hazards in particular 
– whether or not the technologies were taking us down a path we wanted; GM and 
synthetic biology raised concerns around safety, the environment and the sense of 
science (and the future it gives us) being out of control; and on human embryology 
research, concerns focused on morality and whether it is right to carry out this 
research. 
 
The conception of nature evoked also varies according to the technology discussed, 
and perhaps drawing on that, so does the type of regulation being considered or 
asked for. For instance, in discourses around human embryology such as human-
animal hybrid embryos nature is seen ontologically – as a state of being – and 
regulation seen as a moral matter; in discourses around non-biomedical 
technologies such as geoengineering and nanotechnology, nature is seen in 
ecological terms – as a balanced system within which we can’t predict the effects of 
man’s influence, with regulation seen as a matter of government policy and control; 
and in discussions of genetic research such as GM crops or synthetic biology, 
nature is spoken of in deontological terms – as a binary rule or law that we must 
obey or face the consequences, and nature itself is seen as the regulator – bringing 
revenge on those who break the natural laws.  
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Others have argued previously that people don’t have attitudes to technology in 
general but have specific attitudes to particular technologies – for instance Evans 
and Durant (Evans & Durant 1995b)(Evans & Durant 1995a) discussed how people 
feel differently towards medical and other sciences; Bauer and Gaskell have 
described the difference in people’s attitudes towards ‘green’ and ‘red’ 
biotechnologies (Gaskell et al. 2001). But by looking at public discussions of various 
technologies collectively, this analysis has shown that people don’t just have 
different attitudes to different technologies, but they also talk about technologies in 
different ways. It is not just that they feel different levels of support for different 
technologies, but they also identify different issues of concern. Importantly, these 
different attitudes and ways of talking appear to cluster or group in a particular way. 
This is also perhaps a more nuanced and detailed interpretation of the ScienceWise 
outputs than that of Chilvers and Macnaughten (2014) who concluded that there 
were five spheres of public concern expressed in public dialogue reports: the 
purpose of science; trust; inclusion; speed and direction of innovation; and equity. It 
is reasonable to argue that these themes were present throughout the discussions, 
but the way and degree to which they were expressed varied according to which 
cluster of topics was being discussed – equity and inclusion seemed to be more 
important in clusters around biomedical sciences while speed and direction in 
discussions of environmental technologies, for instance. 
 
The way in which the public discourses ‘cluster’ around groups of technologies 
appears to be consistent with previous work that found that the public created and 
used a mental dichotomy or schema to help them assess new technologies. For 
instance, my previous work with Simon Lock (Lock et al. 2014) looking at how the 
public come to understand climate change technologies, found participants in focus 
groups using nuclear and wind power as the two ‘yardsticks’ by which to size up 
new technologies like carbon capture and storage, with views and concerns about 
the new technology following those associated with the existing technology that the 
new one was judged to be most ‘like’ (Lock et al. 2014). It also supports the 
argument that the public use cognitive ‘heuristics’ to judge new technologies, 
drawing on their previous experience of other technologies to create historic 
analogies to guide their decision making around new technologies (Scheufele & 
Lewenstein 2005; Currall et al. 2006; Upham & Roberts 2011; Slovic 2010). 
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Importantly, these clusters of technologies suggests that there is little basis for the 
concerns frequently expressed by the scientific community (for instance in the 
introduction to the House of Lords 2000 Science and Society report) that we are 
seeing a crisis in public confidence in science and that public anxiety over GM 
represents and outright rejection of technology. GM is a particular technology, that 
acts in particular ways and is discussed in a particular way. Other technologies are 
discussed much more enthusiastically, so direct parallels cannot be assumed. 
However, discussions of synthetic biology do appear in the same discourse as 
discussions of GM, which suggests that this could be an area of concern in the 
future. 
 
c. Risks and ethical concerns inherent to technologies 
The clustering of public discourses around technologies also means that when the 
public discussed the technologies, talk of uses, risks, benefits and regulation were 
all tied up in the same discussion, rather than forming separate classes. This 
creates a clear distinction between the public and the expert and policy discourses, 
with the public seeing the social and ethical issues as inherent parts of the 
technologies themselves, while the expert and policy discourses treat these issues 
as epiphenomena that can be separated from the technologies and dealt with. 
Indeed, these different ways of seeing the relationship between science and social 
and ethical issues – and therefore science’s role in progress – is at the heart of the 
differences between the public and the elite sociotechnical imaginaries.  
 
In the public imaginary, progress (which is particularly evident in biosciences’ ability 
to produce cures) is tempered by a perception of the contingency of science and an 
understanding that the risks and social and ethical issues arsing cannot be 
disentangled from the science or technology itself. Balance is also an important 
metaphor used through the public discourse – technologies like synthetic biology 
are seen to be both exciting and scary and that good governance is about balancing 
these benefits and concerns. For the public then, while science represents 
progress, it has also caused some problems too. And these problems are inherent 
in the technologies themselves. 
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In contrast, the ‘elite’ imaginary sees science as a force for progress which is not 
simply focused on ‘cures’ but which can bring about wider changes and address the 
really big problems ahead – including national dominance and increased 
productivity. Social and ethical issues are to do with public perceptions or 
insufficient scientific knowledge. They are either not worth worrying about, because 
the technologies of concern are no worse than the current technologies in use, or 
these concerns can be dealt with by information or more research. The problems 
can be managed away, allowing the science or technology in question to fulfil its 
potential. 
 
A clear illustration of these different perspectives in action was found in the policy 
discourse around human-animal hybrid embryos (Class C2). For the public (Class 
A4), this was a very moral matter. And at the heart of deciding whether or not it was 
research that should go ahead was a question of whether these embryos are 
human or animal. Rather than being a categorical or ontological question that 
needed to be settled however, the public discourse suggested that the act of raising 
and considering the question was important in helping people come to terms with 
this technology.  
 
The policy discourse however recognised this concern raised in the public dialogue 
events, but were keen for it to be settled as swiftly as possible, in order to decide 
which body should regulate this research – if they are human embryos, then the 
HFEA would be responsible but if they are animal embryos, then it would be the 
Home Office. In order to resolve this practical question of regulatory responsibility 
then, this question, which was a very moral matter for the public, was turned into a 
legal matter upon which a judge could rule.  
 
These two different discourses and approaches appear to have strong overlaps with 
Beck and Gidden’s two notions of risk (Beck 1992; Giddens 1994). In the first 
notion, risk is ‘no more than a part of an essential calculus’ (Beck 1998). It is seen 
as a statistical operation which promises to ‘make the unforeseeable foreseeable’ 
(Beck 1998). This matches very strongly with the rhetoric within the expert and 
policy discourses, which seek to quantify and deal with risks ahead. 
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Beck argues however, that as nature has become permeated by industrialisation, 
we are now in a new phase of ‘manufactured uncertainty’, where ‘the production of 
risks is the consequence of scientific and political efforts to control or minimise 
them’ (Beck 1998). This conception of ‘manufactured uncertainty’ appears to have 
strong echoes of the public discourse. 
 
Hilgartner (2000) and Latour (Latour, 1987, Chapter 1) have pointed out that 
scientific texts use the rhetorical technique of anticipating reader’s objections and 
trying to demolish them in advance. It is possible that this is shaping the experts’ 
tendency to provide reassurance and close down debates around risk. Rather than 
representing an underlying belief that this science can do this, it reflects perhaps, a 
belief that policymakers want to be reassured and to be presented with certainties.  
Cook’s work looking at scientists’ attitudes to the GM debate (Cook 2004) found a 
similar tendency to perceive decisions around introduction of GM technology as 
entirely safety oriented and based on a rational choice model, however. He 
describes how the scientists’ focus was almost exclusively on a cost benefit 
analysis of assessable safety issues relating the health and the environment, with 
no reference to unforeseen risk. Since these views were expressed outside a policy 
setting, they suggest that this tendency to separate and manage risk is not simply 
meeting expectations. It is also of obvious use to scientists and policymakers. The 
message is compelling – given the responses and opportunity to address these 
matters, it is possible that science can proceed in a manner that is satisfactory to 
everyone. There is nothing to worry about here.  
 
This understanding is however problematic. It cuts off scientific practice from public 
wishes – the opposite of the aim of public dialogue and the more recent move to 
responsible research and innovation. This tendency to close down concerns is also 
likely to be problematic in the longer term because of the impossibility of the task – 
as Beck has argued, the social and ethical concerns around new scientific and 
technological developments are inherently bound up with these technologies – they 
cannot be separated out as they are a product of those technologies.  
 
Nevertheless, these different understandings have significant implications for public 
dialogue’s impact on policy, which I will discuss further below. 
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d. Focus on people  
In the public discourses, in each of the classes people (rather than the technologies) 
were the focus. This contrasts with the science/technology focus of the expert 
discourses and the much broader spread of the policy discourse across people, 
technology, government and the economy. 
Arguably these different foci simply reflect the different roles taken by each of the 
groups in the discussion. But the ‘people’ focus that the public discourses adopt, 
while unsurprising, does raise some questions about the credibility of this evidence.  
 
Hilgartner (Hilgartner 2000, p.8), who looked at scientific advice through the 
metaphor of ‘performance’, argued that scientific advisory bodies use their technical 
knowledge to display competence and credibility and therefore win the confidence 
of audiences. Its presence in these reports could therefore be seen as a rhetorical 
device that instils the experts authoring the reports with authority by reinforcing the 
privileged and expert nature of their knowledge.  
 
At the same time, the public discourses’ focus on people rather than technology 
could be deepening the perceived differences in credibility between the two sets of 
reports. Cook (2004), talking to GM scientists involved in public engagement 
activities, reported that the public were seen to be making emotional (rather than 
rational) assessments of technologies, and to therefore be being vulnerable to 
manipulation by the press, NGOs and politicians.  Not only is the scientific focus and 
language of the expert reports giving real and rhetorical power to the expert 
discourses, but the public discourses alongside run the risk of looking emotional 
rather than rational – and therefore vulnerable to manipulation by the press, NGOs 
and politicians (Cook 2004). This perception was reinforced by some of the 
documents in the policy analysis – the report on human animal hybrid embryos for 
instance made a distinction between religious and scientific objections to the 
technologies. Comments made by policymakers in interviews also reinforced this – 
one of the former CSAs kept referring to value-based judgements as ‘faith based’, 
arguing that is was the role of academics to rise above that and make rational 
choices, for instance.  
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Unwittingly then, by focusing on people and social and ethical issues, the public 
discourses might be reinforcing the perception that that the public’s views on new 
technologies are irrational and susceptible to change – and therefore not worth 
building into policy. This is a point worth further consideration when thinking about 
how dialogue can have more impact on policy. 
 
e. Role of Nature  
Nature is a key concept in shaping views about technologies – and not just in 
discussions about environmental technologies. I have described above and in 
Chapter 5, how the public discourses express three different concepts of nature, 
and these concepts appear to at least influence how people think about regulating 
particular science and technologies, as well as the limits that should be put upon 
these areas of research.  
 
This role of nature in the public discourse is in contrast to the ‘elite’ discourses 
which do not engage with the concept of nature in the same way – for the experts, 
‘natural’ is a technical term to refer to non-GM strains of plant or animal and in many 
instances is a term used to refer to a less favourable situation.  In the policy corpus 
‘natural’ or ‘nature’ does not appear in any of the discourses at all. 
 
Others have previously identified a role for the concept of ‘nature’ or ‘naturalness’ in 
the public’s conceptions of technologies and risk. For instance Corner et al (Corner 
et al. 2012) found that a key factor driving public perceptions of the acceptability of 
different geoengineering procedures was the extent to which a technology was 
perceived as supporting or imitating natural processes. Lock, Smallman and Rydin 
(2014) found that a sense of ‘naturalness’ equated with a sense of ‘good’ when 
considering climate change technologies; Jasanoff (2005) describes how ‘modern’ 
and ‘unnatural’ became closely linked during the UK’s BSE crisis, with this 
connection later fuelling negative perceptions of GM; Wagner et al (Wagner et al. 
2001) found that expressions relating to ‘tampering with nature’ dominated focus 
group discussions about the dangers or hazards associated with GM, concluding 
that “the public debate on biotechnology is in fact deeply influenced by polarised 
views of nature”.  Furthermore, they identified two perceptions of nature – spiritual, 
where nature is seen as an animistic or spiritual force – and un-spiritual, which the 
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authors describe as quasi-scientific, seeing nature as a complex and uncontrollable 
force. Importantly, these understandings of nature are described as ‘polarised’ and 
‘parallel but diverging representations’ one or other of which people use as a frame 
to argue about GM. In other words, people hold one understanding or another of 
nature, which shapes their views of GM. The discourse analysis does not suggest 
that this has happened in this case. Instead, the conceptions I have identified are 
much less value frames and more understandings that people are able to switch 
between according to the technology under consideration.  
 
So while earlier works have described different and competing conceptions of 
nature, some of which map onto one of the three conceptions identified here, the 
precise nature of each conception, their coexistence and association with different 
technologies is new. This finding, I argue, has come out of the methodology I have 
chosen to use. While the individual concept of nature have been identified by case 
studies, it is only by looking across the subject matter and seeing the three concepts 
discussed side-by-side, that the distinctions and the extent of the conceptual 
differences becomes apparent. 
 
f. Active role for government vs. industry 
The public discourses also assign a particular role and agency to government – of 
controlling the direction of research and the influence of industry, to ensure social 
goods. Industry is however only mentioned in the discourses about biomedical 
developments and GM (classes A2 and A4). When it is discussed, it is seen as 
primarily motivated by the need to make a profit. This isn’t necessarily considered to 
be a bad thing, but it is seen as something that needs to be controlled as it could be 
a distorting influence that takes research down the wrong path and puts the price of 
drugs and technologies out of reach for some. The role of government is seen as a 
counterbalance to this. 
 
This is in contrast to the expert and policy discourses, in which whole classes are 
devoted to the importance of industry – both in supporting science but also as 
beneficiaries of science. In fact, as I will discuss further later, this economic 
perspective appears to be the key driver for the elite discourses. Importantly, the 
role of government is also seen very differently in these elite narratives – in the 
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expert reports, the main role for the state appears to be in providing the funding and 
infrastructure for research and innovation. Existing regulation is described and while 
areas for further research are highlighted, no areas for further regulation are 
discussed. The policy documents, unsurprisingly are much more focused on the role 
of the state in regulating science, but again, the tendency is to describe existing 
regulation and reflect on whether this was sufficient or not, the sub-text being that 
the role of the state is to provide support, ensure no harm is being done and then 
move out of the way. 
 
This policymakers’ perception – that it is not their role to actively be involved in the 
direction of research – has also been found by others. For instance, Macnaghten 
and Chilvers (2014) recently interviewed senior staff in UK-based science 
organisations and found that neither the purpose nor the directionality of science 
and technological development were seen to be major issues for reflection. “The 
good purpose of science was automatically assumed and presented as self-
evident.” (Macnaghten & Chilvers 2014). It is also the basis of the “Haldane 
Principle” at the heart of UK science policy, whereby the state provides the funding 
and scientists decide how best to spend it. It does however present a particular 
problem for public dialogues looking to influence policy as on one hand there would 
appear to be no levers to enact this particular public request, while on the other 
hand, as I and others (for example Evans & Durant, 1995b; Gaskell et al., 2001; 
Macnaghten & Chilvers, 2014) have shown, the direction and purpose of scientific 
developments are key to their public acceptability, and trust in government hinges 
on its ability to act in the public interest. This presents a potential flashpoint in the 
future. 
 
 
2. Rhetorical problems within dialogue 
 
Having acknowledged the insight gained from dialogue, this research however, has 
revealed two functional/rhetorical problems within the dialogue processes 
examined.  
 
In Chapter 4 I have described two rhetorical devices – ‘hyperbolic framing’, whereby 
extreme conditions are used to exemplify the use of a new technology and to test 
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public attitudes; and ‘abstracting’, whereby report authors argue that people aren’t 
worried about the technology in principle but have concerns about particular 
applications. While these devices appear to be used in order to help bring abstract 
aspects of science and technology to life, especially when involving the public in 
‘upstream’ discussions, together, both these devices appear to give the public very 
little room to disagree or object to a technology. Objections to the principle of a 
technology are neutralised by arguing that the public accept particular applications. 
Similarly objections to particular applications are neutralised by arguing that the 
public accept the technology in principle. This (unwittingly) creates a situation 
whereby nothing can be objectionable and there is no option except to conclude that 
there an apparent acceptance of the technology being discussed.  
 
Furthermore, the process of making a technology real enough to be discussed in 
the dialogue, which usually draws upon the expert imaginaries (which are 
themselves normative), also fixes the participants’ understandings. Descriptions of 
the potential of a particular science, given in a dialogue to help the public make 
sense of an abstract concept, by the end of the dialogue have become a description 
of the purpose of a particular science. Conversations about potential uses of 
technologies are then transformed into discussions of conditions for use of a 
particular technology and very little room is left for any concerns to have status as 
anything beyond epiphenomena.  
 
This tendency to frame the discussion in terms of the dominant imaginary and to 
create difficulties for the public in expressing any objections or departures from that 
imaginary has implications for this research. In particular, it suggests that 
differences between the public and elite imaginaries are likely to be underplayed in 
the dialogue events and subsequent reports – the rhetorical devices involved acting 
to mask differences. This would counterbalance any tendency to emphasise 
difference inherent in the IRAMUTEQ methodology.  
 
It also raises important questions about the purpose of dialogue – and whether it 
ever can be valuable in broadening the perspectives from which scientific decisions 
draw, bringing the process of co-production into the open, making science more 
socially robust or democratising science. Thorpe and Gregory (Thorpe & Gregory 
2010) have argued that contrary to the motivations around democratisation of 
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science that have been driving forces behind making public engagement a 
legitimate (and increasingly perceived as necessary) activity, public dialogue 
programmes potentially operate as forms of control and ‘co-optation’ that effectively 
promote and shape the public as markets for new technological products. Looking 
at the discourses within the public dialogues here, they also appear to be playing a 
role in fixing the meanings of yet to be real technologies – not just for the public, but 
for the scientist and policymakers involved too. In a dialogue, stem cells move from 
being invisible cells in a dish in a lab, to cures for cancer or spinal injuries, for 
example. Furthermore, I would argue that the public have little choice but to support 
the scientific narrative of progress being presented to them. At best the dialogues 
are providing an opportunity for the public to outline the conditions for acceptance of 
technologies that are going to be developed. 
 
This is both a conceptual and methodological issue, but one that it will be important 
for new developments – such as the European move to Responsible Research and 
Innovation, which focuses on aligning the outcomes of research with the values of 
society. If upstream engagement is the important focus for public dialogue, then 
ways need to be found to create a space where the realities of science are 
discussed – where the banality of the majority of applications of science are 
admitted and where we can move away from the ‘cycle of promise’ (Brown et al. 
2003).  
 
 
3. Little evidence that public discourse has influenced policy 
 
As I have described in Chapter 6, the analysis of discourses suggests that some 
account is taken of the outputs of public dialogue in policymaking – not least 
because there are specific mentions of the public concerns being raised in dialogue 
events and to the Sciencewise programme. In particular, public dialogue appears to 
be seen as a useful way to identify potential social and ethical issues for 
policymakers and experts alike. The policy discourses also share with the public 
discourses the recognition of uncertainty around science and the need to anticipate 
and monitor for unforeseen consequences that might emerge from new sciences 
and technologies. 
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But, by comparing the discourses and sociotechnical imaginaries within the public 
dialogue, expert and policy documents, it is clear that the overarching viewpoint of 
the public is not reflected in the policy documents. In fact I have described two 
‘competing’ sociotechnical imaginaries – an elite imaginary shared by the scientists 
and policymakers, in which science is key to generating financial wealth and where 
social and ethical issues as epiphenomena that can be managed away; and a public 
counter-imaginary that takes a more sceptical view of the role of industry and 
understands the up and downsides of science as two sides of the same coin. 
 
The policy documents and interviews with policymakers also show a clear 
preference for ‘expert’ advice. Expert sources are frequently mentioned in the texts 
and interviews; when the public perspectives are taken into consideration, the 
issues raised are converted into ‘expert’ matters by looking at social and ethical 
issues as questions of risk or legality; ‘Expert’ verification of public perspectives is 
also frequently sought. This is not to say that public concerns are not of interest to 
policymakers, but the public are usually accessed via ‘stakeholder’ groups – NGOs 
or consumer groups, who arguably act as ‘expert publics’.  
 
Whether this preference for ‘expert’ publics is a matter of expertise or networks will 
be discussed further later, but from the interviews with policymakers, it appears that 
at least part of this is due to public dialogue events not being on policymakers’ 
radar. Indeed politicians, in particular, appeared to be confused about the purpose 
of public dialogue. This was perhaps surprising given that at least one had had 
overarching responsibility for the ScienceWise programme. Those who were familiar 
with it saw its purpose as being to educate the public and bring them round to the 
scientific way of thinking, which, as I will discuss later, may be a fair reflection of the 
reason why such programmes are supported at a political level, even if they aren’t 
the reasons given by others.  
 
In contrast, dialogue did appear to have had some impact on the civil servants 
interviewed, all of whom had been involved with at least one ScienceWise activity. 
Nevertheless, they were still unable to articulate the impact that these dialogues had 
had in any concrete way – at best it reinforced what they had been thinking already.  
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This conclusion is largely in-keeping with the findings of other evaluations of the 
UK’s public dialogue activities, with others finding little evidence for significant 
impact. Macnaghten and Chilvers (2014) interviewed civil servants about their 
institutions’ response to ScienceWise outputs in particular. They concluded that 
“Public engagement activities were seen to have had marginal impact on core 
business…most respondents saw a limited role for active public involvement in 
organisational decision-making.” ScienceWise itself has undergone two recent 
evaluations. The first (Warburton 2011), which covered the time period considered 
in this thesis, was more enthusiastic than Macnaghten and Chilvers, claiming that 
there was evidence that ScienceWise public dialogue projects had influenced policy 
decisions and plans, improved policy and decision making and helped policymakers 
gain new perspectives and insights. But the examples given to illustrate these 
impacts do not indicate that they found much more impact than this research has 
found – they generally highlight how the issues and concerns raised in the 
dialogues were mentioned in the policy reports and how policy makers were more 
committed to involving the public in future policy discussions as a result of their 
initial involvement with ScienceWise. The more recent evaluation (Risk and Policy 
Analysts 2015) quantified the impact of the dialogues and concluded that 50% of the 
dialogues looked at had influenced the development of new decision making 
processes (i.e. had resulted in commitments to involve the public in discussions in 
the future); 50% had resulted in increased knowledge for commissioning bodies 
about the nature of conflicts; 35% had fed directly into policy. The evaluators did 
point out however that in these 35% of dialogues that had influenced policy, the 
public findings had agreed with the commission body or expert viewpoint and “that it 
was unclear what impacts may have resulted in the event that there were significant 
disagreements”.  
 
At best then, public dialogue is useful to policymakers in supporting expert 
viewpoints or identifying future areas of conflict or concern. Given the importance 
that has been put on the move to public dialogue in the UK over the last 15 or more 
years – developed in response to a perceived ‘crisis in public confidence in the 
government’s use of science’ (House of Lords Science and Technology Select 
2000) and quickly establishing itself as the only response to such a perceived crisis 
– such impacts appear to be incredibly modest.  
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4. Reasons why public dialogue has had limited impact.  
 
As I explained in the introduction, others have concluded that dialogue has had 
limited impact because of the lack of reflexivity of policymaking institutions and their 
dominance by technocratic viewpoints (Wynne 2006; Macnaghten & Chilvers 2014; 
Stirling 2007). There has also been a tendency to focus on evaluating the process 
of dialogue, as a proxy to more substantive matters about impact – for instance, 
MacNaghten and Chilvers’s work (Macnaghten & Chilvers 2014), looking at the 
institutional effect of ScienceWise, focused on how different types of dialogue 
processes link to policymaking. Recent work by Emery et al (2014) proposes a 
range of criteria to increase the policy impact of public engagement, all of which are 
process matters. In this research, I have gone beyond pointing to institutional 
structures for explanation, to begin to explain why such institutional structures and 
arrangements exist and cannot accommodate public perspectives. 
 
From the outset, I have been clear that while the process of dialogue must be 
relevant in answering the question of why the impact of dialogue has been so 
limited, it cannot tell the whole story. The substance of the discussions, the way it is 
seen and understood by policymakers and how this ‘evidence’ fits in and competes 
with other sources of evidence must be important.  
 
With this as the starting point, in the next section I will draw on my analysis and 
interviews, as well as STS and political science literature, to try to explain some of 
this lack of impact. I will argue that the output of public dialogue has had limited 
impact because it presents a vision for the future of science and society 
(sociotechnical imaginary) that is significantly different to that of the ‘elites’ and 
which is misinterpreted by elite audiences as opposition. Partly as a consequence of 
this, the nature of the public discourses and the perceived status of public 
dialogues, the outputs of public dialogue are not seen as sufficiently robust evidence 
to base policymaking upon. Furthermore, the way in which public dialogue activities 
are commissioned and managed means that they are outside the policy networks or 
advocacy coalitions that constitute influence in policy. 
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a. Different visions for the future of science – competing 
sociotechnical imaginaries 
I have already described how the public dialogue reports have expressed a 
sociotechnical imaginary that I have labelled ‘Contingent Progress’, which is subtly 
but significantly different to the ‘Scientific Progress’ imaginary of the expert and 
policy documents. I have also argued that in light of this, there appears to be a 
public ‘counter- imaginary’ that is competing with the dominant ‘elite’ imaginary. 
 
John Dryzek, in his work on looking at the outputs of consensus conferences on GM 
foods in six different countries (Dryzek et al. 2008), characterises the situation he 
has observed as “Promethean Elites Encounter Precautionary Publics”.  He claims 
that deliberative publics always express worldviews of a ‘precautionary’ character, 
views which are consistent with Inglehart’s (Inglehart 1990) postmaterialism, in 
which quality of life, freedom and participation take precedence over quantity of 
material goods, security and social order. Policy ‘elites’, constrained by their priority 
to ensure economic competitiveness in a globalizing world, are, in contrast, 
‘promethean’ – having faith in the capacity of humans to manipulate complex 
systems for their own advantage and valuing material prosperity and economic 
efficiency as instrumental to further problem solving. These two ‘worldviews’ are 
generally at odds and irreconcilable with one another, as large costs would be 
incurred if a state departed from promethean facilitation of technological innovation, 
diffusion and adoption, he argues. Put most simply, the public and elites value 
different things and therefore have different views of the future and science’s role in 
it, particularly whether or not science and innovation is a force of progress or a 
source of problems. 
 
My analysis suggests that the public and expert imaginaries do not split into 
‘Precautionary’ and ‘Promethean’ quite as neatly as Dryzek has found in the case of 
GM foods. Dryzek’s ‘Promethean’ outlook appears to go further than the ‘science 
driven progress’ elite imaginary identified here. In particular, in Dryzek’s promethean 
worldview “Ecosystems impose no real constraints on human activity – in particular 
on economic growth” (Dryzek et al. 2008). Such an extreme position was not 
evident in the expert discourses – even in the most robustly pro-science discourse 
(Class B5 – Growth, economy and the planet), economic and scientific development 
was not discussed with disregard to the wider environment – indeed solving 
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environmental problems was seen as one of the key objectives of science for the 
future. 
 
Similarly, while the public discourse around GM foods identified in Class A4 was 
very similar to the ‘precautionary’ worldview that Dryzek ascribes to his public, the 
overarching public imaginary was less so. The public imaginary shares with the 
expert imaginary a sense of scientific progress and there are instances, particularly 
around biomedical sciences, where the public discourses show evidence of 
enthusiasm for some risk-taking and a fear of stagnation and loss of impetus as a 
result of over-precaution. Furthermore the economic value of science is also 
recognised, albeit tinged with a concern that this could be a diverting force.  
 
Moreover, the differences that I have identified between the public and expert 
sociotechnical imaginaries are more subtle and profound than simply a clash of 
values. The differences in imaginaries stem from very different perceptions of 
science, how it works and how it can be used. 
 
In particular, the public understanding that the role of government is in tempering 
the influence of industry, gives an important clue to why public discourses have 
limited impact on policy. It is possible that the counter-imaginary is at odds with the 
objectives of the policymakers and therefore discarded. The House of Lords 
Science and Society Report (2000) (Chapter 5) hints at this possibility in saying 
from the start that “to prohibit science from progressing without express public 
support in advance would be retrograde and repressive, and would stifle creative 
scientific research or drive it overseas. This is not what our recommendations are 
intended to achieve.”  
 
My interviews with former ministers throw further light on this, by showing how the 
economic mobilization of science and technology has not only become the dominant 
thrust of science policy, but also the dominant thrust of economic policy. They also 
described how they were involving scientists in this view by encouraging them to 
think about their research in economic terms, in return for continued financial 
support. Within this situation, which has been termed ‘the Schumpeterian 
Competition State’ (Jessop 2002) the focus of the role of the state is to secure 
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national competitiveness on the global market not just through the promotion of 
innovation but also through the social and economic conditions for innovation.  
 
In this context, Thorpe and Gregory (2010) argue that any attempts to influence 
technoscientific trajectories – as the alternative sociotechnical imaginary presented 
by the public in these dialogue reports arguably do – tend to be conceptualised as 
‘resistance’, and perspectives which need to be ‘brought around’. Public 
engagement activities, they argue, tend to construct a confrontation between an 
‘anti’ public and ‘pro’ experts, with the public always holding the negative position 
and the approach to consensus or even mutual understanding seen as needing to 
bring people around to the inevitable.  
 
Ben Hurlbut (2015), in considering responsibility in synthetic biology research, 
describes a similar mechanism for excluding public imaginaries, but one that 
focuses on the power of the scientific (rather than policy) imaginaries in shaping 
policy trajectories. He argues that in describing the problems that synthetic biology 
can solve, synthetic biologists are also taking authority to decide what challenges 
need to be addressed, what sociotechnical futures are considered good or bad, and 
what promises should be made. This puts a responsibility on society not to stand in 
the way of these future benefits, presenting social and ethical issues as 
‘epiphenomena’. This has the effect of rendering ‘moral deliberation subsidiary to 
authoritative imaginations of technological futures’.  
 
Both of these descriptions paint a picture of reinforcing power and interests that 
combine to make public imaginaries of more contingent or careful progress 
problematic. The power of scientific imaginaries to decide our future is reinforced by 
the policymakers understanding that science and innovation will deliver our 
Schumpeterian competitive future.  Any views contrary to that are undermining the 
power of science and the hope of a better future and therefore need to be minimised 
or addressed. 
 
This interpretation appears to provide a reasonable explanation for why public 
dialogue has so little influence on public policy, and is certainly in keeping with the 
accounts given by former science ministers, as well as more historic work around 
the emergence of an iron-triangle between science, industry and government 
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(Adams 1981; Pielke 2002) and of the way in which science is embedded within 
‘working worlds’ that generate both questions and support for science (Agar 2013). 
But it does not tell the whole story, for a number of reasons. Firstly, to construct the 
public discourses and imaginary expressed in the dialogue reports as being ‘anti’ 
science or holding back development would be a distortion. It is not that the public 
imaginary and discourses are more or less positive about science, they have a 
different understanding of how it sits in our world, the role it fulfils and how it should 
be governed. It is not a binary decision for or against particular sciences, nor even a 
challenge to the basis of the Schumpeterian Competition State. Rather, the public is 
providing a qualitative assessment of the extent to which this is desirable and the 
circumstances under which it would be so.  
 
Secondly, interviews with policymakers – civil servants in particular, but also 
ministers who deal with policy that makes use of science (rather than those making 
policy about science) – indicated that they were not constructing public opinion as 
being simply against science. They expressed an appreciation of the nuances of the 
public discourses, with one civil servant even arguing that this strengthened the 
evidence base. They nevertheless admitted that it was difficult to build such views 
into policymaking – both because of the ‘level’ at which decisions are made and 
because of the process of making a decision.  
 
To explain that further, the policy model that interviewees described involved a 
hierarchy of decisions, with those big picture matters, relating to the shape of the 
world and the broad framework within which policies need to fit, being made by 
politicians through their negotiations within political parties and at the ballot box. Any 
public (or indeed expert) views that aimed to influence such decisions would not 
have any success outside the political processes.  
 
The policy discourse analysis in particular also showed a preference for dealing with 
social and ethical issues as epiphenomenal matters that can be separated from the 
technologies and managed away, returning them once more into ‘expert’ matters of 
risk or legal assessments. The public imaginary, which sees these issues as 
fundamental parts woven through the science and technologies themselves, is 
difficult to account for in this way. In dealing with the public imaginary, these issues 
would have to be kept alive and a continual matter for public consideration and 
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discourse, thereby maintaining these issues as on-going ‘problems’ rather than 
being resolved. This public imaginary, as well as clashing with the overarching goals 
of government, simply does not fit into the ‘machinery’ of policymaking. 
 
This latter point leads to an interesting question about why regulation and what I 
refer to as the ‘machinery’ of policymaking (the rules and structures within which 
decisions and policies are made) takes the form it does. Again, in his work on 
synthetic biology, Hurlbut (2015) argues that the shape of regulatory structures is 
based upon imaginaries of science – in particular the way in which social and ethical 
issues are seen as the ‘epiphenomenal consequences of scientific creativity’ has 
been important in shaping ELSI research in the life sciences, for instance (Hurlbut 
2015). The dominant sociotechnical imaginary both describes and shapes how we 
see science and the role of the state. There is a circularity then, whereby the 
policymaking process has been built around the notion that social and ethical issues 
are separate to the technologies themselves, and, as a consequence, the 
policymaking process has to separate social and ethical issues from the 
technologies themselves in order to deal with them.  
 
Added to this, others (for example Hedgecoe & Martin 2003; Pickersgill 2011) have 
pointed out that this dominant imaginary is also likely to shape how the discussions 
have taken place within the public dialogues. In looking at the rhetoric within the 
discourses, I have pointed out how the shape of the public discussions is very much 
shaped by techniques such as ‘hyperbolic framing’, which make it very difficult for 
participants to find a way to object to the science or technology being discussed. 
The discussions are very clearly framed and directed by the dominant 
sociotechnical imaginary articulated by the experts participating in the debates, as 
well as the officials commissioning the discussion in the first place – and indeed act 
to reinforce and share this dominant imaginary. For example, encouraging the 
public to express aspirations and concerns already frames social and ethical issues 
as epiphenomena. The public discourses coming out of these discussions perhaps 
express a tension between the public counter-imaginary and the dominant 
sociotechnical imaginary, within which the whole exercise is functioning, possibly 
masking even greater differences in imaginaries. 
 
 216
Similarly, the dominant sociotechnical imaginary is also likely to shape how 
policymakers and experts read the outputs of the discussions – exercising a similar 
degree of constraint upon the expert and policy readers. Looking at the outputs 
through the lens of the dominant sociotechnical imaginary, along with the current 
policy framework which strongly reflects that imaginary, it is possible to understand 
how the views of the public are seen as what Hedgecoe and Martin (2003) describe 
as ‘roadmaps’ – a list of conditions which must be met in order for particular 
technologies to develop unhindered and for the dominant sociotechnical imaginary 
to come to fruition. 
 
Furthermore, Jasanoff and Kim (2009) have argued that in the case of nuclear 
power in the USA, conflicts between the sociotechnical imaginaries of the public and 
experts encouraged a perception of the public as ‘emotional, untutored in 
probabilistic thinking and incapable of rational intervention in technical debates’. As I 
have described previously, this perception is likely to be built and reinforced by the 
public discourses’ focus on people rather than technologies, and on nature. Echoes 
of this perception were evident in my interviews with policymakers, particularly with 
the CSAs who questioned the public’s ability to understand the issues of the day 
and asserted that they acted in a non-rational manner. Looking at the public this 
way further undermines the value of the outputs of public dialogue as a source of 
evidence for decision-making – particularly when compared to the expert discourses 
which demonstrate their rationality, impartiality and status so powerfully through 
their use of technical vocabulary. 
 
In summary then, while the views expressed in the public dialogue process are 
driven by the sociotechnical imaginaries held by the participants, by framing the 
questions, using particular illustrations of technologies and asking participants to 
bring the ideas to life in their own minds, public dialogues also appear to co-opt 
people into the dominant ‘elite’ imaginary of science driving progress. Similarly, 
regulation and policy is both designed to follow the shape of the dominant 
imaginary, but is also acting as a lens through which the public discourse is being 
seen and dealt with. Social and ethical issues are both understood to be 
epiphenomena, but also need to be treated as such in order to be dealt with in the 
regulatory ‘machine’. As a result, public concerns can’t be accommodated because 
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they clash with the dominant imaginary (i.e. appear to present obstacles to growing 
the economy) and because they don’t fit into the machinery of government. 
 
b. The problem of expertise 
Further to, and arguably as a part of, the different sociotechnical imaginaries 
revealed in the analysis of discourses and interviews, a clear preference from 
policymakers for ‘expert’ advice was also evident. The policy documents and the 
interviews made many mentions of and demonstrated strong reliance on expert 
sources; there was a tendency to make social and ethical issues ‘expert matters’ by 
converting them into risk or legal questions; stakeholder groups or NGOs – groups 
which could be seen as acting as experts in public issues – were described as key 
sources of public perspectives into policymaking. And the interviews showed how 
little value was put on public opinion generated through dialogue, with policymakers 
alluding to how they didn’t take the public views seriously until experts had come up 
with the same. 
 
I have previously described how the public discourses might be at an ontological 
and rhetorical disadvantage when compared to the expert discourses, which might 
explain at least some of this difference in perception of expertise. As I have 
described above, my findings also chime with claims from others that the 
predominance of technical experts in the policymaking process means that their 
science-centred vision determines science policy and limits organisational capacity 
to consider or contemplate the contexts within which this works (Wynne 1998; 
Hurlbut 2015; Irwin 1995). But I would argue that my interviews reveal something 
further about the nature and influence of expertise in policymaking. 
 
To begin, one point that my interviewees make repeatedly, is that it is not just 
natural science expertise that is important – they also draw on advice from 
economists, social scientists, legal experts and stakeholders. It is not the ‘scientific’ 
status that is important to be included in the discussions, but the ‘expert’ status. So 
while the different visions for science expressed in the public dialogues make these 
outputs less likely or more difficult to incorporate into policymaking, the fact that they 
are not being seen as drawn from ‘experts’ is further undermining their power and 
value. Policy draws on experts. The public are not seen as experts. 
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A good example of this comes from the policy Class C2 discourse. In discussing the 
moral and ethical issues raised by the public in the course of the policymakers’ 
evidence gathering, the public’s objections are diminished by questioning whether 
the views inputted are representative – the claim is made that the state of public 
opinion is not understood; Next the report argues that those objecting to animal 
human hybrid embryos are the same people who object to all embryo research – 
their objections are not to do with the non-humanness but to do with the 
‘embryoness’ of the technology in question and therefore not worthy of 
consideration; finally, the report appeals for ‘expert’ authentication of the public 
concerns, asking whether there are any scientists who share the same concerns. 
 
Further to that however, as I have described earlier, once the social and ethical 
issues have been raised by the public (which is seen in the policy discourses as the 
public’s key role in the scientific process) addressing these issues becomes an 
expert matter. In class C1, concerns around nanoscience are seen as matters of 
risk (rather than moral hazard), which can be quantified and managed by risk 
experts. Class C3 sees problems with human-animal hybrid embryos as a legal 
question, for example. At no point are the public discussed as part of the solution – 
the public identify problems, experts deal with them. In the interviews with 
policymakers, the CSAs in particular also question the public’s capacity to 
understand the issues and to form rational views. 
 
Substantive expertise 
That is too simple an explanation though. How do policymakers know and decide 
who is an expert? Is an expert anyone who shares the elite sociotechnical 
imaginary? I would argue not. Several of the interviews suggested that there was 
something substantive about expertise in policymaking – the policymakers clearly 
valued the opinion of those who had first hand knowledge of the subject being 
discussed.  
 
For example, a former CSA recounted how his experience in an area of physics 
meant that he could challenge and update a model that would have produced grave 
consequences had it been incorrect. A former CSA also gave a particularly clear 
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illustration of the importance of first-hand knowledge when describing the 
involvement of a volcanologist in the 2010 ash cloud incident. In the quote given on 
page 173, he emphasises how this volcanologist wasn’t just an expert in volcanoes 
but in this precise volcano.  
 
The former ministers also talked about their previous experience in relevant 
businesses in explaining the unique contribution they were able to bring to the roles. 
They also described how expertise was sought from those working in the field. To 
use Collins and Evans’s ‘types of expertise’ then (Collins & Evans 2009), there is 
evidence that ‘contributory expertise’ is valued and sought out in policymaking and 
that substantive knowledge is helpful.  
 
These examples are problematic though as various studies (for example Jasanoff, 
2009; Salter, Levy, & Leiss, 1988) have shown that the science used for policy 
making is characteristically different from science generated in pure research 
settings. This at least partly because science and policy considerations become 
closely integrated during production and use, resulting in science in the policy 
setting always being coloured by values. This means that the ‘pure’ science that 
CSAs and other experts have ‘contributory expertise’ in is not the same science 
they are dealing with in a policy situation. The CSAs themselves also admit that 
they are not experts in all of the areas of science on which they are asked to 
comment. In interviews, they described how they don’t have detailed knowledge of 
all areas or science but nevertheless feel able to navigate a route through and give 
‘intelligent commentary’ on scientific issues they are unfamiliar with. Arguably, this is 
also what the ‘expert’ organisations, such as the learned societies, are doing in their 
reports to policymakers, when they speculate about future uses of technologies 
whose purposes are as yet unfixed.  
 
There appears therefore to be the view that this first hand knowledge of a particular 
area of science gives you transferrable expertise in other areas. This is what Collins 
and Evans (2009) describe as ‘referred expertise’, whereby contributory expertise in 
one field is used in relation to another field. The public in contrast are seen to be 
simply drawing on their life experience and non-technical skills to come to their 
viewpoint – Collins and Evans’s ‘ubiquitous discrimination’, which is the way in 
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which those with little scientific knowledge use relationships, status, life experience 
etc. to make technical judgements.  
 
The existence of these two sets of skills is evidenced by the fact that the two groups 
come to different assessments of the same material – different discourses around 
the same technologies, as I have described, for instance. It is however problematic 
to assume that that different assessments are the result of different levels of 
qualities of judgement skills that come from scientific training. They could equally 
come from different outlooks or sociotechnical imaginaries, as I have described 
above. Indeed, research in political science on expertise and its transferability 
across fields has found that experts excel mainly in their own domains. Michelene 
Chi, Robert Glaser, Marshall Farr (Chi et al. 1988) argue that there is little evidence 
that a person highly skilled in one domain can transfer the skill to another. They 
point to the work of Minsky and Papert (1974) on artificial intelligence which noted 
that “a very intelligent person might be that way because of specific local features of 
his knowledge-organising knowledge rather than because of global qualities of his 
thinking.” Furthermore, research looking at problem solving in political sciences 
found that non-domain experts (chemists) solved political science problems much 
like novices (Voss & Post 1988). Tetlock (2005), looking at expert political 
judgement similarly found that specialists were not significantly more reliable than 
non-specialists in predicting what is going to happen in their own area of study.  
While a little knowledge might make someone a more reliable forecaster, knowing a 
lot made some less reliable (Tetlock 2005). Collins’s own early work on replication 
of scientific results highlighted how even within science, when there is no ‘objective’ 
test of an experiment’s quality, the scientists draw on non-scientific criteria such as 
faith in the experimenter’s honesty, size and prestige of the laboratory or 
professional group affiliations (Collins 1985). 
 
Arguably then, the explanation for the different judgements being made by the 
public and experts lies not with different ‘expertises’, but with the different outlooks 
that are being drawn upon in exercising ‘ubiquitous discrimination’. It is possible that 
these are closely linked however – the acquisition of scientific skills might involve 
being co-opted into the expert imaginary too, for instance – creating the illusion of a 
particular set of transferrable skills. But rather than being a substantive quality, the 
concept of ‘referred expertise’ (which is undoubtedly recognised by policymakers, 
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even if it is not referred to in such terms) does appear to be a reflection of outlook – 
ubiquitous discrimination exercised in the framework of the dominant sociotechnical 
imaginary. In other words, I am not arguing that experts are chosen or designated 
because they share the elite sociotechnical imaginary, but that it is the 
sociotechnical imaginary, rather than the skills they have gained by making a 
contribution to a particular scientific field, that accounts for the particular way in 
which scientific experts reach judgements and advice for policy. 
 
A good illustration of this in action was the way in which two of the ministers 
described the experts they most valued in advising on bovine TB. The minister who 
supported the badger cull said how important the advice of the veterinary scientists 
had been, citing their expert knowledge of the field as being the key to their insight. 
The minister who opposed the badger cull however said how valuable the advice of 
the scientists had been, similarly citing their expert knowledge of the field as being 
key. Both therefore made reference to similar sources of real and referred expertise 
– neither the scientists nor the vets had made policy on bovine TB before, so they 
were both exercising referred expertise. What neither interviewee said however is 
that, for whatever reason, the veterinary scientists were typically pro-culling and the 
scientists anti-culling. It wasn’t simply the technical expertise that was being valued 
and judged by the Ministers, but the expertise and outlook combined. This 
reinforces the point about the challenge of incorporating views drawn from the 
public’s counter-sociotechnical imaginary. 
 
Regardless of the reality of its existence however, this understanding of the 
existence of some kind of ‘referred expertise’ that allows scientists to exercise 
expert judgment in whichever field they choose could, on one hand, explain why the 
advice of the public has less impact than that of experts. Even when they are 
speaking outside their own domain, the ‘referred expertise’ perceived to be held by 
scientists is more valued than the ubiquitous expertise offered by the public. The 
public are seen to be offering the wrong ‘type’ of expertise then – something that will 
be important to bring to light in any plans to improve the impact of public dialogue 
exercises in the future.  
 
Furthermore, this classification could help make sense of the policymakers’ 
tendency to turn social and ethical issues into expert matters of ‘risk’ and ‘law’. If 
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you view the public as drawing on only ‘ubiquitous’ skills that everyone has, 
compared to the ‘expertise’ offered by the scientists, public opinion appears to be 
the opposite of technical expertise. In this light, converting social and ethical matters 
into risk and legal issues not only keeps these matters in the expert domain 
(arguably therefore an act of boundary work) but also turns them into matters to 
which expertise can be applied – and where policymakers can be much more 
comfortable of the epistemic authority of advice. 
 
Situational/relational nature of expertise 
Beyond that however, expertise was also seen by policymakers as a situational and 
relational quality – it was conferred by having a particular job or being known to 
have particular expertise. While civil servants talked in interviews about peer-
reviewing advice, this was secondary to knowing people or having them 
recommended by other experts. As I have described in Chapter 6, when asked 
about how they chose scientific experts for advice, the policymakers interviewed put 
a great significance on individuals’ status or location within institutions or scientific 
networks – the CSAs described how they would ask appropriate bodies or networks 
to recommend people and the ministers expressed satisfaction that those employed 
by the appropriate agency would have sufficient expertise, for instance.  
 
This should not be surprising. Others have previously described how expertise is a 
reflection of an individual’s status and place in a network (for example Epstein, 
1996; Jasanoff, 2004; Wynne, 1992). Jasanoff in particular has described how in 
the UK, confidence in governmental advisers rests on the reliability of persons 
rather than technical competence, arguing that “In British advisory committees, trust 
is created through embodiment in trustworthy people: peers, professors, tested 
public servants, representatives of established interest groups or responsible citizen 
organizations. Over and above any demonstrations of technical competence, such 
individuals have proved their right to represent the public interest through years of 
devoted service.” (Jasanoff 1997). Further to that, she also argues that the evidence 
gathering and consultative process only allows the public to participate by invitation 
and that this is designed to exclude opinion that “looks radical, irrational or lacking in 
significant social and scientific support” (Jasanoff, 1997).  
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Both these points are important for public dialogue. If the outputs of public dialogue 
are seen as non-expertise, then it will always be difficult to have any impact with a 
system where expertise is valued and taken notice of. As I have explained above, 
this arguably even results in ‘public’ issues around social and ethical concerns, 
being transformed into ‘expert’ matters of risk and legality. This approach to 
evidence gathering (or evidence valuing) also provides some explanation for why 
the policymakers focused upon ‘stakeholders’ rather than ‘the public’ – these 
‘representatives of established interest groups or responsible citizen organizations’ 
are seen as trustworthy and reliable and understand how their views will fit into the 
policymaking process. 
 
c. Networks 
As well as valuing expertise from those who have contributed to the field, or who 
have a relevant position of authority, the interviews with policymakers showed very 
clearly that their networks were important sources of advice and expertise.  In 
particular, when it comes to seeking the views of the public, my interviews show that 
policymakers tend to think in terms of ‘stakeholders’ – organisations that represent 
public interests (or the interests of some sub groups of the public). As the interview 
with the formal special adviser in particular shows, these stakeholders were often 
drawn from politicians and advisers’ professional networks. 
 
This correlates very strongly with thinking in political science, around the importance 
of groups – that it is not just institutions, cabinets and elected officials that make 
decisions, but that policy often emerges as a result of pressure or influence from 
groups and associations by direct lobbying or behind the scenes negotiations. 
Policy networks (Rhodes 1997; Marsh & Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 1990) and the 
advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (Sabatier 2006; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 
1993; Sabatier 1998) are two of the most recent innovations in policy analysis and 
both emphasise the importance of groups and interactions.  
 
Policy network analysis is structure oriented, focusing on shared resources and 
power dependency. It is based on the idea that modern policy problems are 
complex and therefore no state agency has the resources to address them alone. 
Instead, agencies are dependent upon cooperation and resources from other actors 
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(Rhodes 1997). Well-resourced actors form dominant coalitions which decide the 
rules of the game – how policy problems are perceived, which solutions are 
acceptable etc. (Marsh & Rhodes 1992; Smith 2000; Smith 1993). 
 
Policy networks exist on a continuum of cohesion, from loose issues networks 
(whose membership encompasses a wide range of interests, perhaps with limited 
resources) (Smith 2000), to tight-knit policy communities, which are more stable, 
with restricted membership, shared responsibilities for delivering services and 
integrated membership (Heclo & Wildavsky, 1974; John, 2013). Schneider and 
Ingram (1997), looking specifically at the role of science in policymaking, described 
the network they identified as a ‘policy community’, which is ‘the more closely knit, 
coherent, stable and closed forms of networks. They exist where there is a high 
degree of unity and exclusivity among scientific and professional actors who have 
reached a consensus on existing problems, potential solutions and desired 
outcomes. There is continuity among actors extending over long periods of time’ 
(Schneider & Ingram 1997). Significantly for this research, they concluded that 
unless participants in the policy process share membership of the policy community, 
their knowledge is considered irrelevant, with the effect of excluding or ignoring 
those who might be adversely affected or oppose the policy community’s view. This 
could provide a further explanation as to why the outputs of public engagement are 
not taken account of. 
 
Where policy networks are resource focused, the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF) is focused on agency and beliefs. Policy actors hold ‘policy core beliefs’ 
which are their normative goals for policy and perceptions of the best ways of 
achieving these goals (Sabatier 1998). The success of policy participants depends 
on their ability to translate their policy core beliefs into actual policy. To do this they 
seek out allies with similar core beliefs and coordinate actions with these allies in 
advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Weible 2006). 
 
Central to the ACF is the idea that most policy relevant activities happen in a policy 
subsystem, which is defined as “the group of people and/or organisations interacting 
regularly over periods of a decade or more to influence policy formulation and 
implementation within a given policy area/domain” (Sabatier 1998, p.111). For 
instance ‘the biotechnology policy subsystem in the UK’ has been a unit of study 
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(Montpetit 2011). Coalitions must compete for influence over policy or public 
opinion. But they do this not just by asserting interests over another group’s, but 
also by attacking the premises and understandings of the other (Smith 2000). Actors 
are likely to consider as credible only those who share their beliefs (Kahan et al. 
2011; Siegrist et al. 2000) and over time, initially loose groups with amorphous 
beliefs will coalesce into increasingly distinct coalitions with coherent belief systems, 
with neutral actors dropping out (Sabatier & Zafonte 2001). Importantly, researchers 
using ACF have found that scientists tend to be members of advocacy coalitions, 
being primarily motivated (like any other actor) by their convictions and beliefs and 
in most well developed sub-systems, agency officers and most researchers active in 
the field will be members of specific coalitions in terms of sharing a set of policy 
core beliefs (Montpetit 2011).  
 
When it comes to the various policy subsystems around the issues that public 
dialogues consider (there would be a policy subsystem around synthetic biology, 
geoengineering, human embryo research and so on), the policymakers and the 
scientists would be described as being inside a coalition, but the actors in a public 
dialogue exercise are not. The dialogue organisers are likely to be connected to the 
‘public engagement’ policy sub-system, but not the one relating to the issue in hand 
– in fact the neutral stance taken by organisations like ScienceWise means that they 
can only act as channels and facilitators and never advocates. Arguably the 
sponsoring organisation (BBSRC in the case of synthetic biology, for instance) is, 
but, as I have shown in the comparison of expert and public discourses, the sponsor 
organisations’ inputs to policy (the expert reports) do not tend to reflect the public 
dialogue outputs fully, showing a tendency to discount or externalise public 
perspectives.  
 
The net result, if the advocacy coalition framework or the policy network approach is 
to be considered, is that the outputs of public dialogue are outside the networks or 
coalitions that exert policy influence. This is in contrast to the scientific community, 
the NGOs and policymakers, who are well networked and appear to be engaged 
and made use of in policy decision making.  
 
There is however one further dimension that is important. Coming out in the 
interviews, it is significant that as well as being outside policy networks or advocacy 
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coalitions, public dialogue does not bring with it any agency. NGOs and other 
stakeholder groups often represent membership organisations, or at least have a 
profile and public voice, and as such have the power to mobilise large numbers 
towards their position – and potentially against a policy decision that they are 
unhappy with. Such a threat (or possibility) is a very real concern for policymakers 
(politicians in particular) and so there is an incentive to involve such groups in 
decision making. For example, one Minister described a back and forth between 
groups until you get to the point where nobody is unhappy and can all accept the 
best of a bad deal. Another minister, when talking about Bovine TB, described how 
it was vital to hear from as many stakeholders as possible, as the decision was 
likely to be subject to a judicial review. In this instance, involving NGOs was not just 
a way to avoid public controversy, but also a legal requirement of due process. 
Public dialogue in contrast not only sits outside these networks, but is not depended 
upon in order to make and deliver policy – or to make policy acceptable.  
 
Public dialogue activities then sit outside most descriptions of the types of networks 
and coalitions that are best able to influence policy. They don’t deliver part of policy, 
they can’t mobilise support for or against policy, involving them is not a legal 
requirement and they can’t form issue coalitions on the substantive matters being 
discussed as organisations hosting public dialogues are channels rather than 
advocates. 
 
 
Conclusions for Public dialogue 
 
All of this might appear to paint a challenging picture for proponents of public 
dialogue, but I would argue that it reflects the stage in the field’s development. For 
the past decade, the focus has been on developing the practice – understanding 
how to do dialogue effectively. And as I have argued, this research shows that the 
process does produce valuable insight into how the public come to understand new 
and emerging science and technologies. This however is not without problems, as I 
will discuss below.  
 
For the next phase in the field’s development though, I would suggest that the focus 
needs to be on how to improve the impact of dialogue on policymaking. In particular, 
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based on the research described here, I believe this new phase needs to focus on 
three key questions: 
 
1. How can we involve the public in discussions about upstream 
issues? 
As I have argued above, the current way in which upstream technologies are 
brought to life for dialogue participants (wittingly or unwittingly) allows the expert 
imaginaries to fix the meanings to abstract technologies. This is perhaps inevitable 
but nevertheless problematic, especially given the current move to incorporate 
public dialogue into the Responsible Research and Innovation agenda, which 
focuses on aligning the outcomes of research with the values of society (see for 
instance Owen, Bessant, & Heintz, 2013; Owen, Macnaghten, & Stilgoe, 2012). 
 
This push upstream also moves towards a second tension that I have identified in 
this research, around the need to negotiate sociotechnical imaginaries and the 
difficulty of influencing the meta-narratives around policies. These meta-narratives 
are arguably closely related to sociotechnical imaginaries, but tend to be drawn up 
and agreed by the political process and therefore not subject to the kinds of 
decisions that dialogue seeks to/has the potential to influence.  
 
Clearly there is an important role for discussions of this type. Bringing assumptions 
and aspirations about the kind of world we want to create from and with science into 
the open would be an important way to help policymakers understand the impact of 
their own sociotechnical imaginaries and to consider alternative ways to incorporate 
public values into their decisions and imaginaries. The failure to do this is also a 
longstanding criticism of dialogue practice by people such as Wynne and Irwin 
(Kearnes et al. 2006; Wynne 1992; Wynne 2006; Macnaghten et al. 2005; Irwin 
2001; Irwin & Wynne 1996; Irwin et al. 2012a), when they talk about a lack of 
institutional reflexivity. But it is difficult to see how this could happen in a public 
dialogue situation as these issues don’t appear to be open for discussion by those 
who commission and respond to public dialogue events – as I’ve explained, the 
ministers that need to be influenced see public dialogue as a way to educate and 
bring around the public, as part of fulfilling their ‘elite’ sociotechnical imaginary.  
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At best public dialogue events appear to exert influence at the civil servant level. As 
I have described however, according to the model that the policymakers all 
appeared to work with, this is exerting influence at a level below that needed to 
influence the big picture media meta-narratives and imaginaries. Instead, at this 
level, ministers appear to be taking their lead from their networks – particularly their 
political parties, their mailbags and from wider cultural and social cues such as the 
media and NGOs. 
 
Perhaps then, rather than/as well as continuing to ask what do people think about 
new technologies, it would be interesting to consider where these views come from. 
For example, the public discourses show clear traces of environmental values – 
indeed the public discourses identified here share many aspects of Dryzek’s ‘green 
consciousness’ environmental discourse (such as sense of nature, unnatural 
practices, the violation of nature), which is one of the radical green discourses he 
describes (Dryzek 2005). There are also hints of the 1990s anti-globalisation 
movement’s discourse in the scepticism of the role of the private sector. Exploring 
current ‘fringe’ movements and attitudes might give us more clues about how people 
are likely to respond to future technological developments.  
 
2. How can the policymaking process and machinery deal with social 
and ethical issues as anything but epiphenomena? 
As I have described above, policymakers understand public concerns as 
epiphenomena at least partly because that is the way in which the machinery of 
government and governance works. Questions around how would that machinery 
cope with decisions that are never closed and constantly revisited and what 
structural and institutional changes would be necessary to accommodate and reflect 
this viewpoint will be important to consider in moving the practice of dialogue 
forwards. 
 
3. How can public dialogue be better heard in policymaking? 
The issue of expertise also presents a significant challenge for public dialogue. 
Regardless of whether or not this is a relational or substantive quality being sought, 
it is nevertheless seen as a substantive quality by policymakers, that provides 
epistemic authority. Public perspectives cannot compete with this. Much STS 
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discourse around this issue frames this problem in terms of justice and power. But I 
argue that this is not a matter of the public being deliberately ignored or excluded, 
but of their views being invisible, or misunderstood or distorted by being made 
manageable.  
 
From my analysis and interviews, there is evidence that policymakers are open to 
public opinion and are indeed drawing input via organised groups and direct 
contact. This is supported by work of others who have found that policymakers 
report many different routes through which public values can be heard and 
accounted for in science policy (MacNaghten and Chilvers 2014).  Although this 
might not result in the institutional reflexivity on the part of policymakers that many 
would want, it is not the same as the public going unheard or being excluded from 
the process.  
 
But the biggest way in which public dialogue programmes like ScienceWise can 
improve the impact of their dialogues is likely to be through advocacy and 
networking. The organisers or sponsors of such dialogues could play an active role 
in this on behalf of participants. For instance, the UK Government’s Foresight 
programme had a team who were responsible for promoting the findings of the 
Foresight projects across government and beyond, and of recording impact. The 
team existed for the life span of the project and so had years to build up the 
relationships and contacts needed to ensure impact. Furthermore, making the 
participation process more transparent – by making the names of the participants 
public and giving them a role in advocating on behalf of the dialogue, for instance – 
could increase impact, improve the perceived accountability of the dialogue and in 
turn make commissioning bodies more accountable to act on the advice of the 
dialogues. 
 
It is important to point out however that even though public perspectives do not 
appear to have been taken into account in much policymaking around new and 
emerging technologies over the last decade, this does not appear to have resulted 
in public disquiet.  While some might argue that this is the result of the dialogue 
process itself, even if programmes like ScienceWise have reached and had a 
positive impact on several thousand people, it seems improbable that this provides 
an explanation for a wider lack of concern – especially since even the minister 
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responsible for the programme did not appear to be aware of its role in 
democratising science. Instead, Sheila Jasanoff argues in her description of the 
UK’s ‘Civic epistemology’ that the British people require a degree of 
‘reasonableness’ in the decision making process (Jasanoff 2005). If this has been 
met, then there will not be disquiet. So even if the outputs of public dialogue are not 
heard, provided decisions have been made on a reasonable basis, then they will be 
accepted. 
 
Given the apparently difficult fit that public dialogue has with the UK’s policymaking 
process, the elite sociotechnical imaginary and civic epistemology, its persistence 
as the dominant way of bringing science and society closer together remains 
surprising. It also remains a distinctly northern European approach to the problem. 
Others are already suggesting that there might be other innovations in science 
governance practice – such as citizen science, crowdsourcing, open science and 
innovative governance structures (Owen et al. 2012; Grand et al. 2012; Asveld et al. 
2015; Macnaghten & Chilvers 2014). Exploring and comparing the impact of such 
alternative approaches, including comparisons with other countries, could provide 
interesting research questions – and lessons for practitioners – in the future. 
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Appendix	   1:	   Documents	   included	   in	   the	   computer	   assisted	  
text	  analysis	  
 
Corpus A: Public dialogue 
reports  
 
Corpus B: Expert reports Corpus C: Policy reports 
 
Nanodialogues (2005-
2007) 
Nanodialogues was 
developed as a result of 
recommendations by the 
Royal Society and the Royal 
Academy of Engineering on 
how the Government should 
take forward the new and 
challenging area of 
nanotechnology research.  
 
Nanojury (2003)* 
The NanoJury brought 
together 20 randomly-
chosen people from different 
backgrounds who will hear 
evidence about the role that 
nanotechnologies might play 
in their future. 
 
Nanotechnology for 
healthcare (2008)* 
Sponsored by the 
Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council, 
this dialogue set out to take 
account of a wide set of 
societal views and inform 
nanotechnology research 
trajectories for healthcare  
 
SmallTalk (2005)* 
SmallTalk was a series of 
public dialogue activities that 
explored the aspirations and 
concerns of the public and 
scientists around 
nanotechnologies. 
 
 
 
Nanodialogues response 
(2007) 
BBSRC and EPSRC joint 
response to the 
nanodialogues: engaging 
research councils  
project 
 
Nanosciences and 
nanotechnologies: 
Opportunities and 
Uncertainties (2004)  
Royal Society & Royal 
Academy of Engineering 
report looking at future of 
nanoscience. Included input 
from a public dialogue 
activity. 
 
UK Government Response 
to The Royal Commission 
on Environmental 
Pollution (RCEP) Report 
“Novel Materials in the 
Environment: The Case Of 
Nanotechnology” (2009) 
 
UK Government response 
to the Royal Society and 
Royal Academy of 
Engineering Report 
‘Nanoscience and 
nanotechnologies: 
opportunities and 
uncertainties’ (2005) 
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Synthetic Biology (2009-
2010) 
The Synthetic Biology 
Dialogue has been 
commissioned by BBSRC 
(Biotechnology and 
Biological Sciences 
Research Council) and 
EPSRC (Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research 
Council), on behalf of RCUK, 
and will explore the public’s 
views, concerns and 
aspirations around synthetic 
biology. 
 
Synthetic Biology, Royal 
Academy of Engineering 
(2008)* 
This report presents the 
findings of an exploratory 
public dialogue project, 
commissioned by the Royal 
Academy of Engineering (the 
Academy) and conducted by 
People Science and Policy 
Ltd (PSP) to explore 
uninformed and informed 
perceptions of and attitudes 
to synthetic biology in the 
UK. 
 
 
Synthetic Biology 
Roadmap (2012) Produced 
by the UK Synthetic Biology 
Roadmap Coordination 
Group, which included a 
wide range of stakeholders, 
including academics, 
industrialists and, on behalf 
of the Research Councils, 
the Biotechnology and 
Biological Sciences 
Research Council (BBSRC), 
Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) and the 
Technology Strategy Board 
(TSB). 
 
Synthetic Biology – scope, 
applications and 
implications (2009) Royal 
Academy of Engineering 
Identifies the next steps to 
build on the UK’s position in 
the field, create a regulatory 
framework and to explore, 
with the public, the ethical 
and societal issues involved. 
Includes outputs of the 2008 
public dialogue. 
 
UK Government response 
to ‘A Synthetic Biology 
Road Map for the UK’ 
(Letter from Science 
Minister, 2012) 
 
 
Forensic Use of DNA 
(2007-2008) 
This project aimed to find out 
people’s views on the 
forensic use of DNA, 
particularly in relation to the 
information held on the 
National DNA Database 
(NDNAD). Sponsored by the 
Human Genetics 
Commission (HGC). 
 
 
Nothing to Hide, Nothing 
to Fear: Balancing 
individual human rights 
and the public interest in 
governance of the National 
DNA Database (2009) 
Human Genetics 
Commission 
Report which ‘forensic use of 
DNA’ dialogue fed into. 
 
 
No equivalent policy 
document 
 
Geoengineering (2010) 
The Natural Environment 
Research Council (NERC), 
 
Geoengineering the 
climate: science, 
governance and 
 
Government Response to 
the House of Commons, 
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in partnership with 
Sciencewise-ERC carried 
out this public dialogue to 
explore the views of the 
public in relation to 
geoengineering. In particular 
the moral, social and ethical 
implications of future 
research on geoengineering 
were assessed. 
 
uncertainty 
Royal Society (2009) 
Report into potential of 
geoengineering, which 
included element of public 
consultation. 
Science and Technology 
Committee 5th Report of 
Session 2009-10: The 
Regulation of 
Geoengineering 
 
 
GM Foods (2002)* 
This report presents The 
Food Standards Agency’s 
contribution to the UK 
government’s dialogue on 
GM foods, based on a 
citizen’s jury. The dialogue 
set out to independently 
assess people’s views, 
especially those whose 
voices are not often heard, 
on the acceptability of GM 
food and how this relates to 
consumer choice. 
 
Public perceptions of 
industrial biotechnology 
(2006) 
IB is the application of 
bioscience (including 
genetically modified 
organisms) for the 
processing and production of 
chemicals, materials and 
energy. The aim of the 
project, sponsored by the 
Department for Business, 
Enterprise & Regulatory 
Reform (BERR), was to 
assess and understand the 
public perception and values 
around IB. 
 
 
GM Science Review First 
Report (2003) The GM 
Science Review Panel. 
An open review of the 
science relevant to GM crops 
and food based on interests 
and concerns of the public 
 
IB 2025 – Maximising UK 
Opportunities from 
Industrial Biotechnology in 
a Low Carbon Economy 
(May 2009). 
A report to Government by 
the industrial biotechnology 
innovation and growth team, 
which included members 
from academia and industry. 
 
Genetically Modified 
Foods – Frequently Asked 
Questions (Defra 2004) 
 
The GM Dialogue – 
Government Response 
(2004) 
 
Government response to 
the Industrial 
Biotechnology – 
Innovation & Growth team 
report to Government 
(2009) 
 
 
 
Hybrids and Chimeras 
(2006) 
This project was part of the 
Human Fertilisation and 
 
Human Animal Hybrids 
(2007) HFEA 
Final report of the HFEA 
review of human animal 
 
House of Commons 
Science and Technology 
Committee: Government 
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Embryology Authority’s 
(HFEA) public and 
stakeholder consultation on 
hybrids and chimera 
embryos. This was carried 
out to guide the Authority’s 
recommendations to 
Government on whether this 
type of research should be 
allowed in the future. 
 
Animals Containing 
Human Material (2010) 
Led by the Academy of 
Medical Sciences, this public 
dialogue formed part of a 
broader study on the 
scientific, social, ethical, 
safety and regulatory 
aspects of research involving 
non-human embryos and 
animals containing human 
material. 
 
hybrids, which the public 
dialogue feeds into. 
 
Animals Containing 
Human Materials (2011) 
Academy of Medical 
Sciences  
The broader study on the 
scientific, social, ethical, 
safety and regulatory 
aspects of research involving 
non-human embryos and 
animals containing human 
material, into which the 
public dialogue fed. 
 
proposals for the 
regulation of hybrid and 
chimera embryos. Fifth 
Report of Session 2006–
07. 
 
Government Response to 
the Report from the Joint 
Committee on the Human 
Tissue and Embryos 
(Draft) Bill (2007) 
 
Stem Cell dialogue (2007-
2008) 
This project developed 
public dialogue activities 
around the science and 
social and ethical issues of 
stem cell research, with the 
aim of providing an 
understanding of views and 
concerns among diverse 
groups, including scientists, 
which could then feed into 
policy makers’ strategic 
decision making. 
 
Stem Cell Infrastructure 
Report (2008) The Medical 
Research Council (MRC). 
Considers the research 
landscape and national 
needs, to determine 
infrastructure support for the 
sector. 
Government Response to 
the House of Lords 
Science and Technology 
Committee Inquiry into 
Regenerative Medicine 
(2013) 
Government response to 
the UK Stem Cell Initiative 
report and 
recommendations (2007) 
 
DrugsFutures (2006-2008) 
DrugsFutures was 
commissioned as part of the 
Academy of Medical 
Science’s independent 
review of the societal, health, 
safety and environmental 
issues raised by scientific 
advances in brain science, 
addiction and drugs 
(BSAD).   
Brain Science (2008) 
Academy of Medical 
Sciences 
Report produced by a 
working group chaired by 
Prof Sir Gabriel Horn, to 
consider societal, health, 
safety and environmental 
issues raised by scientific 
advances in brain science, 
addiction and drugs (BSAD).   
No equivalent policy 
document 
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The Big Energy Shift 
(2008-2009) 
The Big Energy Shift aimed 
to encourage people to 
discuss the way they 
insulate, heat and power 
their homes and 
communities. It took place in 
parallel with the formal 
consultations on the Heat 
and Energy Saving Strategy 
and Renewable Energy 
Strategy. 
 
 
No equivalent expert 
document 
 
No equivalent policy 
document 
 
ScienceHorizons (2006-
2007) 
 
Sciencehorizons was the 
public-facing part of a 
stakeholder consultation on 
the Wider Implications of 
Science and Technology 
(WIST) carried out by the 
Government Office for 
Science’s Horizon Scanning 
Centre. Its aim was to 
explore the public’s views on 
future applications of science 
and technology that 
emerged from two Horizon 
Scans which involved 
scientists and experts 
thinking about future science 
and technology. 
 
 
No equivalent expert report  
 
 
No equivalent policy 
document 
 
* highlights those dialogues not funded through the ScienceWise programme 
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Appendix	  2:	  List	  of	  significant	  words	  for	  each	  class	  produced	  
by	  IRAMUTEQ	  analysis	  of	  public	  dialogue	  documents	  
 
Number of texts: 18 
Number of text segments: 5592 
Number of words: 9062 
Number of occurrences: 205499 
Average number of occurrences for each word: 22.677003 
Number of lemmas: 6602 
Number of active words: 6055 
Number of supplementary words: 547 
Number of classes 5 
3999 segments classified of 5592 (71.51%) 
 
Class A1 
15.68% 
Class A2 
25.48% 
 
Class A3 23.38% 
 
Class A4 
17.65% 
 
Class A5 
17.80% 
 
drug 
young 
recreational 
outreach 
user 
person 
belfast 
illicit 
child 
parent 
education 
addiction 
alcohol 
harm 
enhancers 
family 
cognition 
school 
legal 
crime 
heroin 
workshop 
teacher 
application 
area 
treatment 
biology 
potential 
science 
synthetic 
disease 
fund 
nanotechnology 
therapy 
field 
private 
medical 
investment 
patient 
stem 
device 
clinical 
female 
significant 
control 
council 
climate 
geoengineering 
change 
public 
 event 
mitigation 
dialogue 
decision 
talk 
member 
activity 
scientist 
report 
 information 
engagement 
expert 
scientific 
policymakers 
trust 
recommendation 
policy 
explain 
panel 
industrial 
biotechnology 
gm 
food 
crop 
environment 
product 
consumer 
release 
fuel 
biofuels 
natural 
bacterium 
land 
eat 
stage 
impact 
gmos 
production 
enzyme 
 concern 
chemical 
 process 
animal 
 human 
material 
embryo 
research 
create 
hybrid 
egg 
agree 
welfare 
respondent 
cytoplasmic 
cell 
disagree 
creation 
 man 
survey 
figure 
tissue 
 compare 
 percent 
acceptable 
 statement 
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exeter 
service 
bb2 
addict 
cannabis 
class 
vulnerable 
cocaine 
nicotine 
age 
liverpool 
glasgow 
addictive 
classification 
peer 
project 
criminal 
prison 
vulnerability 
relay 
feel 
smoke 
substance 
adhd 
commit 
kid 
line 
drink 
punishment 
approach 
argue 
health 
prescription 
old 
effective 
behaviour 
include 
danger 
inequality 
pressure 
adult 
mental 
healthy 
student 
stigma 
problem 
cell 
development 
innovation 
healthcare 
male 
vision 
sector 
 culture 
commercial 
governance 
 highlight 
profit 
 advance 
 stakeholder 
instance 
 regulator 
govern 
progress 
cancer 
hope 
risk 
 think 
 drive 
nanotechnologies 
aspiration 
technology 
regard 
 tension 
 technical 
 develop 
 ethic 
role 
need 
specifically 
 infection 
regulation 
 concern 
 nanoscience 
cure 
goal 
 consent 
regenerative 
 institutional 
diagnostic 
 heart 
 forward 
government 
principle 
opinion 
engage 
ask 
deployment 
issue 
technology 
 session 
 communicate 
warm 
 datum 
discussion 
 science 
robotics 
 comment 
organisation 
 shift 
 independent 
jury 
 maker 
interest 
attitude 
evidence 
credit 
 scale 
 clear 
 consensus 
 political 
 participant 
action 
 reflect 
give 
 reconvene 
gather 
weight 
 speaker 
 urgency 
underlie 
 finding 
question 
 day 
 further 
simply 
reveal 
online 
organism 
 unite 
 oil 
 country 
 unknown 
 kingdom 
 plant 
feedstocks 
fossil 
farmer 
 produce 
 barrier 
 environmental 
producer 
 shelf 
 labelling 
 reassurance 
 aid 
 contamination 
industry 
 price 
 traditional 
manchester 
 bio 
 ecosystem 
 landscape 
 bioplastics 
ingredient 
acceptance 
economic 
 consumption 
desire 
 efficient 
prompt 
 survive 
increase 
supply 
assessment 
safety 
 car 
 sustainable 
 economy 
 green 
 aesthetic 
farm 
saving 
 brain 
 purpose 
 woman 
type 
 ivf 
suffer 
consultation 
donate 
 genetic 
experiment 
 contain 
nationally 
reproductive 
specie 
foetal 
half 
 write 
amount 
 cow 
cord 
 acceptability 
difference 
 organ 
q1 
 mitochondrion 
 somatic 
 possibility 
donation 
 mouse 
purely 
accept 
unacceptable 
hfea 
 clone 
stem 
transfer 
scnt 
 section 
 blood 
response 
 dimension 
 technique 
foetus 
representative 
es 
creature 
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catch 
slide 
restriction 
tell 
work 
chapter 
afford 
skill 
predisposition 
persons 
freedom 
start 
reduction 
identify 
society 
vaccine 
llegal 
quote 
brainbox 
choice 
buy 
attach 
social 
prescribe 
cope 
black 
widely 
someone 
home 
educational 
restrict 
suggestion 
focus 
prevention 
disadvantage 
leave 
primary 
acknowledge 
provide 
suggest 
limit 
availability 
law 
weak 
shop 
emphasise 
bank 
priority 
fate 
 promise 
 mindful 
 nhs 
professional 
 great 
 focus 
 fundamental 
tech 
mrsa 
enable 
london 
 major 
 examine 
 tie 
note 
 broadly 
 safeguard 
 uncertainty 
access 
misuse 
 depth 
 short 
 central 
 therapeutic 
emerge 
business 
 trial 
 shape 
whilst 
 diagnosis 
 empower 
 basic 
body 
 procedure 
 condition 
huge 
 swansea 
prospect 
 donor 
 ahead 
 key 
motivation 
good 
 
 set 
carbon 
 discuss 
inform 
 important 
 naturalness 
plan 
appreciate 
hazard 
 story 
 authority 
meet 
 subject 
global 
extent 
 consideration 
understand 
tackle 
 citizen 
 ethical 
 aim 
openness 
 objective 
 witness 
 world 
importance 
vary 
agenda 
communicator 
consider 
 
 predict 
 benefit 
 micro 
 worry 
familiar 
growth 
surround 
perception 
safe 
long 
appeal 
decrease 
 slope 
slippery 
assess 
nature 
 water 
 offer 
 claim 
laboratory 
deliberate 
 supermarket 
everyday 
 cheap 
 large 
 waste 
 content 
bioremediation 
 buy 
 element 
struggle 
 context 
cost 
 
 study 
 embryonic 
boundary 
 small 
supportive 
monkey 
 total 
oppose 
proportion 
 controversial 
baby 
 destroy 
 investigate 
derive 
 chart 
 ten 
show 
hear 
 adult 
strongly 
true 
 nuclear 
 morally 
viable 
permit 
word 
cite 
 objection 
pain 
appendix 
 unnatural 
 vitro 
deliberative 
 mechanism 
skin 
 alternative 
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stand 
ritalin 
step 
house 
depression 
hour 
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Appendix 3: List of significant words for each class 
produced by IRAMUTEQ analysis of expert 
documents. 
 
Number of texts: 12 
Number of text segments: 14335 
Number of words: 17791 
Number of occurrences: 520547 
Average number of occurrences of each word: 29.259007 
Number of lemmas: 13889 
Number of active words: 12876 
Number of supplementary words: 1013 
Number of classes: 5 
9305 segments classified out of 14335 (64.91%) 
 
Class B1 
(17.16%) 
 
Class B2 
(20.44%) 
 
Class B3 
(24.69%) 
 
Class B4 
(17.61%) 
 
Class B5 (20.1%) 
 
public 
issue 
nanotechnologies 
ethical 
dialogue 
science 
geoengineering 
scientific 
debate 
concern 
research 
governance 
stakeholder 
workshop 
consultation 
society 
technology 
raise 
uncertainty 
 crop 
gm 
plant 
herbicide 
 gene 
 flow 
breed 
 resistance 
 food 
 variety 
 seed 
ht 
 kingdom 
unite 
 wild 
 weed 
conventional 
 pest 
wee 
 drug 
substance 
mental 
misuse 
treatment 
cognition 
person 
 harm 
child 
disorder 
enhancers 
addiction 
participant 
 alcohol 
brain 
young 
cognitive 
psychoactive 
 illness 
 cell 
human 
embryo 
 stem 
animal 
mouse 
tissue 
hybrid 
create 
embryonic 
es 
 line 
cytoplasmic 
egg 
donor 
 somatic 
 nuclear 
 mitochondrial 
oocyte 
chemical 
 nanoparticles 
manufacture 
nanotubes 
device 
industry 
 production 
ib 
particle 
synthetic 
property 
 product 
 surface 
 size 
material 
bio 
market 
 industrial 
 base 
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report 
group 
question 
policy 
work 
attitude 
council 
royal 
social 
interest 
panel 
deliberative 
commission 
review 
societal 
future 
decision 
 international 
 meet 
 member 
 technological 
 inform 
 address 
 discussion 
 highlight 
 scientist 
 acceptability 
 expert 
 academy 
independent 
 forward 
 citizen 
 engagement 
 undertake 
implication 
 knowledge 
feasibility 
ethic 
 government 
chapter 
trust 
engage 
ensure 
bt 
 rape 
biodiversity 
insect 
 oilseed 
impact 
 farm 
relative 
tolerant 
toxin 
pollen 
maize 
trait 
 grow 
field 
resistant 
farmer 
agricultural 
potato 
fee 
 habitat 
 soil 
agriculture 
 feed 
 glyphosate 
 bird 
pollination 
specie 
 tolerance 
 beet 
invasive 
farmland 
commercial 
transgene 
stack 
 fitness 
 population 
wildlife 
 decline 
spray 
predator 
grass 
pesticide 
recreational 
al 
 user 
abuse 
family 
 individual 
 cocaine 
health 
 illicit 
age 
heroin 
cannabis 
school 
receptor 
smoke 
 healthy 
 depression 
 prevalence 
 psychological 
intervention 
death 
behavioural 
 schizophrenia 
social 
nicotine 
 risk 
 illegal 
survey 
 adhd 
 dependence 
 effect 
neurotransmitter 
 opiate 
factor 
box 
 chronic 
 symptom 
dopamine 
behaviour 
 problem 
effective 
dementia 
 feel 
 chim 
creation 
mitochondrion 
derive 
mtdna 
 scnt 
research 
 transplant 
reprogram 
 germ 
genome 
pluripotent 
vitro 
 blastocyst 
ras 
 nucleus 
immune 
 hesc 
ips 
 cord 
blood 
sperm 
transfer 
clone 
stage 
interspecies 
 type 
 derivation 
 therapy 
 chimera 
 bone 
 differentiate 
humanise 
 disease 
 fertilisation 
adult 
marrow 
transplantation 
graft 
disagree 
gamete 
rabbit 
dna 
nanoscale 
 biology 
 process 
large 
chemistry 
 biological 
sector 
price 
exposure 
energy 
computer 
measurement 
 company 
application 
 feedstocks 
engineer 
molecule 
 chip 
cosmetic 
 fuel 
renewable 
waste 
scenario 
carbon 
uk 
 technology 
 optical 
synthesis 
 atom 
 mass 
design 
nanometre 
assembly 
oxide 
fermentation 
manufacturer 
 machine 
workplace 
volume 
nanomaterials 
oil 
 free 
 high 
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area 
database 
objective 
direction 
 role 
 open 
 climate 
 explore 
 confidence 
 wide 
organisation 
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Appendix 4: List of significant words for each class 
produced by IRAMUTEQ analysis of policy 
documents. 
 
Number of texts: 11 
	  Number of text segments: 2589 
Number of words: 5909 
	  Number of occurrences: 94673 
Average number of occurrences for each word: 16.021831 
Number of lemmas: 4470 
Number of active words: 3785 
Number of supplementary words: 685 
Number of classes: 4 
1561 segments classified out of 2589 (60.29%) 
 
	  
	  Class C1 (16.72%) 
 
Class C2 (29.15%) 
 
Class C3 (29.08%) 
 
Class C4 (25.05%) 
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Appendix	  5:	  Question	  Framework	  for	  Semi-­‐structured	  
Interviews	  	  
 
A – types of expertise and networks 
 
1. What was your role in Government? 
 
2. What did it involve? What was your objective? 
 
3. Why do you think you were chosen for that job?  
 
4. What kind of skills do think you brought to the job? (ask specifically about 
science background) 
 
5. How was most of your time spent? 
 
6. How did you decide who to talk to? What sort of people? How did you 
identify them? Do you usually know them already? How do you know they 
are the right people? 
 
7. Did you ever work with people who had conflicting advice? How did you deal 
with conflicting advice?  
 
8. Were there any instances where the public seemed to have a different view 
than the experts? Why do you think that was? How did you resolve it? 
 
9. How did you know what the public were thinking (esp. cf Lords role)? 
 
10. Have there been any instances where the science didn’t help or wasn’t 
sufficient to make recommendations? What did you do? Was there an 
opportunity to revisit the decision? 
 
11. Do you think it is ever possible to split the science from advice – to act on 
the science alone? Would that ever be desirable? 
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B. Public 
 
12. How does the view of society feed into this? How do you know what the 
public thinks? 
 
13. Have you been involved with any public dialogue events? [if not involved – 
as whether he thinks it is important, why, what can public bring?] 
 
14. What kind of insight did you think the public brought to the decisions/policy? 
Would you describe it as ‘expertise’? 
 
15. Did you think it was useful? Why? 
 
16. Did you act upon these views? Do you know of any examples where 
something raised in dialogue affected decisions?  
 
17. Most of the evidence suggests that public dialogue has limited impact on 
policy. Do you have any ideas why that might be? 
 
18. Have you heard of the term RRI? 
 
19. What does it mean to you? 
 
20. Do you think it can become a realistic way of doing research? Why? What 
are challenges? 
  
